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Abstract 
Agency is a foundational and ongoing concern for the field of Rhetoric and Composition. Long 
thought to be a product and possession of human action, rhetorical agency represents the most 
obvious connection between the educational and theoretical work of the field and the civic 
project of liberal arts and humanities education. Existing theories of anthropocentric rhetorical 
agency are insufficient, however, to account for the complex technological work of digitally 
enmeshed networks of humans and nonhumans. To better account for these complex networks, 
this project argues for the introduction of new materialist theories of distributed agency into 
conversations about agency within Rhetoric. Such theories eschew the distinction between 
rhetorical and material agency and instead offer a way of accounting for action and change that 
makes room for rhetorical and material interventions as well as human and nonhuman 
participants. I take as my site the social media aftermath of the 2013 bombing at the finish line of 
the Boston Marathon. The digital networks of human users and nonhuman spaces (especially 
Twitter and Reddit) produced specific tangible effects: #BostonHelp helped stranded runners and 
tourists find food, shelter, and ways of communicating with family and friends, and Reddit’s 
/r/findbostonbombers forum enabled and fueled hurtful speculation about an innocent missing 
student. The strength, impact, and endurance of these networks leads me to three important 
conclusions: rhetorical/material agency must be distributed across a network of human and 
nonhuman participants; human intention no longer functions as an appropriate measure of the 
success or failure of rhetorical/material agency; and responsibility – like agency – must be 
distributed across networks’ human and nonhuman members.   
 1	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Project Overview 
This project focuses on intersections between new materialist approaches to rhetoric, 
especially those rooted in the work of Bruno Latour, and rhetorical approaches to networked 
technologies. In part, the goal of this work is to investigate the potential for these intersections to 
alter our disciplinary conceptions of rhetorical and material agency. In particular, I am interested 
in how new materialism might allow us to reconsider agency in ways that better reflect the 
complex nature of causal relationships. As a way to understand the real-world implications of 
this altered view of agency, I will examine a particular event: the April 15, 2013 bombing at the 
finish line of the Boston Marathon. Specifically, the chapters that follow discuss a number of 
social media responses to the bombing.  This event offers a few particularly powerful examples 
of how “dependent” rhetorical agency – characterized by relationships between humans and 
nonhumans – is enacted and offers us a way of understanding the possibilities opened when we 
(1) conceptualize rhetorical agency as the result of relationships and (2) recognize the integral 
role of nonhuman actors within this network.  
The social media responses to the Boston Marathon bombing provide particularly potent 
examples of this kind of distributed, relational agency, which depends on nonhumans as well as 
humans to produce agentive acts with rhetorical dimensions. Consider, for example, the 
outpouring of grief and offers for material support extended via the hashtag #BostonHelp: 
Tweets about the bombing began mere seconds after the blast. Many of these used the official 
race hashtag (#bostonmarathon) or various personalized tags. But a few hours into the mayhem, 
a new hashtag appeared aimed specifically at providing material support via social media. 
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#BostonHelp represents a rhetorically tinged node in the agentive network, which also contained 
human intentions (long part of traditional anthropocentric notions of rhetorical agency) as well as 
nonhuman technologies, platforms, and material goods.1 The conjunctive articulation of various 
elements – some material, some rhetorical, most a messy amalgamation of the two – produced a 
powerful agency that resulted in displaced runners and tourists finding important material and 
emotional support in the aftermath of the bombings. A number of other moments provide 
glimpses of agency as the product of a kairotic conjuncture of rhetorical, material, and 
rhetorical/material actants: the shift in the purpose of the official hashtag in the hours after the 
bombing and the troubling emergence of false accusations from the subreddit 
/r/findbostonbombers might both be read as examples of emergent, dependent agency. This 
agency is neither merely material nor merely rhetorical but its actants and the ties that bind them 
may be either material or rhetorical or both material and rhetorical. 
This project begins with a disciplinary question: how can we reimagine agency in a way 
that (1) better represents rhetors’ lived experience and (2) opens additional ways of 
understanding the role of technologies in our communicative acts? This disciplinary question, 
however, has broader implications for our perception/definition of agency, especially in terms of 
how we understand the role of the rhetor (no longer as master of the communicative situation but 
as a single participant among many), how we understand the need for conscious intention (does 
each member of that network that occupies the causal field need to understand the implications 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Some readers might respond that as humans were the authors of these tweets, the network is simply a human 
creation. I would suggest, however, that such a position fails to fully account for, at minimum, the opacity and 
impact of communicative mediums. Marshall McLuhan asserts that “the medium is the message,” but he also argues 
that our interactions with nonhuman machines alter “our relations to one another and to ourselves” (19). 
Additionally, I would point to Latour’s discussion in Pandora’s Hope of how gun, hand, and gun-in-hand are all 
distinct entities. The human and the nonhuman join to produce something that was not originally present in either 
the human or the nonhuman; the collective formed by adding human hand and nonhuman gun creates a wholly new  
entity, the gun-in-hand capable of shooting (193).  
 3	  
of her/his/its influence?), and how much we value the nonhuman members of these 
communicative networks.  
We may begin to account, through the new materialist work of Latour, for the influence 
of one set of missing participants: the nonhumans who co-construct such an agentive network. In 
view of Latour’s project – the composition of a good common world – a reimagined, dependent 
view of agency makes room for unaccounted for nonhuman actors, including networked 
technologies. Simultaneously, an examination of such technologies, including social networking 
tools like Twitter, reveals the already dependent nature of agency for those who participate in the 
network that includes such tools. In particular, I will argue that Latourian composing – of worlds 
and words – offers a productive vehicle for reimagining agency as dependent and technology as 
lively and vital. Further, I will argue that if we could better represent the complex set of 
relationships and myriad actors that are necessary to exert agency or affect change, if we began 
to imagine that intention is not the most important factor – or may not be a factor at all – in the 
influence a rhetor has in his/her/its network, we might invite a whole new set of participants and 
questions into rhetorical studies. 
Research Questions 
How does understanding agency as relational and dependent alter the ways in which we 
described and deploy that agency? How does conceptualizing technology a lively hybrid reflect a 
dependent definition of rhetorical and material agency? 
Site Overview 
Every year, on the third Monday of April, the city of Boston shuts down. Banks and 
businesses close and downtown is marked off by barricades and police officers. It’s Patriots Day 
in Boston. Inaugurated as a way to commemorate the American Revolution Battles of Lexington 
and Concord, the holiday features reenactments and parades, celebrations and sports: the Boston 
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Red Sox have played a home game on Patriots ’ Day every year since 1959, with a few notable 
exceptions for inclement weather. The holiday is also home to the Boston Marathon. 
The Boston Marathon, managed by the Boston Athletic Association since its inception in 
1897, is the oldest annual marathon in the world (Boston Athletic Association). A premier event 
for serious runners, even qualifying for the Marathon is a huge accomplishment. The course 
follows a grueling twenty six plus miles through winding, hilly terrain, which culminates as the 
course reaches Boston College’s “Heartbreak Hill.” The final five miles of the marathon take 
runners back into the city, winding through Brighton and Brookline before runners make their 
way back into the city proper. And it was into this final stretch that tragedy intervened on 
Patriot’s Day 2013. Nearly three hours after Rita Jeptoo, the women’s winner, crossed the finish 
line and long after most of the elite runners had completed the course, two bombs, constructed in 
pressure cookers, filled with BBs and nails, and stashed about 200 feet apart and about 300 yards 
from the finish line, exploded, killing three and injuring more than 200 runners, spectators, and 
emergency personnel.   
Watching the raw footage of the scene recalls any number of apocalyptic disaster movies. 
Photos and video taken at the exact moment of the blast show twin flashes of fire followed by 
billowing smoke, then screams and terrified, soot covered people running. A few seconds after 
the blasts, police officers converge on the scene, some with guns drawn searching for a hint of 
the perpetrator, some, with a look of disbelief and terror, tend to victims. Within minutes, all 
trace of non-emergency personnel has been evacuated from the immediate scene. Very soon, all 
that fills the frame are flashing lights and strewn paper and plaster.  
In addition to the personal video and photographs that captured the explosions and their 
aftermath, the chaotic scene was captured and broadcast in real time by the Marathon’s finish 
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line camera, set up by the local CBS affiliate to allow family members and loved ones to 
remotely witness runners’ triumphs. This footage would come to figure heavily in the official 
law enforcement hunt for the perpetrators as well as social media sites’ attempts to identify the 
bomber, including those by Reddit’s now infamous /r/findbostonbombers group. 
Social Media Responses 
There are any number of fascinating avenues of rhetorical exploration opened by this 
tragedy, but perhaps the most surprising is the large role that social media played – for good and 
for ill – in the aftermath of the bombing. In particular, I’d like to examine two spaces that had a 
disproportionately large impact in the aftermath. Twitter, especially the hashtags #BostonHelp 
and the repurposed #BostonMarathon, which was initially established by race organizers to 
promote the event and its sponsors but took on a very different role in the aftermath of the 
bombing. In the same way that, in the hours and days following the bombing, Twitter became an 
space for Bostonians and Twitter users across the country to share help and grief, Reddit, 
specifically the subreddit “r/findbostonbomber” played a huge – and hugely embarrassing role – 
in the hunt for the bombing suspect. 
Tragedy and Twitter 
Originally inaugurated on Twitter as a way to encourage group identification by Chris 
Messina in August of 2007 and institutionalized by Twitter two years later when hashtags began 
to automatically generate embedded hyperlinks, hashtags have become among the most common 
social media marketing tools. Like many events before it, the 2013 Boston Marathon had its own 
hashtag: #BostonMarathon. In the days and weeks preceding the race, the official hashtag was 
largely used to promote race related activities and media coverage of the event. On race day, 
many runners and their friends and family used #BostonMarathon to communicate about race 
times and offer congratulations. At 2:50 pm on race day, however, the hashtag suddenly 
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morphed from personal and promotional to newsworthy. Just seconds after of the first bombing-
related tweet (which was sent by @KristenSurman within seconds of the first blast and read 
“Holy Shit! Explosion!”), @MrWillRitter (press secretary to then senate candidate Gabriel 
Gomez) used the official race hashtag to share more specific information about the situation: 
“Two huge explosions just went off at #BostonMarathon finish. Cops running.” Mr. Ritter’s 
tweet was the first in what became an avalanche of information (and misinformation) about the 
bombings: false reports of a fourth casualty and seemingly well-intentioned misinformation 
about potential suspects coexists alongside official information from the Boston Police, the 
White House, and other sanctioned sources of information. As it turns out, #BostonMarathon has 
been the most enduring of the hashtags used in the aftermath of the bombing. More than two 
years after the bombing, news stories concerning the aftermath still feature the official race 
hashtag. 
As the tragedy unfolded, however, some Twitter users found the official hashtag unsuited 
for their specific communicative needs. Strikingly, many of the alternative hashtags associated 
with the bombing grew out of cathartic shows of emotional and material support for the city. One 
such hashtag is #BostonHelp. About an hour into the tragedy, as it became clearer to Boston 
residents and tourists in the city to celebrate the Marathon and Patriot’s Day that no one would 
be allowed back into hotels near the bombing site, #BostonHelp emerged as a way to offer 
material goods: food, shelter, and charging stations for electronics. One Twitter user in 
particular, @mollfrey, seems largely responsible for this shift. In response to Twitter users 
looking for ways to help the displaced and a @BostonTweet (an account with close to 100,000 
followers that focuses on news and events in Boston) missive about Google’s “People Finder” 
initiative, @mollfrey suggests #BostonHelp: “Can a hashtag -- maybe #bostonhelp -- be 
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promoted for offers of aid and housing for those displaced/stranded?” Soon enough, this tag 
became the accepted way to offer material support to displaced people. Indeed, @mollfrey can 
be seen reinforcing the purpose and use of this tag by tweeting directly to those involved in the 
official response with information about the hashtag: “@Boston_Police2 Lots of offers of help on 
#bostonhelp Are people allowed back to hotels downtown tonight or are many seeking shelter?”; 
“@bostonmarathon Is anyone in your org coordinating response and linking runners to offers 
surfacing on #bostonhelp?”  
Crowdsourcing Blame and Misidentification 
  Within hours of the bombings, while some social media users offered help to displaced 
runners and tourists, other users began to sift through the scores of pictures, videos, and firsthand 
accounts of the bombings that appeared on Twitter, Facebook, 4Chan, Reddit, and other online 
meeting spaces; of particular interest to these digital communities was the finish line feed, which 
provided real time footage of the lead up to and aftermath of the explosions, and the police 
scanner, which provided insight into law enforcement responses to the tragedy.  
On Wednesday, April 19, one of these forums began to garner national attention. 
Alongside dedicated forums on 4Chan and numerous blogs, the subreddit /r/findbostonbombers 
fueled speculation about the identity and whereabouts of bombing suspects. From “blue robe 
guy,” a bearded man carrying a black backpack who appeared in numerous photographs snapped 
in the hours before the bombs detonated, to an unlucky eBay user who purchased two pressure 
cookers not long before the bombing, Reddit users speculated wildly about the identity of the 
bombers based on little actual evidence. Not long after Reddit user oops777 initiated the 
/r/findbostonbombers forum, speculation landed squarely on Sunil Tripathi, a 22-year-old Brown 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This is no longer the official Twitter feed for the Boston Police Department. On April 15-19, 2013, however, this 
Twitter account sent a number of updates, which are now linked from the official Boston Police Department feed 
(@bostonpolice). All tweets from @Boston_Police have now been deleted, but the vast majority of these tweets 
appear – word for word – in the newer @bostonpolice’s feed. 
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University student who had been missing since March 16, 2013. What happened to Tripathi (and 
to other innocent men, including Mike Mulugeta) is called in internet parlance “doxxing,” 
obtaining and posting personal information about someone already under intense public scrutiny. 
The wild speculation about Tripathi and the release of his family’s address, telephone number, 
and other personal information led to nearly twenty four hours of harassment before the FBI 
publically released the names of the actual suspects. Though tragic, the outpouring of 
harassment, like the outpouring of support offered through #BostonHelp, offers important insight 
into the role that networks – not just individuals – play in the performance of agentive and 
meaningful acts. 
Technical Tools and Material Impacts 
Among the most important tools in this process of misidentification was the raw feed 
from the Boston Marathon finish line camera, which was streaming live online before, during, 
and immediately after the bombs went off. Installed by Boston CBS affiliate WBZ, the finish 
line camera was meant to provide real time footage to those who couldn’t attend the race in 
person. The 2013 feed shows throngs of photographers gather and disperse as first the women’s 
winner and then the men’s winner cross the finish line. It shows race officials and triumphant 
runners, jubilant crowds and expectant spectators. At 2:50 pm on race day, however, it also 
shows a brilliant flash of light, raining debris, and dismayed emergency officials. Just minutes 
after the bombing, the formerly chaotic scene goes eerily still. Footage from the WBZ camera 
went on to be featured prominently in local, national, and international coverage of the event as 
well as the subsequent searches, by law enforcement and by amateur online sleuths, for the 
perpetrators. Other surveillance videos also come to play an important role for law enforcement 
and prosecutors. As I note in Chapter Two, video from cameras installed by the Port Authority 
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and local businesses provide the now iconic photographs of the Tsarnaev brothers among the 
Marathon spectators in the moments before the bombing.  
A Note on Methodology 
 By in large, this work will be what Patricia Sullivan and James Porter in their 1997 
treatise on postmodern research methods, Opening Spaces, call an interpretative work: using 
relevant scholarship and theory, I will make a number of arguments regarding the ways in which 
agency is produced. This work will also seek to utilize Sullivan and Porter’s notion of 
postmodern mapping, that is creating tentative maps of situations that may help us see evolving 
connections between actors. As Sullivan and Porter note in “Postmodern Mapping and 
Methodological Interfaces,” the value of mapping as a research tool and a methodology is that  
“by mapping you can get a better handle on a messy picture” (90).  
Similarly, I will use maps as a way to trace, in the Latourian sense of the word, 
connections between actors by following the traces – in this case tweets, Reddit posts, and other 
discursive/technological artifacts. For my purposes, Latour’s use of “trace” has two important 
(and related meanings). “Trace” as a verb is a methodology, a way of following an actor or 
actors as they connect to other actors. “Trace” as a noun is an artifact, the thing an actor leaves 
behind that allows us to follow it/him/her. In Reassembling the Social, Latour frames his work 
“as the tracing of associations” (5). Following Latour, then, this work represents an effort to trace 
(v.) by following the traces (n.) that the work of connecting leaves behind. In this way, I hope to 
produce maps that provide some insight into the dependent networks through which agency is 
produced in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombings.  
Some of this tracing and mapping will be accomplished through narrative means: by 
retelling a particular sequence of events related to social media response to the bombings, I hope 
to provide insight into the networks that produced particular agentive acts and highlight 
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connections between actors in the network. In addition to these narrative retellings, in Chapters 
Three and Four, I code tweets based on a set of categories that emerged from initial examinations 
of the collected Tweets. This content analysis is based in Grounded Theory (Glaser; Haas & 
Witte; Clark) and allows me to discover and revise categories as I review the tweets with the 
hashtags #BostonHelp and #BostonMarathon. 
Literature Review 
 All of these arguments, maps, and codes are informed by a few foundational assumptions 
about agency and subjectivity. Specifically, my arguments in the chapters that follow rely on 
distributed notions of agency and subjectivity. Those assumptions are explored in the literature 
review that follows, which attempts to lay bare the theoretical foundations that inform my 
thinking about agency, subjectivity, and networks. 
Autonomous Agency 
Individual, autonomous agency might be traced alongside the history of Western rhetoric. 
From the time of the Greek codification of Western rhetorical history through the work of 
Kenneth Burke in the 1950s and into the current work of the field of Rhetoric and Composition, 
rhetorical agency has been theorized almost exclusively for autonomous human agents. In Book 
1, part 2 of his Rhetoric, Aristotle lays out three kinds of persuasion available to the rhetor: “The 
first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience 
into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of 
the speech itself.” Of these three, the rhetor is wholly responsible for the first two and is the 
craftsman of the final one. Following this ancient Greek tradition, the Roman philosopher 
Quintilian famously defined rhetoric as a good man speaking well (2.15.34). The definitions of 
rhetoric offered by Aristotle and Quintilian firmly ensconce the autonomous human (in this case 
male) agent at the center of rhetorical acts as the final cause of persuasion. This emphasis on the 
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central human speaker as the sole possessor of agency is not, however, exclusive to historical 
rhetorics; this vision of agency continues to appear in scholarly and professional documents 
across the field of rhetoric and composition (See Gorzelsky and NCTE resolution on Teacher 
Expertise and position statement on Teacher Evaluation, as examples.)  
 Others, however, have complicated this humanist, individualistic rhetorical traditional 
while continuing to emphasize the role of the human rhetor (Burke; Cooper; Foss). Burke’s 
dramatic pentad, for example, offers a variation on this humanistic tradition. His focus on ratios 
as opposed to direct human causality retains the central human agent but allows for the influence 
of other elements, as “the ratios are principles of determination” (15). The direct relationship 
between actor and action articulated by Burke, however, relies on a conscious, autonomous 
human agent. Burke clearly demonstrates the interdependence of the elements of the pentad, but 
his description of agent, and later his discussion of agency itself, reinforces a reliance upon 
human causality: “the agent is an author of his acts, which are descended from him, being good 
progeny if he is good, or bad progeny if he is bad, wise progeny if he is wise, silly progeny if he 
is silly” (Burke 16). Burke reinforces the dependence of the various elements of the pentad in his 
1978 article “Questions and Answers about the Pentad.” In that article, Burke reminds his reader 
that, in his discussion of the pentad, the “stress is less upon the terms themselves than upon what 
I would call the ‘ratios’ among the terms,” that is their relationships to one another (332). My 
point here, then, is not that Burke offers us a vision of agency that relies solely on autonomous 
human action; rather, even within his vision of the “ratios,” the human agent still remains at the 
center of the causal field. 
 More recently, however, posthumanism, new materialism, and actor network theory have 
opened new possibilities for rhetorical agency that further decenter the human subject and 
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introduces nonhuman actors into the causal field (Hallenbeck; Koerber,; Latour 1999; Mara & 
Hawk). Rickert has embraced the metaphor of ambience and chora to account for the factors 
unaccounted for in many discussions of the rhetorical situation (“In the House of Doing”; 
Ambient Rhetoric); similarly, Marilyn Cooper, in her 2011 “Agency as Emergent and Enacted,” 
has offered “surround” as a way of accounting for the influence of nonhumans on human action. 
I will argue, however, that nonhumans should be seen as even more integral to agentive action 
than Cooper’s work implies. 
Agency and New Materialism 
New materialist conceptions of the relationship between nonhumans and humans offer 
such an integral position to nonhumans. By foregrounding the agentive potential of nonhuman 
actants, new materialism suggests that agency is possible only via networks of humans and non-
humans (Bennett 2010; Bogost; Coole & Frost; Cooper; Greene; Harman; Herndl & Licona; 
Latour 1999; Miller; Winsor). In fact, following the new materialist and posthumanist emphasis 
on nonhumans’ role in the causal field, I will argue that agency does not belong to any single 
actor, whether human or nonhuman; rather, agency is a product of the relationship between 
actors and exists only at their point of contact. These points of contact – and one of the things 
that holds these relationships together – are rhetorical acts.  
Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, editors of the collection New Materialisms: Ontology, 
Agency, and Politics, argue that one of the major projects of new materialism is attributing 
“emergent, generative powers (or agentic capacities) even within inorganic matter” (9). These 
theories also “generally eschew the distinction between organic and inorganic, or animate and 
inanimate, at the ontological level” (Coole & Frost 9). In short, new materialism “conceives of 
matter itself as lively or as exhibiting agency” (Coole & Frost 7). Or as Jane Bennett puts it, “a 
materiality that is itself vibrant or active” (“A Vitalist Stopover…,” 49). This lively matter 
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associates with human actors to create agentive networks. These relationships are not fixed, 
however; rather the configuration of the network changes based on the motives for and kinds of 
action needed in a particular situation, so the result is “objects forming and emerging within 
relational fields, bodies composing their natural environment in ways that are corporeally 
meaningful for them, and subjectivities being constituted as open series of capacities or potencies 
that emerge hazardously and ambiguously within a multitude of organic and social processes” 
(Coole & Frost 10). The flexible and fluctuating nature of the networks imagined by the new 
materialists suggests an expanded notion of agency and cause; no longer does the human actor 
stand alone as the agent of change; s/he is now joined in the position by a multitude of other 
actors. Further, s/he is shaped by these non-human actors as much as s/he shapes them, and it is 
in his/her relationships with these other actants (human and non-human) that agency is produced.  
Likewise, Bruno Latour suggests, in Pandora’s Hope, On the Modern Cult of the Factish 
Gods and elsewhere, that the product of this kind of formative relationship is more than the sum 
of its parts. In Pandora’s Hope, Latour uses the example of Pasteur’s experiments on 
fermentation to make this point: “This list of inputs [for subsequent experiments] does not have 
to be completed by drawing upon any stock of resources, since the stock of resources drawn 
upon before the experimental event is not the same as the one drawn upon after it” (126, 
emphasis in the original). As Rickert does with agency, Latour claims here that an interaction, in 
this case an experiment, produces something that cannot be accounted for by the initial actants 
that participated in said experiment. Instead, the combination of actants produces something 
wholly new. Latour makes a similar suggestion in On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods. 
Throughout the first chapter of this treatise on belief, Latour outlines the strange properties of the 
“factish,” a neologism that reflects properties of both a fact and fetish. And when these factishes 
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interact with other actors, Latour suggests the action produced by the encounter is not a result of 
either of the original actors but a unique product of their interaction: “These two idioms, that of 
liberty and that of alienation, blinds us to the strange positioning of factishes capable of making 
one do things that no one, neither they nor you can control” (56). The relationship between 
factishes and ourselves yields action not in the control of either actor; the ability to act or create 
change, what we understand as agency, is not, then, the product of either the human or the 
factish/object but a product of the relationship between the two (or more, depending on the size 
of the network).  
Technology and a Relational Definition of Agency 
Latour’s discussion of factishes and relational yields reflects arguments about rhetorical 
agency as a kind of position or product of relationships rather than a possession of a single 
actor/rhetor (Herndl & Licona 2007; Geisler 2004; Miller 2007). Consider, for example, Carolyn 
Miller’s argument about automation and the need for a relational definition of agency in “What 
Can Automation Tell Us about Agency?” In this article, Miller argues that agency is best 
understood as performative, a kind of “kinetic energy…generated through a process of mutual 
attribution between rhetor and audience” (137). Miller thus concludes that “agency is…a 
property of the rhetorical event, not of agents” (137). Miller’s emphasis here is on the 
performative nature of rhetorical agency and the interaction of human subjects, but her notion of 
dispersed/momentary agency reflects the new materialists’ emphasis on the power of lively, 
agentive technology.3  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Miller’s discussion of automation recalls, in part, Heidegger’s discussion of causality in the “Question Concerning 
Technology.” Too often, Heidegger argues, we consider only human causality and ignore the material, social, and 
idealistic/formulaic dimensions of creation. Similarly, I will argue, our current understandings of how agency is 
produced give too little credence to the impact of nonhuman actants in the  rhetorically and materially constructed 
networks that produce agancy. Viewing agency as dependent and relational (as I will argue in the next chapter) 
allows us to better understand the fuller picture of causes that conspire to produce effects.  
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Latour’s work on hybrids (see for example his 2011 essay “Love Your Monsters”) offers 
a new way of understanding the relationship among technology, writing, and agency. No longer 
merely a tool or a new writing space, technological hybrids play an integral in the creation of a 
common world, as more than tools, as co-inhabitants of the new world (Bennett, 2010; Haraway; 
Latour, 2011). In view of this re-imagined vision of technology, I would argue that sites like 
Twitter become an important site for the performance of this new agency and a space for new 
kinds of writing acts, including those proposed by Rickert in Acts of Enjoyment. In particular, 
social media spaces, enabled by networked technologies, are important to this discussion of the 
intersections between new materialism and agency for two reasons: first, social media 
technologies/spaces like Twitter act as an existing example of the kind of relational, dependent 
agency argued above. Simultaneously, these spaces open room for new kinds of writing acts. 
If new electronic spaces and divided, posthuman notions of subjectivity require a new 
diffuse, dependent notion of agency, it follows that new acts are opened by this new sense of 
agency. These new acts reveal our dependence on human others, yes, but these new acts/this new 
agency also points to a new space, a compositional space characterized by ephemera, 
connectivity, responsivity, and spontaneity. Are these not also the values/characteristics of the 
new agency? Are these also not the values/characteristics of new media/social media spaces, 
Twitter in particular? In particular, we may find that agency as defined by Latour, bound up as it 
is in the act of creating the network or the common world, requires spaces that both reflect the 
character of the network and the notion of networked agency, and allow human and nonhuman 
actors to engage in writing acts that mirror the values of networked agency. The Boston 
Marathon attacks, then, especially the social media responses and the altered purpose of the 
finish line camera that captured joyous images of triumph and the terror of the bombing’s 
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aftermath, acts as a site for recognizing and enacting this altered understanding of rhetorical 
agency, the role of intention, and the role and value of nonhuman in this actors within the 
dependent relationships that characterize the agentive field.  
Conclusion, Or What Do I Mean By Agency? 
This work relies heavily on a broad definition of agency as the ability to have an effect on 
other bodies. Because of my reliance on the posthumanist work of Latour, Coole, Frost, and 
others, I see material agency, which attends to the work of nonhumans, as both necessary to and 
contributing to any production of agency. For the purposes of this work, then, I seek to conflate 
rhetorical and material agency; or, more precisely, I wish not to treat rhetorical agency as a 
special class of agency. This conflation does not negate the powerful role of rhetorical acts; 
indeed, I will argue that conflating material and rhetorical agency allows me to productively 
examine agentive networks as both material and semiotic (following Donna Haraway). Rhetoric, 
then, becomes part of material forces in the same way that, following Rickert’s work in Ambient 
Rhetoric and Nathaniel River’s “Rhetorical Theory/Bruno Latour,” material forces exert their 
influence over rhetoric.    
Chapter Breakdown 
Chapter Two: Nonhumans, Vitality, and Networked Agency 
 Following the present chapter’s introduction to new materialism, Chapter Two explores the view 
of nonhumans that underpins that work. Using the work of Latour and Jane Bennett, Chapter Two offers a 
methodological foundation for this project and, in doing so, offers a view of nonhumans as lively 
co-participants in the construction of networks that produce rhetorical/material agency.  Tracing 
as a methodology requires patient attention to the growth and movement of the networks under 
investigation and highlights the participation of nonhumans. These nonhuman objects, ideas, and 
technologies are not, however, the inert matter of existing theories of rhetorical agency. They 
are, instead vital, lively participants who restrict, enable, constrain, and invent with the human 
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members of the collective. I subsequently examine how this works has already been taken up in 
Rhetoric and Composition (Cooper; Miller), and more specifically in digital rhetoric (Hawk; 
Reid; Rivers). I end this discussion by briefly examining the circulation of a lively nonhuman: 
the surveillance video from the Forum restaurant, video that produced the iconic images of the 
suspects moving through the crowd and came to figure heavily in the prosecution’s case against 
the surviving Tsarnaev brother.   
Chapter Three: Relational Agency and the Emergence of #BostonHelp 
Following the present chapter’s  review of literature, with its attention to the fragmenting 
of the postmodern subject and the dispersion of human agency (Bizzell; Davis) and Chapter 
Two’s discussion of how lively, vibrant material actors (Latour; Bennett; Coole and Frost) have 
already made their way into rhetorical theory (Cooper; Miller; Rivers; Reid), Chapter Three will 
argue that agency – both rhetorical and material – is inherently relational and dependent and 
exists only as the product of relationships between humans and nonhumans. I will investigate 
earlier revisions to anthropocentric rhetorical agency within Rhetoric and Composition, 
including work by Carolyn Miller, Adela Licona and Carl Herndl, and Marilyn Cooper, and use 
this work as well as material theories of rhetoric (Latour; Rivers; Hallenbeck) to argue for 
relational conceptions of rhetorical/material agency.  I will use the emergence of the hashtag 
#BostonHelp in the aftermath of the Marathon bombings to illustrate the relational nature of 
efficacious rhetorical acts: following the bombings, as many runners and other tourists were 
barred by law enforcement from retrieving their belongs and returning to their hotels, numerous 
Twitter users began to tweet offers for food and shelter using the aforementioned hashtag. These 
acts of kindness are intentionally agentive acts enabled by a network of technologies (spaces like 
Twitter as well as the internet itself and the hardware necessary to connect), material goods (the 
food and shelter they offer), and the human kindness that underlies the offers. 
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Chapter Four: The Question of Intention: Repurposing #BostonMarathon 
Following Chapter Three’s discussion of relational, dependent rhetorical agency, with its 
emphasis on intentional acts via #BostonHelp, Chapter Four will question the necessity of 
intention in establishing the relative agency of particular communicative acts. In particular, I will 
use the shift of the hashtag #BostonMarathon (from official race hashtag to communicative tool 
to search for missing loved ones, update other users, and share messages of grief and support) to 
argue that the original intention of an actor, whether human or nonhuman, is not necessarily 
relevant to the crafting of agentive acts. The shift from official hashtag/promotional tool to a tool 
for sharing grief and searching for lost loved ones couldn’t have been foreseen by the creator of 
the hashtag. Rather, the intervention of events beyond the control of organizers and runners and 
the presence of nonhumans with their own properties allowed for the rhetorically powerful shift. 
This chapter, then, will argue for a move away from intention as an integral part of establishing 
whether a rhetorical act is agentive or successful (i.e. how closely a rhetorical act comes to 
producing its intended effect) and toward a distributed view of how agency is produced. 
Chapter Five: Networked Responsibility and Reddit’s Hunt for the Bombing Suspects 
Following the discussion of lively nonhuman participants (Chapter Two), relational 
agency (Chapter Three) and the role of intention in rhetorically agentive acts (Chapter Four), 
Chapter Five will use Reddit’s hunt for and eventual mis/identification of the bombing suspects 
to suggest that relational networked agency that includes nonhuman actors can best be seen in 
new, responsive communicative spaces made possible by networked technologies and the 
interactive web that characterizes the turn to web 2.0. Using work from Gregory Ulmer, Latour, 
Miller, and Cooper, I will argue that these spaces (1) typify the kind of relational agency I argue 
for the in first chapter, (2) demonstrate the relevance of nonhuman participation in agentive acts 
(Latour), and (3) illustrate a kind of networked accountability/responsibility. In particular, this 
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chapter will take up the question of ethical responsibility for distributed views of agency: if 
multiple humans and nonhumans are responsible for the eventual misidentification of an 
innocent young man, who is ultimately responsible for the negative consequences of their 
rhetorically agentive acts? Ultimately, I will argue, each member of the network bears some of 
the responsibility, but this distribution of blame does not lessen our societal ability to hold actors 
accountable for such acts. 
Conclusion 
 Taken together, these chapters make three overarching arguments: first, the artificial 
division between material and rhetorical agency is less productive than a unified theory of 
agency; therefore, this work seeks to explore – through the social media responses to the 2013 
Boston Marathon bombings – the ways in which rhetorical and material agency dovetail 
together. Second, agency – broadly defined – is not the purview of any single actor, whether 
human or nonhuman; rather, agency exists at the points of contact of multiple actors with a 
momentarily shared purpose. This contact between actors with a shared purpose is constructed, 
at least in part, through rhetorical means. Finally, technological networks and actors are 
fundamental to understanding practices that produce agency.  
By examining the thousands of tweets sent in the hours and days following the bombings 
at the Boston Marathon, I hope to trace agentive networks, real world examples of the material-
semiotic actor/hybrid described in the new materialist work of Latour, Donna Haraway, and their 
ilk. In doing so, I offer a revised sense of agency that points rhetoricians, technicians, and 
everyday users to the material nature of rhetorical acts and the rhetorical forces that shape matter.  
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Chapter Two: Nonhumans, Vitality, and Networked Agency 
 Chapter One lays out the specific case under consideration here as well as the theoretical 
rationale for revising agency to better account for the ways in which digital technologies and 
other material actors impact our rhetorical practices. The goal of this chapter, then, is to lay out 
the methodological foundation for this project and, in doing so, to account for a key assumption 
that underpins both the methodology and theory that invigorate this discussion, namely that 
nonhumans – particularly technological nonhumans – are not the passive objects many of our 
theories of agency imagine them to be. On the contrary, nonhumans are vibrant, vital, productive 
members of agentive networks. 
Tracing as a Methodology 
For my purposes, tracing as a methodology emerges from the work of Bruno Latour. 
More specifically, in Reassembling the Social, Latour expends a great deal of effort (and a great 
number of words) arguing that tracing relations, assemblages, and the movement of particular 
actors provides researchers with insight into how humans and nonhumans come together to form 
agentive networks. In fact, in the introduction to that text, Latour notes that his decades-long 
project is not to redefine sociology as “the ‘science of the social’, but as the tracing of 
associations” between human and nonhuman actors (5). This redefinition of sociology – and the 
broader, interdisciplinary work of solving social, environmental, legal, and other collective 
problems – requires us to acknowledge the vital participation of nonhumans. Latour works 
toward this more inclusive sociological practice by tracing (v.) the traces (n.) that actors leave 
behind as they join and leave networks (Reassembling the Social, 23). Actor-Network Theory, 
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Latour notes, is laborious and slow because “ANT prefers to travel slowly, on small roads, on 
foot, and by paying the full cost of any displacement out of its own pocket” (Reassembling the 
Social, 23). ANT, Latour acknowledges, is a painstaking process that requires adherents to 
follow nonhuman and human participants from network to network and trial to trial. In ANT, 
answers, actors, and agency emerge when we “trace connections” rather than when we work to 
stabilize and solve seemingly incommensurable problems by fiat. In fact, it is the connections 
among actors that make them durable enough to grapple with messy, complex problems: “ANT 
claims that it is possible to trace more sturdy relations and discover more revealing patterns by 
finding a way to register the links between unstable and shifting frames of reference” and by 
tracing members of networks as they do the meticulous labor of making and severing 
connections (Reassembling the Social, 24). 
  Because of the detailed work involved in tracing actors as they enroll in and disconnect 
from various networks, tracing as a method of investigation requires patience, for we must 
“follow the actors’ own ways and begin our travels by the traces left behind by their activity of 
forming and dismantling groups” (Reassembling the Social, 29). Latour’s methodology works 
not by recognizing already established networks but rather by highlighting the ways that 
networks form and change in response to stimuli or interventions from actors and problems 
outside the network. As Latour argues in “On Actor-Network Theory: A Few Clarifications Plus 
More than a Few Complications,” Actor-Network Theory’s emphasis on following actors is “not 
about traced networks but about a network tracing activity…there is not a net and an actor laying 
down the net, but there is an actor whose definition of the world outlines, traces, delineate, limn, 
describe, shadow forth, inscroll, file, list, record, mark, or tag a trajectory that is called a 
network” (14). For Latour, the movements of nonhuman participants allow us to observe the 
 22	  
shape, size, and composition of the worlds they inhabit; following their movements allows us to 
give shape to the networks in which they operate. This act of tracing also reveals the silent work 
of nonhuman actors as they build relationships with other human and nonhuman members of the 
networks they join or leave. 
 This approach – following the provisional relationships that actors create as they enroll 
and are unenrolled in groups that craft networks – is particularly valuable when we examine 
hybrid problems. Hybrid problems – what Latour calls “matters of concern” – offer particular 
challenges to researchers because they are both materially and rhetorically/discursively 
constructed imbroglios. It is these heterogeneous networks of humans and nonhumans that 
require quiet, patient attention to human and nonhuman activity: “Speech acts always look 
comparable, compatible, contiguous, and continuous with other speech acts; writing with 
writing; interaction with interaction; but objects appear associable with one another and with 
social ties only momentarily” (Latour, RS 80). Objects, however, are not silent nor are they 
stationary. Tracing allows us to recognize and record these momentary connections in order to 
better understand the relationships that produce change. Tracing makes the vitality of nonhuman 
actors both visible and articulate.  
Further, ANT’s emphasis on relationships reveals a different way of understanding 
research sites and questions, as tracing reveals that “sites no longer differ in shape or size, but in 
the direction of the movements to and fro as well as in the nature, as we shall see, of what is 
being transported: information, traces, goods, 204 Second Move plans, formats, templates, 
linkages, and so on” (Latour, Reassembling the Social, 204-5). For Latour, then, it is the 
nonhuman participants – the information, the goods, the plans – that give definition and 
distinction to the networks they inhabit. As Blok and Jensen argue in their discussion of Latour’s 
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move from matters of fact to matters of concern, this new social approach to sociology insists 
that research becomes about “following the actors,” wherein researchers “trace the many 
connecting threads” – which are often networks in and of themselves – “that create, and set the 
scene for, any particular interaction and any particular actor.” Or, as Nathaniel Rivers argues, “to 
practice ANT is to trace the actors and to see the social as an emergent effect of the labors of 
many untold actors” (Rivers, “Tracing…”). The goal of tracing, of following the heretofore silent 
and seemingly stationary nonhuman members of agentive networks, then, is to enumerate and 
give voice to those who haven’t yet been able to speak for themselves – at least not in ways 
easily recognized by other methods of discovery. 
 This new method does not reveal a new set of circumstances, however. Rather, ANT 
provides a way of better recognizing, understanding, and giving voice to actors who have long 
been part of the production of rhetorical/material agency. Because we have assumed more direct 
cause and effect and because we have long privileged the rational acting human, we have missed 
these vital but slow moving and unspeaking participants. And so long as they are invisible, we 
cannot fully account for how we might actual create change in the world:  
An invisible agency that makes no difference, produces no transformation, leaves no 
trace, and enters no account is not an agency. Period. Either it does something or it does 
not. If you mention an agency, you have to provide the account of its action, and to do so 
you need to make more or less explicit which trials have produced which observable 
traces—which does not mean, of course, that you have to speak about it, speech being 
only one of the many behaviors able to generate an account and far from the most 
frequent (Latour, Reassembling the Social, 53). 
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Tracing makes visible the heretofore invisible activity of networks of actors, especially those 
actors who cannot speak for themselves in traditional ways. For nonhuman actors, this kind of 
tracing is revelatory, for without deliberate attention to their movements and contributions, 
Latour argues, the role of non-speaking, nonhuman members of agentive networks are too often 
left out; they remain unaccounted for, invisible, and in terms of their participation in 
rhetorical/material agency, imaginary. Tracing, then, leads to representation and recognition of 
members who, I will argue in each of the subsequent chapters of this project, often have a 
significant impact on the shape and purpose of any given network.  
Things Matter in Philosophy and Sociology 
Actor-Network Theory’s emphasis on tracing as a methodological tool reinforces an 
important assumption that underlies this project: things – that is nonhuman actors – matter. First, 
it’s important to note that the nonhuman in Latour’s account is not a stationary, passive object 
but a “circulating entity” (Latour, Reassembling the Social, 132). This sense of vibrancy and 
movement coincides with Jane Bennett’s vibrant materiality, which emphasizes “the capacity of 
things – edibles, commodities, storms, metals – not only to impede or block the will and designs 
of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of 
their own” (Bennett, Vibrant Matter, viii). The nonhumans Bennett enumerates here are all 
solidly material, but her emphasis on the productive capacity of nonhuman participants could just 
as easily be attributed to technological nonhumans, who sometimes lack the same weighty 
material presence. For Bennett, these participants don’t simply act as constraining forces – as 
they do for rhetorical theorists like Bitzer and Burke – but have creative potential as well. Rather 
than a minor revision to our theories of agency production, Bennett’s goal is to fundamentally 
alter the way we understand “the material agency or effectivity of nonhuman or not-quite human 
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things” (Bennett, Vibrant Matter, ix). Beyond recognizing a vibrancy that might better account 
for how change actually happens in the world, Bennett emphasizes another important reason to 
recognize the vitality of material actors: 
The image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter feeds human hubris and our 
earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption. It does so by preventing us from 
detecting (seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling) a fuller range of the nonhuman 
powers circulating around and within human bodies. These material powers, which can 
aid or destroy, enrich or disable, ennoble or degrade us, in any case call for our 
attentiveness, or even ‘respect’ (Vibrant Matter, ix). 
For Bennett, as for Latour, recognizing the contributions of nonhuman actors may allow us to 
better address a pressing, potentially fatal issue: climate change. For Bennett, in order to address 
messy, materially-situated matters of concern, we must move away from human exceptionalism 
and toward a more egalitarian representation of how human and nonhuman actors participate in 
networks that create change. Instead of an anthropocentric vision of agency, Bennett insists that 
we might combat human hubris and narcissism by embracing an anthropomorphic understanding 
of how nonhuman actors interact with the world: “We need to cultivate a bit of 
anthropomorphism – the idea that human agency has some echoes in nonhuman nature – to 
counter the narcissism of humans in charge of the world” (xvi). This shift has implications, 
according to new materialist theorists Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, for researchers/theorists 
as they examine the connections between human and nonhuman actors because “humans, 
including theorists themselves, [must] be recognized as thoroughly immersed within materiality's 
productive contingencies” (7). The contingencies here are lively and productive potentialities 
present in nonhuman actors. For these theorists, it is not just human actors that animate and 
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invigorate the networks in which they participate; rather, nonhuman actors also have the 
potential to propel and/or change a network.  
New Materialism in Rhetoric  
 The work of the new materialists under consideration in the previous section has already 
begun to make its way into Rhetoric and Composition. In particular, Latour and Bennett’s 
theories of networks have been taken up by two prominent scholars in the field: Carolyn Miller 
and Marilyn Cooper. For her part, Miller uses Latour’s and Bennett’s work to consider how 
machines – automated scoring machines, for her purposes – might act on and with human 
teachers. Her investigation of how technologies undercut traditional models of rhetorical agency 
leads her to argue that human agency is a necessary fiction and that rather than being concerned 
with how agency is produced, we would be better off considering how agency is attributed and 
how that attribution serves wider political and social goals. 
 To underscore this shift from agency as a possession to agency as a series of attributions, 
Miller argues that agency is perhaps a fiction, but an important one, a product of a reciprocal 
energy exchange between rhetor and audience. Agency, she asserts, is bound up in space, time, 
and circumstance; it is, above all else, a performance, an exchange between rhetor and audience. 
Too often, “our talk about agency has tended to essentialize the temporal, condensing into a 
property or possession of the hypostatized agent what more productively should remain 
temporalized in the act or performance” (147). Instead, Miller offers a picture of agency as “the 
kinetic energy of performance,” a product of the interaction between rhetor and audience and 
“positioned exactly between the agent’s capacity and the effect on an audience” (147). The effect 
on the audience, though, is not a passive reception but an active exchange or challenge or 
acceptance. 
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Because of her emphasis on the relational exchange between audience and rhetor, the key 
question for Miller is not about how agency is produced or how well it represents the actual 
causation but rather how agency is attributed to rhetor and audience. Agency, she argues, “is a 
product of the inescapable ideology of the Human Barnyard” (153). Agency is first and foremost 
a product of humans interacting with other humans, and “if agency is an attribution,” as opposed 
to a possession, “our ideological concerns have been misplaced,” concerned as they are with 
intention, causation, empowerment, and change. Instead, says Miller, “we should be concerned 
less about empowering subaltern subjects and more about enabling and encouraging attributions 
of agency to them by those with whom they interact—and accepting such attributions from 
them” (153). This process of attribution matters because who gets credit – or blame, for that 
matter – shapes the perception of the event and marks the possibility for future engagement. This 
process of recognition is fundamental, Miller argues, because attribution and recognition open 
and foreclose particular possibilities: if I believe another actor cannot respond, my rhetorical 
action is likely to focus elsewhere. If however, I believe another actor possesses the capacity for 
action, I am much more likely to attend to her/his/its needs and concerns.   
Miller is not willing, however, to invite this sort of agentive attributions for the 
nonhuman members of any rhetorical situation, though she leaves open such a possibility: “given 
sufficient experience and exposure, we may accept these machines as Latourian hybrids to which 
we unproblematically delegate rhetorical agency” (152). Such a move is not, however, of most 
interest to Miller. Instead, Miller’s goal is to craft an understanding of agency that “will help us 
determine how and where to draw the line—between the human and the nonhuman, between the 
symbolic and the material—and how to make our case to others” (152). This final concern – how 
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best to make our case, how best to change minds, how best to effect change – is, for Miller, a 
largely human affair. 
 Like Miller, Cooper acknowledges a shifting basis for rhetorical agency. Instead of 
accepting rhetorical agency as a necessary fiction, though, Cooper instead argues that we might 
still rescue human agency from postmodernism’s dismantling of the unified subject:  
An insistent question that arises, then, is whether we must simply resign ourselves to 
modernist lamenting or postmodern rejoicing at the loss of our responsibility for the way 
our world turns out, or whether some notion of human agency in bringing about positive 
changes can be rescued. I’m for rescuing, rather than lamenting or rejoicing (420).  
For Cooper, the most pressing question facing those concerned with agency has to do with 
human responsibility: if we cannot locate agency within self-knowing, intentional human 
subjects, we risk losing the ability to hold humans accountable for negative – sometimes tragic – 
outcomes. Human agency, Cooper asserts, must be rescued if we are to have any sense of social 
responsibility. For Cooper, then, human agency, takes the form of “an emergent property of 
embodied individuals” (421). Agents – not subjects, a term bound up in notions of simple, direct 
causation – are reflective, conscious, and intentional. They have “conscious intentions and goals 
and plans;” however, “their agency does not arise from conscious mental acts, though 
consciousness does play a role. Agency instead is based in individuals’ lived knowledge that 
their actions are their own” (421). For Cooper, agents are directly impacted by the nonhumans 
around them – their “surround,” as she calls it – but ultimately, “all actions are embodied, 
including what are thought of as ‘mental’ actions—speaking, writing, reflecting” (424-5). 
Nonhumans, then, function as more than constraints – they can be productive, creative forces in 
Cooper’s theory of agency – but they are not co-actors. They are, rather, somewhere between the 
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passive objects of traditional theories of agency but far from the lively matter from Bennett or 
Latour’s work.  
Though Miller and especially Cooper grapple with new material, networked theories of 
agency, their work tends to reinscribe anthropocentric rhetorical agency. Latour and Bennett, 
however, argue for a far more radical change, both in terms of how we see nonhuman 
participants and in how we account for agentive practice. Understanding nonhuman actors as 
vital, active, contributing members of agentive networks leads to what Bennett calls a 
“congregational understanding of agency” (Vibrant Matter, 20). This congregation (or collective, 
to use Latour’s vocabulary) necessarily includes humans but it also includes a multitude of 
nonhuman actors. Agency – as a term of investigation or representation of action and change – 
“becomes distributed across an ontologically heterogeneous field, rather than being a capacity 
localized in a human body or in a collective produced (only) by human effort” (Bennett, Vibrant 
Matter, 23). Furthermore, when we begin to account for nonhuman participation in agency, new 
materialists argue that we might begin to recognize “the productive, inventive capacities…[of] 
materiality itself” (Coole and Frost 8). This new understanding of agency (as congregational, 
collective, and distributed) does not represent a new kind of agency; instead, it allows theorists 
and researchers to better articulate the ways in which agency has always operated. As Bennett 
argues, “There was never a time when human agency was anything other than an interfolding 
network of humanity and nonhumanity; today this mingling has become harder to ignore” 
(Vibrant Matter, 31). As Cooper argues, our sense of ourselves as causal agentive actors has long 
been fundamental to our understanding of rhetorical agency in particular. Actor-Network theory, 
distributed agency, and Bennett’s vibrant matter threaten this sense of self. Recognizing and 
granting agentive capacities to nonhuman participants has the potential to fundamentally alter 
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our sense of self-efficacy. However, whereas Cooper warns against such a move, Coole, and 
Frost, and Bennett suggest that this change might be a positive, even necessary one.  
In particular, Coole and Frost address Cooper’s argument – discussed further in Chapter 
Four – that one reason a fully distributed model of agency won’t work is because human actors 
experience themselves as acting, causal subjects and, Cooper argues, any functional theory of 
rhetorical agency must account for this experience: “We experience ourselves as causal agents, 
and any theory of agency needs somehow to account for that experience. And we need to hold 
ourselves and others responsible for what we do.” Coole and Frost suggest that instead of 
protecting human agents from challenges to their belief about their own role in causing change, 
we might be better served by even more fundamentally challenging this experience. Distributing 
agency across human and nonhuman actors leads to a change in how human actors experience 
their agency: “individuals' experiences of themselves as subjects and agents of their own lives 
are also transformed” (21). This transformation is one step toward Bennett’s goal of moving 
human actors from fantasies of mastery toward cooperative, networked agentive practices. As 
Bennett argues, “I believe that encounters with lively matter can chasten my fantasies of human 
mastery, highlight the common materiality of all that is; expose a wider distribution of agency, 
and reshape the self and its interests” (Vibrant Matter, 122). For Bennett, as for Latour, an 
inability to recognize the productive capacity of matter and other nonhuman participants/actors is 
not just short-sighted; it is dangerous. Mastery leads to destruction, but community, relationality, 
and responsiveness – to human and nonhuman others – might allow us to better grapple with 
pressing hybrid problems, including climate change. 
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Digital Rhetoric and a More Robust Role for Nonhuman Actors  
Though Miller and Cooper do not argue for the kind of fundamental shift laid out by 
Coole, Frost, Bennett, and Latour, in digital rhetoric, the use of Bennett and Latour’s work4 
heralds a more foundational transformation for rhetoric. In particular, Nathaniel Rivers 
(especially his multimodal work in Enculturation) and Alex Reid argue for a prominent place for 
nonhuman actors within rhetorical theory and agency. Reid sees the move toward an object-
oriented or at least an object-interested rhetoric as fundamental for better understanding how 
rhetoric impacts the world around it: “As I see it, the prospects for a digital rhetoric might begin 
with an investigation of the rhetorical operation of these objects so that we might understand 
how our democratic, scientific, and cultural discourses develop with these objects as 
participants.” Nonhumans, then, are not surrounding, inert matter that constrains our practice but 
are rather productive members of the network that produces action and change. This newly 
recognized networked existence, Rivers argues, is not one intended to privilege the nonhuman 
over the human but instead to “account for humans and nonhumans in symmetrical ways: as 
actors acting but never alone” (“Tracing…”). For these digital rhetoricians, networked theories 
of agency and action allow us to decenter human actors so that we can attend to the nonhumans 
who shape, constrain, and participate in rhetorical practice. In fact, the field’s attention to social 
media and multimodal composition provides a perfect opportunity to open ourselves to the 
nonhumans who already populate our practice. As Rivers asserts in the conclusion to his series 
on Latour’s potential for rhetorical theory,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Latour and the other new materialists’ renewed attention to the movement and vibrancy of nonhuman actors has 
particular salience for digital rhetoric as we begin to see digital objects and spaces as more fundamental to our 
rhetorical practice than we can yet imagine. Coole and Frost note that one of the cultural changes that makes this 
theoretical move toward a vibrant notion of material and  nonhuman actors possible is “the saturation of our intimate 
and physical lives by digital, wireless, and virtual technologies” (5). Latour also argues that digital technologies are 
potent examples of the kind of lively matter with which Actor-Network Theory is most concerned: “A material 
infrastructure provides everyday more proof of a precise follow up of associations, as any look at the W/orld Wide 
Web turned World Wide Lab shows” (Latour RS 119). 
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Rhetoric’s investment in new media composition (which is far from universal) has drawn 
our field’s attention to a range of potentially extra-discursive skills. Rhetoric’s 
simultaneous material turn ratchets-up this interest in the non-discursive. We are invested 
in both the rhetoric we can achieve through new media and the rhetorical agency of the 
media themselves (“Manual Rhetoric”).  
For Rivers, as for Reid, new media production – and the technologies and spaces required to 
compose in new media environments – reveal our reliance on and engagement with nonhuman 
actors. This dependence isn’t a new development; rather the increasing integration of technology 
into our rhetorical practice forces us to at last grapple more fully with the ways that seemingly 
passive objects directly impact rhetorical work. 
In fact, Rivers and Reid represent a particular strain of digital rhetoric, one concerned 
with understanding digital technologies as more than mere tools. Indeed, the inclusion of 
nonhumans in our definitions of rhetorical practice necessitates a change from viewing objects as 
passive, immobile, and asocial to a view of these objects as relational and, to use Bennett’s 
terms, vibrant and vital. Rivers in particular reminds us that such move isn’t aimed at 
disenfranchising human actors but rather encourages us to “embrace equally the nonhuman, not 
simply as artifacts of rhetorical production, or as vessels of cultural meaning, or even as 
containers for rhetorical action, but rather as active participants in what Latour calls an object-
oriented democracy” (“Tracing…”). Rivers calls on rhetoric to strive for a symmetrical 
representation of human and nonhuman contributions to the networks that make 
rhetorical/material agency possible and to think more deeply about their nonhuman companions. 
The goal of focusing on the participation of nonhumans is to make them and the work they do 
visible and efficacious, for “to ignore nonhumans or to render them invisible in the analysis of 
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public rhetoric is to miss the important work they do” (Rivers, “Tracing…”). To put it more 
directly, Rivers argues, “we humans are not the only ones here, and we are far from being the 
only beings who matter. All matter matters, and so all matter is rhetorical” (“Tracing…”). Matter 
is rhetorical in two senses: first, matter is constituted by both physical and discursive work. I’m 
thinking here of the messy hybrids that populate Latour’s work and of Donna Haraway’s 
material-semiotic actors. Matter is also rhetorical because it is necessary for rhetorical 
production. We need wifi and word processors, microphones and stages, classrooms, courtrooms, 
and social media spaces.  
Enrolling these vibrant nonhumans into our rhetorical practice may also allow us access 
to conversations and problems from which rhetoric has often been excluded. For Reid, bringing 
objects into rhetoric allows us to work with disciplines – like science and technology studies – 
and on problems – like climate change or the spread of Ebola – with firm material foundations. 
For too long, Reid argues, rhetoric’s emphasis on purely human agency and strictly symbolic 
action has separated us from colleagues and co-investigators in STEM and the social sciences:  
Rhetoric has a significant role and we might investigate that role if we can manage to 
extricate ourselves from the anthropocentric symbolic action that has largely defined our 
discipline in the modern era. In my view, rhetoric, a minimal rhetoric as I have called it, 
operates in all relations that have a capacity to generate cognition and agency. We see 
these relations in house flies, slime molds, and bacterial colonies. We see them in robots 
and software (“Composing…”).  
Reid, working from Latour and Bennett as well as from the work of Ian Bogost, calls for an 
inclusive, minimalist rhetoric, one that doesn’t require conscious intention or language use to be 
valuable members of rhetorically agentive assemblages. 
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This inclusion of nonhuman actors, though, seems – as noted earlier – to threaten human 
agency. Reid acknowledges as much: “Agency is the pinnacle of being human, but as such it is 
also the human quality that is most easily threatened, by technology, by government, by 
materiality, or perhaps even twinkies, as the apocryphal legal defense goes” (“Composing…”). 
The fragility of human agency – agency that can be threatened by attention to any of the 
multitude of things present during the exercise of such agency – opens up two possible 
responses. Reid argues that our reaction has largely been to acknowledge the presence and 
impact of nonhumans, especially technologies and especially when technologies fail us, but to 
deny them the productive capacities for which the new materialists argue. Too often, when 
confronted with the impact of nonhuman members of our network, “we mutter under our breath 
that some damn application doesn’t want to let us do something,” but Reid argues, “we know we 
don’t really mean that, don’t really mean to extend to some object some kind of agency to 
object” (“Composing…”). Reid, though, following Latour and Bennett, argues we might do just 
that, and in doing so, we might discover that “it is also possible to locate agency in a very 
different place, in the virtual, potential spaces that emerge within and among objects” 
(“Composing…”). As writing practices change, as technologies press even more deeply and 
inescapably into our daily lives, it becomes harder to deny the strange impact of those 
nonhumans on our own rhetorical practices. Too often still, Reid says, “we speak of mute tools 
devoid of their own agency or sensibility” when we might instead speak of technologies as 
collaborators with force and potentiality of their own (“Composing…”). This vitality and 
potential, though, doesn’t endanger human vitality and potential; it adds to it by making our 
practices more real (in the Latourian sense) because it allows us to account more specifically for 
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how and why each of the nonhumans in our networks are enrolled. We must, as Latour says, 
show our work. 
Indeed, including nonhuman participants doesn’t deny human agency but rather 
strengthens it, something that our colleagues in the sciences have long known. As Rivers argues, 
“a successful scientist or engineer keeps their rhetoric strong and their project alive and thus real 
by moving between the human and nonhuman securing allies and getting them to act together” 
(“Manual Rhetoric”). Rhetoric is made stronger as assemblages are enriched through the addition 
of an ever increasing number of human and nonhuman actors. For his part, Byron Hawk makes a 
similar argument about writing studies. In “Reassembling Post-Process,” Hawk, following 
Thomas Kent’s work on post-process pedagogy, notes that “writing is public, writing is 
interpretive, and writing is situated” (75). This emphasis on situational, kairotic writing theories 
leads Hawk to Deleuze and Guattari’s – and Latour’s – theory of assemblages. Viewing rhetoric 
and writing as a process of creating ever stronger assemblages leads to an approach based on 
“embodied enactions with a complex evolving world that include innumerable objects at various 
levels of scale” (77). This reimagining of rhetorical and writing practice is decidedly posthuman 
in that though it includes humans, it “decenters them in relational models of assemblage and 
expression” (Hawk, “Reassembling,” 77). More than simply decentering the human actor, Hawk 
imagines a rhetorical and writing practice focused on the “disclosing of a world [through] the 
expression of voices, differences, and complexities [that] clearly emerge through the agency of 
both human and nonhuman actors” (89). The world disclosed by this mixture of human and 
nonhuman actors would necessarily be different than world drawn simple from human 
experience and might provide rhetoric with new matters of concern. 
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What these digital rhetoricians are arguing for, then, is a new definition of rhetorical 
practice, one that maintains an interest in human actors but opens itself to the productive 
participation of nonhuman actors as well. Instead of simple persuasion, rhetoric becomes, Rivers 
argues, “the glue or the work of gluing together relationships” (“Introduction”). Instead of 
humans acing on other humans, rhetoric might become “the art or science of living together…the 
work of relating” to the human and nonhuman others that populate our networks and give shape 
to our world (“Introduction”). For Rivers, as for Reid and Hawk, a materially invested, object-
interested rhetoric takes up questions about “arranging the words and the cables, the images and 
the circuits” (“Manual Rhetoric”). It is not that the cables and circuits have suddenly become 
relevant to rhetoric; instead these authors are arguing that nonhumans have always been relevant 
to rhetoric but we have only now begun to take them seriously. For Rivers, Latour’s insistence 
that researchers slowly, painstakingly show their work is also an insistence that rhetoric “account 
for the nonhuman, the nonsymbolic, and nondiscursive labor of rhetoric, of identification, of 
persuasion, and of composition. For rhetoric to fully account for what makes things work, 
rhetoric must account not only for the human but nonhuman as well” (“Show Your Work”). 
Ultimately, Rivers is concerned with how best to effect change. Rhetoric has a fundamental role 
to play in the construction of Latour’s good common world, but in order to participate in such 
reconstruction, we must account not only for the human labor that rhetoric requires but for the 
nonhuman labor as well. We must make the work of our nonhuman compatriots visible and 
vocal. 
Assembling Actors  
 Though this chapter focuses specifically on nonhuman actors, I don’t wish to indicate that 
these nonhumans act alone. For theorists inside and outside rhetoric, nonhumans participate but – 
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just like the humans in their networks – they do not cause or create. Instead, they are one part of 
a heterogeneous collective of things. Latour uses the terms “assemblage” for such collectives, a 
term that emphasizes the shifting and provisional nature of these groups of humans and 
nonhumans. These types of networks form, shift, and disintegrate in response to trials, pressures, 
and problems; the result of these shifting alliances and ever-changing groups is “a composite 
assemblage” instead of a totalizing whole (Latour, Reassembling the Social, 208).  
Assemblages that include nonhuman technologies and technological artifacts (like digital 
videos and images) are particularly interesting examples of this kind of “sui generis object: the 
collective thing,” which Latour notes are peculiar precisely because they are “too full of humans 
to look like the technology of old, but…too full of nonhumans to look like the social theory of 
the past. The missing masses are in our traditional social theories, not in the supposedly cold, 
efficient, and inhuman technologies” (“Where are the Missing Masses?” 175). For these 
composite networks/assemblages, strength, durability, and responsivity come not  
from concentration, purity and unity, but from dissemination, heterogeneity and the 
careful plaiting of weak ties. This feeling that resistance, obduracy and sturdiness is more 
easily achieved through netting, lacing, weaving, twisting, of ties that are weak by 
themselves, and that each tie, no matter how strong, is itself woven out of still weaker 
threads (3 “On Actor-Network Theory”) 
is the whole underlying argument of networked theories of action and agency: change requires a 
multitude of actors and artifacts and their relationships with one another make each of them 
stronger and better able to resist outside forces and respond to outside problems. Latour’s theory 
of networks and assemblages begins not with grand theories or universal laws but with 
“irreducible, incommensurable, unconnected localities, which then, at a great price, sometimes 
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end into provisionally commensurable connections” (3 “On Actor-Network Theory”). For the 
network I discuss for the balance of this chapter and the networks examined in the remaining 
chapters, these provisional connections are forged by one specific stimulus: the Boston Marathon 
bombings and the resulting social and legal obligations facing the community at large. 
Following a Nonhuman 
 On Monday April 15, 2013, two bombs (one in front of the Forum, a local restaurant, and 
another in front of Marathon Sports) exploded near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, 
killing three and injuring more than two hundred others. The site of the blasts – situated in 
downtown Boston among restaurants, bars, and shop – was covered by a number of video 
cameras: in addition to the local CBS affiliate’s finish line camera, most local businesses in the 
area had at least one camera focused on the area of the blast, and the Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority installed cameras throughout the downtown area, including at least six 
cameras with a view of the finish line or surrounding area. A week after the blast, on Monday, 
April 22, 2013, the US government filed charges against alleged Boston Marathon bomber 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Tsarnaev (alternately called “black hat guy” or “Suspect #2” in news reports 
following the bombing) faced numerous charges, including conspiring with his older brother 
Tamerlan to use a weapon mass destruction resulting in death, a charge whose punishment can 
include an indefinite prison sentence or the death penalty. Among the most important pieces of 
evidence against Tsarnaev was surveillance video from these local businesses and the MBTA. In 
particular, footage from the Forum restaurant, the site of the second of the two blasts, figures 
heavily into the government’s case against Tsarnaev. Politico describes the importance of this 
particular video like this:  
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At 2:45 p.m. on April 15, video taken from a surveillance camera at The Forum 
restaurant, near the marathon’s finish line on Boylston Street and the site of the second 
explosion, shows a man believed to be Tsarnaev slipping his backpack off his back and 
onto the ground. The man stays near his bag for the next four minutes, looking at his 
phone and apparently taking a picture, according to the complaint. 
According to Masha Gessen at the Washington Post, the video continues to show Tsarnaev linger 
in front of the restaurant until the first bomb explodes: 
At 2:46 Dzhokhar Tsarnaev comes down Boylston Street. You can barely tell that he is 
carrying a backpack: that was visible on the other, widely circulated video taken by a 
different camera. He stops shortly before he would have crossed the view of the camera, 
and stands facing the street. He fidgets, much the way he does in the courtroom now – 
though there is no telling if this is a nervous habit or simply the habit of someone who 
can’t stand still. At one point he looks down: he may be setting down the backpack, or he 
may be looking at his phone. At 2:49:44, everyone in the picture looks left: the first bomb 
has gone off. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is the only person who doesn’t look in the direction of 
the blast. Instead, he turns right and begins walking away – but only a second or two 
before other people in the picture also begin moving rightward, away from the blast. As 
he walks away, you can’t see whether he still has a backpack – at least, that is not visible 
at the resolution at which the video was shown to the media and the public in court (the 
jurors can see a higher-resolution screen). Then the picture seems to turn black-and-
white. It takes a few moments to realize that there is in fact color in it, but the amount of 
soot released by the second blast drastically changes the color palette. The camera kept 
filming as people began helping the injured: pouring beer on a man who was on fire, 
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taking off their belts to fashion tourniquets, and carrying the first people toward the 
medical tent and the ambulances that started to arrive. 
I quote descriptions of the video at length here for two reasons: first, these descriptions – which 
require more than 350 words to communicate what occupies less than two minutes of edited 
footage – reinforce that words are all too often an inadequate representation of lived experience. 
The discrepancy between the large number of words and the time occupied by the actual video 
confirms an argument made by Latour, Bennett, and others: speech acts cannot replace – though 
they can seek to represent – the nonhumans for which they purport to speak. The decision by 
prosecutors to supplement survivor testimony – which most trial attendees cast as devastating 
and moving – with video testimony reinforces the important role of nonhuman participation (in 
this case the video images) in communicating the events of the day. 
Second, these descriptions hint at the value of these videos for prosecutors in the trial 
against Tsarnaev. Video surveillance – widely discussed in media coverage of the first day of 
trial testimony – figures heavily into the prosecution’s case again Tsarnaev. Why does the video 
matter so much? Because Tsarnaev’s participation in the bombings is not at issue in the trial but 
his motivations and state of mind are. In her opening statement, defense lawyer Judy Clark 
acknowledges Tsarnaev’s culpability: “There's little that we dispute. It was him” (Quinn).  The 
question at issue, then, the defense argues, is why? Why would a seemingly engaged, bright, 
young man do something so heinous? Clark claims he was forced to participate by his older – 
and now deceased – brother Tamerlan, brainwashed by his closest relative. In contrast, these 
descriptions and expert testimony about the video positions it as indicative of Tsarnaev’s 
calculation: in his opening statements, federal prosecutor William Weinreb noted that video 
evidence will show that Tsarnaev “stood next to children for four minutes before he turned and 
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walked away leaving the bomb” behind them (Boeri and Cullen). As David Boeri and Kevin 
Cullen argue in their coverage of the trial, the video (which ends with “random…and chaotic 
shots” of the aftermath of the bombing compiled from a variety of sources) allows the jury – and 
the wider public the jury represents – to bear witness to Tsarnaev “being confronted with the 
reality of what he did.”  The “random and chaotic shots” that characterize the video shown in 
open court force Tsarnaev and the jury to experience some of the disorienting aftermath that the 
survivors describe in their testimony. The video itself – shown by prosecutors then discussed by 
multiple witnesses, including technical analysts for the FBI – is also a network of its own. The 
footage entered into evidence by the prosecution under a single exhibit number is actually a 
compilation of footage from multiple sources, including city-owned surveillance cameras, 
business-owned surveillance cameras, footage from local affiliate coverage of the race, and 
amateur footage shot on cellphones and other mobile devices. 
By the time prosecutors showed the jury video from the camera above the Forum’s front 
door, the image of the younger Tsarnaev wearing a backwards white baseball cap was already 
well-known. On April 18, 2013, just over forty-eight hours after the twin blasts rocked the 
Marathon finish line, the FBI released two now iconic photographs of their primary suspects 
(Figures 1 and 2). Already, we can trace the path of the surveillance video from the Forum to at 
least three hybrid collectives or matters of concern: the FBI’s hunt for the Marathon bombing 
suspects, the US government’s case against Tsarnaev, and the media coverage of his trial. In 
each of these cases, some group of humans and nonhumans faces a problem. For the FBI, their 
network of facts, evidence, investigators, and victims faced an obstacle: in order to move from 
search and rescue to investigation to indictment, the network needed to identify perpetrators. To 
identify perpetrators, the network needed the help of as yet unknown actors who could provide 
 42	  
   
Figure 1: "Suspect #2," later identified as   Figure 2 "Suspects in Crowd," later identified as Dzhokhar  
Dzhokhar Anzorovich "Johar" Tsarnaev    (on the left) and his older brother Tamerlan 
(FBI, 18 April 2013)    Tsarnaev (on the right) (FBI, 18 April 2013) 
   
names and locations for the suspects. These photographs are the threads that connect the FBI to 
those with the information they need. Without the photographic and video evidence, this 
connection becomes impossible or at least improbable.  
 This brief vignette does not, of course, accurately represent an ANT account. I have not 
yet done the painstaking work of tracing each of the collectives I’ve observed nor have I done 
the work of understanding how the video collage came to be as a single, blackboxed actor as 
opposed to the multitude of actors it once acted as. In fact, this tracing work is not yet possible: 
though the trial phase ended on April 9, 2015, Tsarnaev’s sentencing is not yet concluded and the 
trial transcript, the most detailed account of how the surveillance video circulated inside the legal 
network of the trial, won’t be available until the end of 2015, if then. Instead, this brief sketch of 
the ways in which the video surveillance moved within and among multiple networks offers a 
small glimpse into how we might recognize the productive capacity of nonhuman actors. There’s 
no doubt that the surveillance video had an impact: it’s used by law enforcement to find the 
suspects, by news stations to inform the public about the unfolding events surrounding the 
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bombing, and by lawyers to work toward an adjudication in the case within our legal system. It 
operates on and among human actors, but it does so with power of its own.  
Conclusion 
 Recognizing nonhuman participation in agentive networks marks an important shift in the 
focus of rhetorical and material investigations of how agency is produced. Coole and Frost argue 
that changes proceeds from “infinitesimally small causes” which eventually “end up having 
massive but unanticipated effects” (14) and which “[dislocate] agency as the property of a 
discrete, self-knowing subject” (20). Without the unified Enlightenment subject at the center of 
rhetorical/material agency, the actors needed to produce agency multiply, and we may begin to 
recognize the participation of nonhumans alongside their long-recognized human counterparts. 
These nonhumans are not the stable, static objects of old; on the contrary, for the new 
materialists and rhetoric and composition scholars under consideration in this chapter, nonhuman 
participants are vibrant, vital contributors to rhetorical situations. In particular, within digital 
rhetoric, Rivers and Reid have adapted Latour and Bennett’s work to argue for nonhuman 
participants as integral and productive members of agentive networks and participants in – as 
opposed to simple constraints to – rhetorical practice. 
The narrative that closes this chapter offers one such example: the surveillance video 
introduced into evidence at Tsarnaev’s trial – which is itself a network of spliced video from 
multiple sources – is enrolled in multiple legal networks, first in the form of stills released to the 
public as part of the hunt for the suspects and later as an exhibit for the prosecution in first phase 
of the trial. The surveillance video acts within networks, among human and nonhuman 
participants, in measurably agentive ways: the suspects were identified (with help from the 
photographs crafted from surveillance video) and the younger Tsarnaev was convicted. In the 
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chapters that follow, I work to trace other agentive networks, networks populated by other lively 
nonhumans including hashtags, photographs, digital spaces, and enumerable other spaces, 
objects, and rhetorical markers. 
  
 45	  
 
 
 
Chapter Three: Relational Agency and the Emergence of #BostonHelp 
 
 
“Freedom becomes the right not to be deprived of ties that render existence possible, ties emptied 
of all ideals of determination, a false theology of creation ex nihilo.” – Bruno Latour, On the 
Modern Cult of the Factish Gods5 
 
“A pedagogy of laughter…invites them to hesitate, to strain to hear the noise, the static that gets 
drowned out by the booming call of the One. It invites them to Become Legion...” – Diane Davis, 
Breaking (Up) at Totality6 
 
Introduction 
 At 4:18 pm on April 15, 2013, less than an hour and a half after two explosions rocked 
the finish line of the Boston Marathon, @fellinline sent a tweet offering stranded runners or 
others displaced by the large and growing crime scene downtown a place to stay: “If you need a 
place to crash/water/etc. I am in the south end near back bay. message me. #bostonhelp.” 
@fellinline wasn’t the first to offer her help; throughout the afternoon, as it became clearer to 
runners and residents that hotels and other buildings near the site of the bombings were not going 
to reopen before nightfall, a smattering of Twitter users in and around Boston began offering 
food, water, charging stations, transportation, and places to stay to those wandering the city. 
@fellinline was the first, however, to use a specific hashtag to mark her offer. 
 #BostonHelp appears to have been born out of this first tweet and a number of others that 
appeared around the same time all using the same tag. Just two minutes after @fellinline’s initial 
offer, another user, @mollfrey, began suggesting the hashtag to others making similar offers. At 
4:20, @mollfrey replied to @rahulbot, who was offering his guest room to “stranded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Page 59 
6 Page 252, emphasis original 
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runners/families from hotels by the finish line.” To his offer, @mollfrey responded, “proposed 
hashtag #bostonhelp for offers of this sort. You know of others?” Over the first three hours after 
the inauguration of the tag, @mollfrey sent a number of tweets, like hers to @rahulbot, 
promoting the use of #BostonHelp as a way to mark offers of material comforts for those 
displaced by the bombings and its investigation. @mollfrey wasn’t the only one using and 
promoting the tag: in the first fifteen hours after @fellinline’s initial use of the hashtag, nearly 
2,000 tweets bearing the tag were sent, with nearly 1,200 appearing in just the first three hours.  
In what follows, I argue that the growth of this network, grounded in tangible offers of 
material support bound up in a rhetorically constructed latticework of users (who are themselves 
already hybrids, Twitter handles as opposed to embodied humans), technological tools, and 
material goods, provides us a way of understanding agency – broadly defined as having an effect 
– otherwise. For the purposes of this chapter, I will maintain a focus on the ways that humans 
deliberately participate in these networks and the material entities with which they engage during 
their participation. As I noted in Chapter 2, however, these material entities are, themselves, 
vibrant and lively members of the network that produces agency. In later chapters, I will begin to 
question the role of deliberate intention and begin to grapple more concretely with how material 
actants participate in networks beyond their association with human actants.  
The present argument for a networked, dependent view of rhetorical/material agency will 
be made in two ways: first, I offer a literature review and theoretical argument for revising our 
notion of agency. Building on previous challenges to anthropocentric agency, including work by 
Carolyn Miller, Adela Licona and Carl Herndl, and Marilyn Cooper, and rejections of Kantian 
unified subjectivity, especially the work of Thomas Rickert and D. Diane Davis, I will use Bruno 
Latour’s work to argue that agency is a product of dependent relationships between human and 
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nonhuman actors. Secondly, and most germane to my discussion of the social media responses to 
the Boston Marathon bombings, I will argue that this distributed notion of agency – which I 
characterize as both rhetorical and material – is already at work in our interactions with 
technologies. As my description above of the creation and subsequent deployment of the 
#BostonHelp hashtag hints, having an effect in a network occupied by social media technologies 
already requires material and rhetorical interventions. This view is supported by a qualitative 
analysis of the 1,177 tweets sent in the first three hours after the instantiation of #BostonHelp: 
the emergence and growth of the hashtag – as well as individual tweets sent by individual users – 
are agentive. The 2,000-plus tweets eventually sent within the #BostonHelp network and the 
more than 6,000 offers housed on the Boston Globe’s Google Doc lead to real, displaced people 
finding food, shelter, and electricity that they desperately needed. 
Revising Our Theories of Agency: Rhetoric and Materialism 
Human Rhetorical Agency 
As my goal is to offer an alternative to anthropocentric notions of rhetorical agency, I 
will begin my discussion by surveying some of the problematic assertions associated with 
traditional conceptions of agency as a human possession. Chief among these is that notions of 
rhetorical agency as the possession of a single individual yield an overly simplistic view of cause 
and effect (Bennett, 2010; Coole & Frost, 2010). The causal links implied by traditional notions 
of rhetorical agency also remove the possibility for agency from the audience of our rhetorical 
practice: if my actions or words are all that are needed to cause change, then all of the agency 
lies with me. I have denied my audience the opportunity to participate or refuse to participate in 
the action. 
 Traditional notions of causal agency are also notable for their continued reliance on the 
autonomous human subject. Despite postmodern and posthuman turns in philosophy and 
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increased attention to technological objects within rhetorical studies, in our theories of agency, 
humans remain the primary object of our discussions of agency, the sole possessors of agentive 
capacities (Cooper, 2011; Gorzelsky, 2009; NCTE, 2012; Werder, 2000). As noted in Chapter 1, 
the history of the human as the sole agentive force might be traced alongside the historical 
development of the western rhetorical tradition. From Aristotle to Burke, rhetoric has long relied 
on a human acting rhetor to exert or perform agency, to persuade or move the audience to action.  
 Some in the discipline have, of course, already worked to complicate a humanist, 
individualistic rhetorical tradition while continuing to emphasize the role of the human rhetor 
(Burke, 1969; Bizzell, 1996; Cooper, 2011; Foss, 2006; the London Feminist Salon Collective, 
2004; Miller, 2007; Werder, 2000). Carmen Werder, in her 2000 article, “Rhetorical Agency: 
Seeing the Ethics of It All,” for example, calls for a reevaluation of the concept as it relates to 
writing program administration. Werder argues that agency for WPAs has long been a question 
of control and power rather than a question of working with multiple forces to affect change. 
Agency, which she defines as “the potential for effecting change based on the extent to which the 
collective resources, titles, and expertise of a particular situation are made available for the 
individual and common good,” must be reimagined to account for the role of ethics (11). For 
Werder, then, “an ideal ethical system is one that allows for informed choices for all participants, 
one that provides for individual agency at the same time that it enables others to choose freely 
their own courses of action” (7). Although Werder aims to create a new ethics of agency within 
Rhetoric and Composition, her vision of agency still relies upon an Enlightenment notion of 
individuality.  
 Patricia Bizzell, on the other hand, in her address to the 1996 Rhetoric Society of 
America Conference, offers a definition of rhetorical agency that accounts for the fractured 
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subjectivity of the postmodern subject. She contends that, through revisiting our disciplinary 
history, especially Lloyd Bitzer and Edwin Black’s 1971 report, The Prospect of Rhetoric, we 
can envision rhetorical agency as something available even to subjects supposedly fully 
constituted by discourse.7 Bizzell begins by revisiting Lester Faigley’s interrogation of the 
postmodern subject, which seems to have “little or no agency” (38). While she appreciates the 
way postmodern views of fractured subjectivity disrupt unified, homogeneous depictions of the 
subject, she finds the fractured, agency-less postmodern subject similarly unpalatable. Instead, 
she argues, the postmodern subject derives her agency from the convergence of social and 
historical forces that constitute structures of power and from her awareness of these forces; she 
knowingly acts within, among, and against the forces that constitute her subjectivity. However, 
Bizzell’s articulation of an agentive postmodern subject, though fractured and externally 
constituted, still emphasizes the human subject.8  
Revising Subjectivity 
Bizzell’s work does, however, question the efficacy of a unified subject and the potential 
for agency if no such subject exists. In fact, over the last three decades, a number of rhetorical 
theorists have begun to interrogate the centrality of the unified humanist subject and noted the 
potential impact of a shift away from unified subjectivity (Bizzell, 1997; the London Feminist 
Salon Collective, 2004; Mills, 1997). Postmodernism’s fracturing of the Enlightenment subject 
meant a crisis for human agency: without a unified actor, is agency even possible? As Thomas 
Rickert notes, “often, poststructuralist theories of the subject are equated with a loss of agency” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Rickert, through Zizek, pays considerable attention to the fractured subjectivity of post-modern students. Using Zizek’s 
argument about the de-oedipalization of subjectivity, Rickert suggests that students come into classrooms as “multiplicities, 
technes of the self, dispersed subjectivities, performances” (177). Others, including Patricia Bizzell, note that the post-modern 
subjects are created through discursive interaction and that there is no identity for the self outside of discourse. There’s no kernel 
or essence of subjectivity, only that which is created through language. This fractured subjectivity complicates discussions of 
human agency because it removes the central autonomous figure necessary to most conceptions of rhetorical agency.  
 
8 For further exploration of the role of the autonomous human agent in the development of historical Greek and Roman as well as 
more contemporary rhetorics, please see Michael Leff’s 2003 “Tradition and Agency in Humanistic Rhetoric” as well as Wayne 
Brockriede’s 1971 “Trends in the Study of Rhetoric: Toward a Blending of Criticism and Science.” 
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(68). However, Faigley, one of the theorists who has dedicated much of his career to sketching 
connections between writing, subjectivity, and postmodernity, argues that even with a fractured 
postmodern subject, agency is still possible: “While electronic discourse explodes the belief in a 
stable, unified self, it offers a means of exploring how identity is multiply constructed and how 
agency resides in the power of connecting with others and building alliances” (199).   Rickert, 
for one, embraces the networked, decentered vision of agency proffered by Faigley. Rickert 
locates agency “at the subjective point through which one’s own singular and dynamic network 
is threaded” (24). Though Faigley’s work displaces the unified, coherent subject and thereby 
troubles autonomous human agency, the human subject – however fractured it may be – remains 
at the center of the agentive event. 
Following Faigley, then, Rickert further takes up the impossibility of unified human 
subjectivity. In his 2007 book Acts of Enjoyment, Rickert argues for a postpedagogy that 
emphasizes eruption and interruption of rationality and control. Among the most compelling 
reasons for such an alteration is the shifting, fractured nature of subjectivity.  Subjects, he 
emphasizes throughout the book, cannot be characterized by a single identity but must rather be 
seen as multiple selves because they have been, to use Lacan’s (via Zizek) term, “de-
oedipalized”9 (Rickert 162-3). This de-oedipalization results in “multiplicities, technes of the 
self, dispersed subjectivities, performances” (177).  Rickert places these multiplicities in contrast 
with the unified subject necessary for participation in traditional notions of rhetorical agency, a 
position something like D. Diane Davis’ “actor-hero,” a notion he finds particularly harmful to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Drawing on work by Zizek, Rickert defines de-oedipalization as the “lack [of] libidinal, internalized attachment to authority” 
and as the co-existence of multiple, sometimes conflicting desires and identities (162). The prospect of an actant, to use Bruno 
Latour’s term (see below), with multiple “technes of the self” (Rickert 177) is often greeted, according Rickert, with pedagogies 
of control that attempt to re-integrate the fractured subjectivities. Because an actant has not undergone the process in which 
conflicting desires are integrated into a single subjectivity, that actant retains multiple desires and therefore multiple avenues to 
enjoyment/pleasure. Postpedagogy resists the urge to integrate these multiplicities and instead offers students a space to produce, 
create, and perform their conflicts. 
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students: “What is wanted of course is a theory of agency that allows for the continued belief that 
the given social totality can be transcended and therefore remade” but this remaking gives rise 
only to violence and cynicism (89). And precisely because of this cynicism, we must begin to 
conceive of an agency that better represents the lived experiences of rhetors. Rickert defines 
agency as the “excess… [that] comes from what is other to the socially given” (90). Like 
Latour’s discussion of the experiment whose outcome cannot be accounted for by any of its 
inputs, Rickert positions agency here as external to the social/rhetorical situation that produces 
agency. Traditionally, following Bitzer’s articulation of rhetorical situation, for example, “the 
socially given” would the autonomous acting subject in the context of the rhetorical scene. For 
Rickert, however, these social situations produce something unaccounted for by the various 
elements of the situation. Put another way, the interaction between the speaking subject and the 
rest of the rhetorical situation produces an excess, something that goes beyond the sum of the 
parts (rhetor, audience, context). This heretofore unaccounted for product is agency, no longer 
embodied but accessible only in the relationship between the rhetor, audience, and context.  
In his most recent book, Ambient Rhetoric¸ Rickert advocates an even more radical break 
from notions of unified human subjectivity. In particular, Rickert uses digital spaces as powerful 
examples of an ambient sense of rhetoric. “Digitality,” he says, “provides new haunts, new 
places for…strands of communication, figuration, and affect to circulate” (101). This new sense 
of circulation reveals a kind of subjectivity. Following Heidegger, Rickert argues for an “I-
situation,” which retains some sense of individual identity while simultaneously recognizing how 
“human beings are holistically involved in, individuated through, and motivated by key moments 
composed by an entire situation” (111). Identity, then, cannot be separated from the 
circumstances under which it was forged and in which it performs. Subjectivity, therefore, is 
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constituted, dispersed, and reformed by the ambient, material environments in which it lives and 
acts. The “I-situation” reading of subjectivity forces us to acknowledge our weddedness, our 
inextricability from material conditions to the point that changes in those conditions result in 
changes in ourselves (115).  
Similarly, Heidegger’s discussion of the four causes in “The Question Concerning 
Technology” points to the importance of material causes and conditions. In a discussion that 
prefigures his articulation of the fourfold, Heidegger uses the example of a sacred chalice to 
rearticulate Aristotle’s four causes. In his discussion of the “bringing forth” of the chalice, 
Heidegger notes that there are four categories of causation, all of which must be present for the 
chalice to become a chalice: the material cause (the silver from which the chalice is made), the 
form (the idea of chalice that allows others to recognize the chalice as a chalice), the purpose (the 
sacred ends for which the chalice is used), and the effective cause (the chalice maker who molds 
the chalice) (3). It is this final cause – the chalice maker – with whom theories of rhetorical and 
material agency have largely concerned themselves. From Aristotle to Burke to Bizzell, the final 
human cause too often eclipses the necessity of the other causes. For Rickert and for the theorists 
that follow, however, there is a sense that attention to the rhetor/actor – the final human cause – 
is insufficient to understand how agency is produced. 
Possibilities of an Agency Otherwise 
What, then would an agency otherwise look like? In what follows, I will sketch an 
intersection between theories of response/ability (Diane Davis) and network theories (Diana 
Coole, Samantha Frost, Jane Bennett, and Bruno Latour) of agency that might illuminate a 
distributed, relational, dependent notion of agency – rhetorical and otherwise – that better 
explains the kinds of efficacious rhetorical and material acts that characterized the social media 
response to the Boston Marathon bombings. For Davis, relationship between the self and the 
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other determines how, why, and if the actor acts. In the case of materialist, networked agency, 
especially for Coole, Frost, Bennett, and Latour, the possibility of affecting other bodies depends 
on the connections to other nodes and actors. For Bennett, in fact, agency is “power flowing 
across multiple bodies” (55). Here, agency becomes not a feature of any single actant10 in the 
network but a product of the confluence of multiple nodes at a particular kairotic moment. 
Although these conceptions of agency represent different theoretical contexts (ethical 
philosophy, materialism), the shared notion of dependence connects them to one another and to a 
discussion of how networked technologies act on and with human actors.  That is to say, new 
materialist articulations of the value of nonhuman actors and the vitality of networked 
subjectivities – discussed at length in Chapter Two – and Davis’ extraction of a Levinasian ethics 
of responsibility offer important insights into how and why networks alter human subjectivity 
and agency. In both theoretical frames, however, the autonomous human of Enlightenment 
models of agency and action is replaced by an actor completely engaged in a formative set of 
relationships with others. Autonomy, individual purposefulness, and freedom are displaced by 
dependence and shared purpose. 
Assigned Agency and Dependent Action 
As the interactions within #BostonHelp demonstrate, networked subjectivities and 
interactions necessitate an agency that attends to others. Davis’ attention to our ethical 
responsibility to the Other presents a way of understanding the impetus for action and 
encourages attention to the act as a response (particularly the rhetorical act but also the act of 
engaging, of exploring explicated by Thomas Rickert in Acts of Enjoyment). Thus, agency born 
of responsibility to the other offers a way of understanding both our impetus for agency and our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Actant, another of Latour’s neologisms, acts as an alternative to the humanistic “actor” and avoids the problem of referring to 
the “acting subject.” As Latour notes in Pandora’s Hope, “since in English ‘actor’ is often limited to humans…‘actant’ is 
sometimes used to include nonhumans in the definition” (303). 
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relational dependence because, for Davis, we have no agentive possibilities apart from our pre-
ontological relationship with and responsibility to the other. 
In her 2000 book, Breaking Up (at) Totality, Davis posits that traditional notions of 
agency have become suspicious because of the connections to Enlightenment humanism, with its 
reliance on reason, and autonomy. According to Davis, human reason, as imagined in the 
Enlightenment, requires a single subject. However, in the face of the polyvocality of postmodern 
subjects, “the (saving) power of rationality and, therefore, human agency have become suspect” 
(Davis, Breaking Up (at) Totality 18). The Enlightenment notion of autonomy is so embedded in 
our cultural assumptions about action and change that even our grammar rules reinforce the 
necessity of a single actor or cause. For example, Davis contends, via Nietzsche, that “our faith 
in agency… is based on our faith in grammatical structure, which requires that every deed have a 
doer, that every action have an agent” (94). Further, Davis notes that traditional notions of 
human agency and autonomy rely on a sense of self-control that is often disrupted: “if human 
beings are routinely and unceremoniously possessed by outside forces [like laughter] or 
‘rhythms’ that have little to do with social norms (nomos), they can hardly fancy themselves in 
control either of their lives or of the course of human events” (23). This lack of control suggests 
the presence and importance of others; in fact, the self becomes othered, separated as it is from 
its own conscious intention because of its lack of control.  
Posthumanism, a broad term that includes the kind of vibrant, agentive materialism laid 
out in Chapter Two, demonstrates, according to Davis, that “there never was any autonomous 
agency, intention or will…not even within the subject positions into which we are called” 
(original emphasis, 44).  Posthumanism’s  indictment of autonomous human agency and 
emphasis on nonhuman, networked  participation reveals an important alternative to 
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enlightenment notions of agency Posthumanism, like new materialism (discussed below and at 
length in Chapter Two), embraces the possibility of agency, even rhetorical agency, for 
nonhuman actors,11 or, at the very least, offers nonhuman actors an important function within the 
causal field, a field bursting with human and lively nonhuman participants in the vein of 
Bennett’s vibrant materialism. 
Beyond a turn toward posthumanism, Davis offers another important possibility for re-
envisioning rhetorical agency in her 2010 book, Inessential Solidarity. In this text, Davis 
describes a version of rhetorical agency that embraces multiplicities in terms of identity and 
responsibility. For Davis, agency begins with “a responsibility to respond, a preoriginary 
rhetorical imperative, [which] is the condition for any conscious subject rather than the other 
way around” (106). A rhetor doesn’t create or discover a need for action; the responsibility to act 
on behalf of the other creates the rhetor: “This relation with and obligation to an alterity that 
precedes (and exceeds) any…being is antecedent… [to] any relation ego could have with self” 
(106). Through agency, subjects discover how to be responsible to the other(s), and Davis 
elaborates a “thoroughly rhetorical notion of agency” that exists only through discursive 
interaction with others (89). 
Davis also insists that apart from a new definition, we need a new rationale for theorizing 
(and teaching) agency. Her work in Inessential Solidarity functions, in part, as a response to the 
“phantasm of the free and willing agent” upon which so much of the field’s theoretical and 
pedagogical endeavors are based (87). Often, this autonomous, causal agency is our justification 
for existing as a discipline because agency is “the link between rhetorical practice and civic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Because of his desire to remove himself from the subject/object discussion, Latour uses the term nonhuman  to refer to any 
actor that is not a human one. As Latour maintains in his glossary for Pandora’s Hope, “the pair human/nonhuman is not a way 
to ‘overcome’ the subject-object distinction but a way to bypass it entirely” (308). This terms encompasses technologies, animals, 
and any other nonhuman that participates in network formation.  
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responsibility” (87). For Davis, however, we shouldn’t be creating heroes, for “‘I’ am/there is no 
hero...there can be no heroes. There are only hostages” (111), hostages because we are bound to 
the other and to respond to the call of that other (and perhaps to act on her behalf). Davis, like 
Rickert, cautions us against attempting to create individual heroes, but the lack of freedom to 
choose responsibility doesn’t free the subject from response; on the contrary, because she is 
responsible for the other, “the subject is nonetheless charged with acting…not [as] a free agent 
but an assigned agent…infinitely responsible for responding to the call of the Other(s)” (113). 
For Davis, theorizing rhetorical agency should not create individual heroes but rather encourage 
rhetors to understand their response-ability to and responsibility for the other/others.  
New Materialist Networked Agency 
 The conception of agency that I’ve outlined above exemplifies a dependence on multiple 
bodies. It also hints at the need to consider the material realities of situations in which agency is 
enacted and the immense effect nonhuman actors have on rhetorical situations. Recently, as 
discussed at length in Chapter Two, there has been a revival of materialism, which I’ll refer to as 
“new materialism.” This new materialism attends to the matter of life and opens up possibilities 
for considering the role of nonhumans in changing material conditions. At the heart of 
networked, new materialist conceptions of agency, two foundational assertions persist: first, the 
comfortable binary of matter (objects), on the one hand, and human beings (subjects), on the 
other, becomes problematic, especially in view of how much human beings rely on “objects,” 
technological objects in particular. Secondly, rather than being conscious, independent agents for 
change, human beings exist within networks of humans and nonhumans, and human beings often 
operate under an “illusion of autonomous agency” (Frost 59). A new materialist conception of 
agency challenges both the subject/object binary and the primacy of the autonomous human 
agent. 
 57	  
 The division between subject and object has long privileged the human subject as the 
causal agent. In his 1945 Grammar of Motives, for example, Kenneth Burke explicates his 
dramatic pentad, which contains at least three categories related to agency. Of particular interest 
to a materialist conception of agency is Burke’s definition of “agent.” In the first chapter of 
Grammar of Motives, “Ways of Placement,” Burke argues, “the agent is an author of his acts, 
which are descended from him, being good progeny if he is good, or bad progeny if he is bad, 
wise progeny if he is wise, silly progeny if he is silly” (16). The direct relationship between actor 
and action articulated by Burke relies on a conscious, autonomous human agent. Burke clearly 
demonstrates the interdependence of the elements of the pentad12, but his description of agent, 
and later his discussion of agency itself, reinforces a reliance upon human causality13. 
New materialist agency, on the other hand, asserts that agency is possible only in 
networks of humans and nonhumans. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, editors of the collection 
New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, contend that one of the major projects of 
new materialism is attributing “emergent, generative powers (or agentic capacities) even within 
inorganic matter” (9). These theories also “generally eschew the distinction between organic and 
inorganic, or animate and inanimate, at the ontological level” (Coole & Frost 9). In short, new 
materialism “conceives of matter itself as lively or as exhibiting agency” (Coole & Frost 7). Or 
as Jane Bennett puts it, “a materiality that is itself vibrant or active” (49). This lively matter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Burke reinforces the dependence of the various elements of the pentad in his 1978 article “Questions and Answers about the 
Pentad.” In that article, Burke reminds his reader that, in his discussion of the pentad, the “stress is less upon the terms 
themselves than upon what I would call the ‘ratios’ among the terms,” that is their relationships to one another (332). My point in 
this section, then, is not that Burke offers us a vision of agency that relies solely on autonomous human action; rather, I want to 
highlight that even within his vision of the “ratios,” the human agent still remains at the center of the causal field. 
 
13 Davis too addresses Burke’s articulation of rhetorical agency: in Chapter 1 of Inessential Solidarity, Davis takes up Burke’s 
theory of identification and notes that though Burke bases a great deal of his theory of identification on Freud’s notions of the 
same concept, Burke disregards Freud’s emphasis on affective attachment and identification, which prefigures rational 
identification (19). Instead, Burke insists that actors/agents begin their interactions as distinct, discrete individuals who are then 
joined through identification, which, though it may have affective elements, is ultimately ruled and adjudicated by rational 
examination and discourse. Davis, however, rejects this orginiary divide that Burke identifies as the discrete actor, opting instead 
for a “preoriginary rhetoricity” that disassociates identification from division (38). 
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associates with human actors to create agentive networks. These relationships are not fixed, 
however; rather the configuration of the network changes based on the motives for and kinds of 
action needed in a particular situation, so the result is objects and actors formed through their 
relationships with one another and the environment in which they emerge; further, subjectivities 
can be seen not as fixed or stable identities but as “capacities or potencies that emerge 
hazardously and ambiguously” (Coole & Frost 10). The flexible and fluctuating nature of the 
networks imagined by the new materialists reveals an expanded notion of agency and cause: no 
longer does the human actor stand alone as the agent of change; s/he is now joined in the position 
by a multitude of other actors. Further, s/he is shaped by these nonhuman actors as much as s/he 
shapes them, and within his/her relationships with these other actants (human and nonhuman), 
agency is produced.  
Beyond influencing and shaping one another, Latour argues that the capacity of a 
network is more than simply the sum of its parts. In Pandora’s Hope, Latour uses the example of 
Pasteur’s experiments on fermentation to note that the resulting lactic acid cannot be found in 
any of the experiments’ inputs; rather it is a product of a new actor: the network itself. The 
combination of chemicals, instruments, scientists, and other actors produces something wholly 
new. The ability to act or create change, what we understand as agency, is not, then the product 
of either the human or the nonhuman members of the network but a product of the relationship 
among the actors. Following Latour, then, I would argue that agency cannot be assigned to any 
lone member of the network but only to the network as a whole. 
What, then, are the ramifications of conceiving of agency as a set of articulatory 
processes as opposed to autonomous human causation? Coole and Frost insist that viewing 
agency as articulation blurs the relationship between action and change to the point that “there is 
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no quantifiable relationship between cause and effect” (14). Simple cause and effect are replaced 
by “infinitesimally small causes [which] transform successive conditions for interaction among 
elements such that they end up having massive but unanticipated effects” (Coole & Frost 14).  
As a result, this change in causation “dislocates agency as the property of a discrete, self-
knowing subject” (Coole & Frost 20). Like Coole and Frost, Bennett defines entelechy, a set of 
manifold possibilities for action, not as “the unique possession of each individual but rather a 
vitality flowing across all living bodies” (55). Although Bennett focuses on living bodies here, 
Chapter Two’s emphasis on vibrant nonhumans demonstrates that she does not restrict material 
agency only to living things; rather, this distributed, relational form of agency includes 
possibilities for other kinds of bodies as well. Additionally, the move away from simple cause 
and effect offers important alternatives for our classroom practices of rhetorical agency. Among 
its most problematic features, autonomous, human agency assumes a clear causal relationship 
between human action and verifiable change: too often in writing courses, we teach students that 
learning to write persuasively will allow them to change the world. When, almost inevitably, 
rapid change doesn’t occur, students become disillusioned. By complicating the causal field and 
recognizing the ecological nature of agentive practices, we may be able to offer students a more 
realistic view of the role their rhetorical choices can play in changing the world. 
This change, though, works within (and sometimes against) particular context and must 
account for appropriate timing. In her article “The Inertia of Matter,” for example, Coole 
contends that agency is a kairotic conjuncture of sorts. Building on the work of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, Coole asks us to reevaluate subject centered conceptions of agency “not as an 
essential characteristic of the rational subject, a deity or some vital force, but as those contingent 
capacities  for reflexivity, creative disclosure, and transformation that emerge hazardously within 
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the folds and reversals of material[ity]” (113). According to Coole, therefore, networked agency 
is both dependent (in this case on the “folds and reversals,” that is the interactions between 
material actors) and contingent and timely.  
Coole’s conception of a fluid agency does not mean, however, that agency is never 
embodied. Carl Herndl and Adela Licona maintain, in their 2007 article “Shifting Agency: 
Agency, Kairos, and the Possibilities of Social Action,” that we may begin to think of agency not 
as a trait but rather as a position, framing agency as “the conjunction of a set of social and 
subjective relations that constitute the possibility of action” (135). However, for Herndl and 
Licona, agency is not something that can be “seized, assumed, claimed, had, possessed, or any of 
the many synonyms for these transitive verbs” (134); rather, agency is a “question of 
positioning,” which means that, according Herndl and Licona’s theory of the “agent function,” 
“agency [exists] before the agent” (149). Following Herndl and Licona, I would posit that agency 
might be embodied momentarily, a kind of kairotic embodiment as a response to a confluence of 
factors, but agency does not require embodiment. Agency must be found in the relationship 
between actors, in the articulation of humans to other humans or to nonhumans. Even in the 
embodied moments, however, the human actant remains inextricably linked to the other 
members of her network. S/he continues to depend as s/he continues to act. 
Significantly, however, the lack of autonomy for individuals within networks does not 
result in a total denial of human agency. Rather, as Frost claims in “Fear and the Illusion of 
Autonomy,” humans act as part of a complex set of effects: “in considering the causes that 
coalesce to produce and act, we must think of the complex of contextual passive causes as well 
as the complex of active causes” (161). In other words, attention to networks of causes doesn’t 
deny the possibility of human agency; it simply positions such human agency as dependent on 
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other factors. Furthermore, Frost’s argument suggests that conceptions of autonomous human 
agency actually strip human actors of their efficacy because they fail to accurately represent real-
world causal fields.  
The Problem of Autonomy 
Some of the points above have recently been articulated by Marilyn Cooper in her CCC 
article “Rhetorical Agency as Emergent and Enacted,” which I discussed at length in Chapter 
Two. In that article, Cooper argues for a conception of rhetorical agency that emphasizes 
individual efficacy and personal responsibility within networks of actants. She uses the work of 
Bruno Latour to assert that  
neither conscious intention nor free will—at least as we commonly think of them—is 
involved in acting or bringing about change: though the world changes in response to 
individual action, agents are very often not aware of their intentions, they do not directly 
cause changes, and the choices they make are not free from influence from their 
inheritance, past experiences, or their surround. (421)  
Much of this argument is directly in line with arguments from the new materialists discussed 
above. The theoretical work of Coole, Frost, and Bennett seem to support the idea that agency 
slips the bounds of conscious intention and free will and the assertion that choices and agency 
depend upon external factors (the “surround,” as Cooper terms it). In fact, Frost, in the article 
“Fear and the Illusion of Autonomy” maintains, like Cooper, that networked, dependent agency 
doesn’t erase the possibility of human agency.   
I would suggest, however, that Cooper’s attention to individuality as a key component of 
agentive action is problematic in view of the dependent nature of materialist agency as 
articulated by Coole, Frost, and Bennett. I don’t mean to say that there is no possibility for 
human action, only that conceiving of agents as autonomous individuals and restricting agency to 
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“embodied beings” eschews much of the theoretical work that Coole, Frost, Bennett, and even 
Latour do to include nonhuman agents as an important part of the causal field (Cooper 443). 
Cooper doesn’t deny the dependence I have focused on; rather she emphasizes the central role of 
the human actor, and in doing so, doesn’t offer as prominent a place for nonhuman actors. Like 
Burke before her, Cooper introduces the possibility of understanding the multiple forces that 
constitute agency but she continues to prioritize the human actor above all else. This focus on 
human action and responsibility seems problematic if we consider the ways in which Latour in 
particular, especially in his 2009 article “Will Non-Humans Be Saved? An Argument in 
Ecotheology,” contends that nonhumans have the same kind of agentive potential too often 
reserved for human actors: “Non-humans have not been emerging for aeons just to serve as so 
many props to show the mastery, intelligence, and design capacities of humans or their divine 
creations. They have their own intelligence, their own cunning, their own design, and plenty of 
transcendence to go on, that is, to reproduce” (472). In fact, Latour, in his 2010 article “Coming 
Out as a Philosopher,” asserts that relationships between actants form the foundation for his 
philosophy. Unlike the moderns, who would separate nature from the social, Latour wishes to 
demonstrate that “relations are not what is added to a world of meaningless matters of fact, but 
what are empirically given in the world of experience” (604). For Latour, one cannot divorce 
nature from society any more than one can divorce the individual from the collective in which it 
acts.  
Furthermore, in Science in Action, Latour cautions that isolation is, in fact, the weakest 
position for an actant. In Chapter 1, “Literature,” Latour tells the story of the “dissenter,” a 
skeptic intent on calling into question the work of a scientist. As the dissenter tests the scientist’s 
conclusions and instruments, and fails to discredit either, he becomes increasingly isolated. The 
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scientist, on the other hand, becomes more strongly connected to the innumerable black boxes14 
with which he made and verified his discoveries. At the close of the chapter, Latour laments the 
fate of this poor skeptic: “we saw a dissident driven into isolation because of the number of 
elements the authors of scientific articles mustered on their side” (62). Despite all of his attempts 
to enroll supporting actors, the dissenter ends up alone and discredited. An isolated actor can 
only build, Latour observes, “dreams, claims and feelings, not facts” (41). If we insist on a truly 
autonomous agent, we force our agent into the weakest position according to Latour. Only those 
deeply embedded within and dependent upon the network have access to causal power; the more 
enmeshed an actor becomes the sturdier it becomes. 
#BostonHelp and the Creation of an Agentive Network 
 Examining one such network might provide valuable insight into the material-semiotic 
nature of agentive networks. The hashtag #BostonHelp represents just such a network. As noted 
earlier, #BostonHelp was established in the wake of the bombings as a way for Twitter users to 
offer material support for displaced runners and other tourists. An analysis of the 1,177 tweets 
sent in the first three hours after the hashtag was established (at 4:18 pm on April 15, 2013) 
reveals a set of practices that supports the theoretical arguments that regard agency as produced 
by networks of humans and nonhumans. Specifically, analysis of #BostonHelp suggests that 
rhetorical acts and material goods are both necessary to the successful creation of an agentive 
network. The emergence of this particular network supports the notion that rhetorical and 
material resources depend on one another for the creation of agentive acts. In what follows, I 
review my qualitative analysis of the collected data (1,177 tweets spanning from 4:18 pm to 7:18 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Latour uses the term “black box” to denote a long, uninterrupted chain of translations and a large network of actants that has 
become stable enough that those that interact with it no longer see it as a set of processes but as an unchanging object. In 
Pandora’s Hope, for example, Latour discusses the process by which field data (soil samples, measurements, etc.) become a 
graph in a scientific article. Though, to those who read the article, the data appear as an unassuming graph, the translation from 
field work to graph on a page actually represents a long, traceable chain of enrollment and translation. Latour notes that “we can 
elongate the chain [of translations that take us from data to graph]…yet we can neither cut the line nor skip a sequence, despite 
our capacity to summarize them all in a single ‘black box’” (70).  
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pm on the day of the bombing). These tweets were gathered directly from the Twitter page 
dedicated to the tag, though additional information, including exact times for particular tweets, 
was collected from individual Twitter users’ pages. The categories with which I coded these 
tweets emerged from my initial examination of the data. Originally, I worked with 8 categories: 
hashtag promotion, self-promotion, policing, material support, emotional support, advice, 
information/resources, and other. After a preliminary pass through the tweets, I combined advice 
and information/resources into a single “Information and Resources” category because the 
content of tweets in those two categories was quite similar; I also combined policing and hashtag 
promotion into the category “Boundary Work” because it was sometimes difficult to distinguish 
between policing and promoting behaviors. Additionally, I eliminated the “self-promotion” 
category as only 2 tweets fit within that category. Instead, these two tweets are now classified as 
part of the “Other” category, which represents tweets that either didn’t fit into one of the other 
four categories or whose purpose was difficult to identify. See Table 1 for additional information 
regarding these categories. 
Mapping #BostonHelp 
In order to better understand the network that emerges under the auspices of #BostonHelp 
and what this network might reveal about the production of agency in networks of humans and 
nonhumans, I offer two different maps. Following Sullivan and Porter’s methodological models 
in Opening Spaces, I have constructed both a methodological frame map (Figure 3) and a 
research scene map (Figure 4).  
Figure 3 is what Sullivan and Porter call a “Methodological Frame” map and captures the 
methodological scene in which I’m working: this chapter began with a narrative introduction, a 
snapshot of the creation and deployment of the #BostonHelp hashtag in the hours after the 
bombings. In the map below, this narrative falls in the middle space between literature based and 
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qualitative research based: it relies on others’ accounts of the day’s events, but falls short of the 
rigor associated with qualitative research. 
Table 1: This table represents the 5 categories that emerged during the coding process as well as their relative frequencies. 
Category Description Example Number 
of 
Tweets 
Percentage 
of Total 
Emotional 
Support 
Offered 
emotional/spiritual 
support and/or cathartic 
displays 
@BergenerLaw: “Our 
thoughts are with Boston 
following today's tragic 
events. 
#BostonHelp” 
55 4.7% 
Information 
and 
Resources 
Provided additional 
information about the 
bombing, police 
activity, etc. or links to 
other useful resources 
@HampCC: “Find who 
you're missing through 
Google's Person Finder: 
google.org 
#bostonhelp 
#bostonmarathon” 
115 9.8% 
Material 
Support 
Offered access to or 
requested lodging, food, 
transportation, etc. for 
displaced runners and 
other tourists 
@fellinline: “If you need a 
place to crash/water/etc. I 
am in the south end near 
back bay. message me. 
#bostonhelp” 
 
396 33.6% 
Boundary 
Work 
Policed content, defined 
the purpose of the 
hashtag, and/or 
encouraged others to 
read the content of the 
tag 
@mollfrey: 
“@BostonTweet Can a 
hashtag -- maybe 
#bostonhelp -- be 
promoted for offers of aid 
and housing for those 
displaced/stranded?” 
537 45.6% 
Other Did not fall into one of 
the other categories or 
did not have a clear 
purpose 
@EstefanyMMusic: 
“Helping my hometown! 
#BostonHelp” 
74 6.3% 
 
On the vertical axis, my introductory section is wholly site specific, so I have plotted it as 
close as possible to “Site Specific Discussion” on the y-axis. From this narrative tracing, I move 
to a theoretical literature review and argument: using the work of Bruno Latour, Thomas Rickert, 
and others, I argue that agency might be viewed as kind of kairotic conjuncture, a product of the 
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interaction between multiple, dependent actors. On my methodological map, this theoretical 
discussion falls in the abstract/literature based quadrant, which reflects my emphasis on 
theoretical as opposed to site specific texts. 
 
Figure 3: Methodological Frame Map 
Finally, I discuss nearly 1,200 coded tweets featuring the #BostonHelp hashtag, with special 
attention to their varied purposes. Viewed in the context of the theoretical argument that 
precedes it, this qualitative data traces the networked, dependent relationships that are necessary 
for the production of agency. An analysis of these tweets also suggests that rhetorical and 
material concerns are both necessary for the production of an agency with is simultaneously both 
material and rhetorical. On the map above, I’ve placed these coded tweets on the qualitative end 
of the horizontal axis and significantly closer to the “Site Specific/Situated Discussion” than the 
“Abstract Discussion.” This placement accurately depicts the content of the analysis that follows: 
though I make some abstract conclusions about what this data tells us about agency in digital 
spaces, much of my analysis is specific to #BostonHelp as a site.  
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Returning again to the tweets themselves, as I noted a moment ago, Table 1 lists the 
coding categories and their relative frequency in the first three hours after the hashtag was 
established. I’ve coded only tweets from the first three hours for two reasons: first, if, as the data 
bears out, the primary object of the hashtag (after promoting its own existence) is to offer 
material support to displaced persons (mostly food, lodging, and charging stations), then the 
hours before dark are the most important. After sunset, which happened around 7:30 on April 15, 
2013, these offers are less likely to provide needed support. Second, perhaps owing to the logic 
outlined above, traffic on the #BostonHelp hashtag drops off sharply after 8 pm.  
The coded tweets fall into five main categories: emotional support, information and 
resources, material support, boundary work, and other. The network begins with an offer of 
material support (@fellinline’s initial offer of his guest room, tweeted at 4:18 pm). This first 
offer is followed by a bit of boundary work: users – exemplified by @mollfrey – reached out to 
others on Twitter who were offering food, shelter, transportation, etc. and suggested they use the 
tag. Users also tweeted to popular, Boston-based accounts encouraging them to let their 
followers know about the hashtag. Meanwhile, some users, especially once the hashtag began to 
appear among the trending tags and in news stories about the digital responses to the bombing, 
used the tag to offer emotional support as well. These emotionally based messages, however, are 
a relatively small portion of the network and isolated mainly to a thirty minute period after the 
tag began to trend. As the above table notes, data from 4:18pm (when the first tweet was sent) to 
7:18pm suggests that the vast majority of the nearly 1,200 tweets sent in the three hours after the 
birth of the hashtag served just two purposes: “Material Support” (tweets including offers of 
tangible goods and spaces) and “Boundary Work” (tweets that reinforce the material purpose of 
the tag and/or encourage others to use the tag to mark these kinds of offers) account for 79.2% of 
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the tweets bearing the #BostonHelp hashtag.  Offers of nonmaterial support (represented above 
by the “Information and Resources” and “Emotional Support” categories) make up only 14.5% 
of the collected Tweets. 
The prevalence of tweets coded as material support might be most easily attributed to the 
boundary work, the policing and promoting behaviors, exhibited by members of the 
#BostonHelp community that specifically defined appropriate content for tweets bearing the tag. 
Of the numerous users exhibiting this kind of policing and promoting behavior, the first and 
potentially most influential is @mollfrey. Of the fourteen tweets @mollfrey sent bearing the 
#BostonHelp tag in the three hours under consideration here, thirteen are coded as either material 
support or boundary work. In the first three hours, in fact, @mollfrey attempted to connect with 
three highly visible Boston focused Twitter feeds: she tweeted directly (by including their 
username in the text of her tweet) to @BostonMarathon (the official twitter feed for the race), 
which boasts more than 65,000 followers, @BostonTweet (a feed focused on, to quote their 
Twitter bio, “loving life in Boston and things to do of value in the city”), which has more than 
97,000 followers, and @watertowntab  (which tweets news about the Watertown township), with 
its 2,500 followers. These three accounts share two features important to the work of the 
#BostonHelp network: first, these accounts are local and their followers are likely to be local as 
well. For material offers to be useful to stranded runners, those offering the help must be close 
enough to actually, physically interact with those in need. Followers of these accounts are likely 
to fit that criterion. Second, each of these accounts represents a fairly large, already established 
network of users. The followers of these accounts are united by their interest in local Boston 
issues but are otherwise a diverse lot, ranging from local news personalities to small business 
owners to students. The tweets directed to these three accounts, viewed in the larger context of 
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boundary work, demonstrate concerted attempts to draw on established local networks to extend 
the reach of the hashtag based community.  
Arguably, this rhetorical boundary work is necessary in order to create the most 
opportunities to offer material support, the second most common function of tweets in the 
#BostonHelp network in the first three hours of its existence. #BostonHelp’s material support 
took two main forms. First, many users tweeted directly to those in need. The first tweet to bear 
the hashtag, sent by @fellinline at 4:18 pm is an example of such a direct offer: “If you need a 
place to crash/water/etc. I am in the south end near back bay. message me. #bostonhelp.” Similar 
messages populate the first three hours. @ElPelonTaqueria, the official Twitter feed for a 
Mexican restaurant near Fenway Park, sent a similar message at 5:07 pm: “open wifi, place to 
charge cell, or just don't want to be alone, food and drinks,- pay only if you can #bostonhelp.” 
That one tweet was retweeted – copied word for word and sent to a progressively larger network 
of Twitter users – 1,264 times. This large number of retweets brings this one message and the 
#BostonHelp network into contact with an ever expanding group of users and potential 
contributors.  Offers of material support also took the form of direct links to websites containing 
the list of available hosts and runners in need. The primary Google Doc, created and archived by 
the Boston Globe, boasted nearly 6,000 unique offers for shelter and transportation by the time 
they stopped accepting submissions two days after the explosions. For coding purposes, I have 
identified any tweets that link directly to housing and transportation resources as material 
support as that is the intended purpose of the Boston Globe’s form and of other lists that 
collected offers of support sent via social media.  
Based on the data represented in Table 1, Figure 4 is what Sullivan and Porter call a 
“Research Scene” map: 
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Figure 4: Research Scene Map  
Because this map is an attempt to trace those parts of the network identified through my analysis 
of the tweets sent in the first three hours after #BostonHelp first emerged on Twitter and because 
this map represents one view of what we know based on those tweets, I have chosen to exclude 
tweets coded as “other,” as these tweets represent a set of connections, purposes, and intentions 
that remain a mystery. My tracing of the remaining categories produces the map shown in Figure 
4. Twitter forms a porous boundary around the hashtag: though some of the same tweets that 
were coded as part of this project certainly ended up on Facebook (as many users choose to link 
the two services so that anything posted on Twitter automatically populates on the user’s 
Facebook profile), their primary target audience, as best I can tell, is Twitter users. As a member 
of the Twitter community, then, I find myself (identified in green above) within the boundaries 
of Twitter. Within the larger porous boundary of Twitter, we find a second porous boundary: the 
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hashtag itself. It is within this second boundary that we find the specific tweets, coded according 
to purpose. The use of hashtags is a primary characteristic of organizing groups on Twitter. Since 
2009, Twitter has automatically converted a hashtag into a hyperlink, which takes users to a page 
that aggregates tweets bearing the same tag. The tags, then, come to mark specific conversations 
and communities of users who share a purpose and/or interest. Therefore, the hashtag community 
under consideration here includes all users and tweets that bear the tag, but those tweets also 
circulate in other spaces on Twitter, including the user’s profile page and the timelines of the 
author’s followers.  
Material/Rhetorical Agency and #BostonHelp 
Over time, the data suggests, with policing from specific users like @mollfrey and 
promotional tweets that identify #BostonHelp as a way to find places to stay, the hashtag comes 
to primarily represent material offers instead of emotional ones, though Tweets offering 
condolences, prayers, and other emotional missives still occupy part of the network. The balance 
of tweets, weighted as it is toward boundary work and offers of material support, has two 
important implications. First, acts that might be considered wholly (or at least largely) rhetorical 
are a vital part of the network. Of my five coding categories, two are obviously rhetorical: 
boundary work and offers of emotional support lack an obvious material component (though 
they certainly rely upon invisible material elements, including the technological objects 
necessary to participate on Twitter). The boundary work, in particular, represents an important 
rhetorical intervention: if we examine the network created by the #BostonHelp hashtag over 
time, we see that the incidences of tweets meant to offer emotional support – a purpose not 
supported by the promotional work of some members of the network – tapers off quickly as users 
begin to understand the purpose of the group as material and not emotional. Still, this seemingly 
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non-material boundary work is vital to the efficacy of the offers for material support. That is, the 
rhetorical work of policing and promoting the hashtag allows the network to expand and reach 
additional displaced runners and material supporters. Also, over time, we see the network expand 
to include actors from outside of Twitter including the Google form featuring the contact 
information of users seeking help and of users offering it. We also see the intervention – and 
accompanying publicity – of more mainstream sites including the Boston Globe’s boston.com 
and Google’s “People Finder,” deployed very quickly after the explosions as a way for stranded 
runners and concerned family members to connect with one another. 
In terms of our theories of agency, the network map in particular offers one way of seeing 
the necessary components of the network, including the rhetorical traces – the tweets themselves 
–  that connect so many of the actors. I would argue, following Rickert’s assertion that situations 
call us into being in particular ways15, that @fellinline and @mollfrey are called into being as 
specific kinds of actors through material circumstances (the bombing) and through their 
interaction with Twitter’s existing network of constraints and users. Each user who participates 
in the network depends on other users to respond and share, but these users are also dependent 
upon the logic of the service itself, how it organizes and links tweets according to hashtags, and 
how hashtagging and retweeting allow the initial network to expand.  
Conclusion 
 Rhetorical agency denotes an important project in rhetorical studies and technical 
communication. In 2004, Cheryl Geisler commented that “balancing concern for educating 
students in rhetorical agency while at the same time developing a society that grants agency 
more broadly may be one of the major challenges for the future of rhetorical studies” (15). The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15Rickert	  notes	  that	  “the	  writer	  is	  not	  merely	  in	  a	  situation;	  instead,	  the	  writer	  is	  a	  situation”	  (Ambient	  Rhetoric,	  
128).	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acts of kindness that emerged under the #BostonHelp hashtag represent a kind of gift economy 
and a set of networked relationships that are not adequately represented in our traditional notions 
of individual human agency or in Kantian views of unified human subjectivity. The conceptions 
I outline above share a more dependent nature. By layering dependent and networked visions of 
agency, we might come to a more complex vision of agency, one that privileges the relational 
over the autonomous and the dependent over the independent. In such a case, agency is not the 
property of any single actant but the product of the relationship between actants. Or, perhaps, 
more importantly, agency becomes a product of the work of what Latour calls mediation and 
translation undertaken by actants to improve the strength of their networks, which is, at its core – 
as I noted in Chapter Two – a rhetorical endeavor. A move toward dependent, networked agency, 
because of its attention to the others, human and not, who populate our spaces, might offer room 
for joy and surprise, for interruption and eruption, for affect, all of which are too often stifled by 
the impossible responsibility of autonomous agency and Enlightenment subjectivity.  
 These theoretical arguments in favor of a distributed and dependent notion of agency are 
further buttressed by an examination of the creation and expansion of #BostonHelp in the 
aftermath of the Boston Marathon Bombings. In the first three hours after the initiation of the 
tag, more than a thousand tweets marked with #BostonHelp appeared on Twitter. Taken together, 
these tweets form an agentive network of users, technologies, and material goods that provided 
numerous displaced runners with food, lodging, and other essential goods and services until they 
could return to their hotels. #BostonHelp is a tangible example of an agentive network, 
comprised of humans and nonhumans that depended upon one another to provide needed 
services to displaced runners. This network also demonstrates the inextricability of rhetorical and 
material means: the function of this dependent network of connected entities relied quite heavily 
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upon the rhetorical policing and promoting behavior that characterized nearly half the coded 
tweets. This rhetorical work, however, depended on external material conditions (the horrifying 
events of the day), network technologies (a material-semiotic actor comprised of physical 
interfaces and linguistic code), and physical goods (the beds, goods, and power cords that figure 
so heavily in the tweets offering material support). 
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Chapter Four: The Question of Intention: Repurposing #BostonMarathon 
Following Chapter Two’s discussion of relational, dependent rhetorical agency, with its 
emphasis on intentional acts via #BostonHelp, Chapter Three will question the necessity of 
intention in establishing the relative agency of particular communicative acts. In particular, I will 
use the shift of the hashtag #BostonMarathon (from official race hashtag to communicative tool 
to search for missing loved ones, update other users, and share messages of grief and support) to 
argue that the original intention of an actor, whether human or nonhuman, is not particularly 
relevant to the crafting of rhetorically agentive acts. The shift from official hashtag to a tool for 
sharing grief and news couldn’t have been foreseen by the creator of the hashtag. Rather, the 
intervention of events beyond the control of organizers and runners and the presence of 
nonhumans with their own properties allowed for the rhetorically powerful shift. This chapter, 
then, will argue for a move away from intention as necessary for establishing a rhetorical act as 
agentive and toward a distributed, messy view of how agency is produced. 
 In what follows, I will make two connected arguments: first, the successful instantiation 
of a predetermined intention or purpose is not necessary to classify an act as rhetorically 
agentive.  Thus rhetorical agency does not require the purposeful intention of a human rhetor. 
While most theories of rhetorical agency measure the success of a particular rhetorical act 
against the intentions or purposes of the rhetor, such a model doesn’t work when we decenter 
rhetorical agency and distribute it across multiple actors. Second, because of the participation of 
this multitude of actors, purpose and outcome, cause and effect, cannot be conflated. This 
decoupling of purpose and outcome, cause and effect, leads to the “slight surprise of [rhetorical] 
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action” (Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 266). In order to support this argument, I will discuss the 
implementation and subsequent shift in the use of #BostonMarathon. For my purposes, the 
creation of this tag is in and of itself a specific rhetorical act. The tag is a rhetorical marker and 
activity that allows @BostonMarathon to reach a specific audience of runners and digital 
spectators.   
To better understand the hashtag’s original purpose, I first offer an overview of corporate 
uses of Twitter as way of connecting with potential consumer or participants. Next, I discuss the 
initial uses of the #BostonMarathon hashtag by the official Twitter account of the Boston 
Marathon, @BostonMarathon, as a specific example of the kind of corporate uses encouraged by 
the service. Finally, I will examine the ways in which the hashtag was repurposed in the 
aftermath of the bombing for rhetorical purposes that cannot be accounted for by the intentions 
of the original creators of the tag. In fact, multiple users take up the hashtag for a variety of 
sometimes conflicting purposes in such a way that original intention seems wholly inadequate 
and disconnected from the subsequent invocation of the hashtag.  
“Twitter for Business” 
2010 was a good year for Twitter. Following its sudden relevance to emerging protests, 
like those in Iran in 2009, Twitter was poised to become a massively important part of the social 
media surge that has characterized the last decade, and the first few months of 2010 featured 
enormous increases in traffic to the service. In February of that year, Twitter surpassed the 50 
million tweets per day mark; by May, that number was more than 65 million, with 190 million 
unique visitors per month. These numbers are impressive, and even for those in the tech 
community who had been paying attention to the service since it gained national attention at 
SXSW in 2007, the scale of Twitter’s user base was a surprise. In fact, in many ways, 2010 
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seems to have been the tipping point for Twitter, not just in sheer numbers of users but in the 
amount of personal data those users were willing to share. End of year data from 2010 shows 
significant increases in users sharing their personal information with the service:  69% of users 
provided a specific bio, more than double the percentage that had done so only a year before. 
Twitter users were also more forthcoming with information about their names (73% in 2010 vs. 
33% in 2009), locations (82% in 2010 vs. 44% in 2009), and links to their professional or 
personal websites/blogs (44% in 2010 vs. 22% in 2009). This surge in information sharing 
suggested to many observers that users were beginning to trust and integrate the service into their 
regular social media routines as well as their personal and professional digital identities. This 
increase in user information also made Twitter particularly attractive to corporate actors, who 
rely on personal information to better target digital advertising and inform their engagement with 
current and potential customers.  
 Not surprisingly, given the surge in the number of users and the amount of information 
they shared, 2010 also marks a shift in the corporate use of Twitter. Through 2009, 
organizational use of Twitter focused largely on “listening in” for customer feedback (Crawford) 
and crowdsourcing content (Ehrlich and Shami), though some companies had begun to realize 
the marketing potential of the service (Asur and Huberman; Jansen). In December 2009, 
however, Twitter launched the first of its organizationally focused features, “Contributors,” 
which allowed multiple authorized users to contribute to a business’s account. A year later, 
Twitter officially launched its “Twitter for Business” page. These new business features along 
with the growing number of users and the increasing amount of specific user data made Twitter 
particularly attractive to businesses and organizations looking to connect more directly to 
consumers and to those looking to expand their existing customer base.  
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@BostonMarathon Joins Twitter 
 It was into this new, more organization-friendly Twitter that the Boston Athletic 
Association emerged when it joined Twitter in January 2010. The Boston Athletic Association, 
tweeting under the @BostonMarathon username, largely followed Twitter’s advice to 
organizations: the BAA used their linked Twitter and Facebook pages to share photos, trivia, and 
milestones as a way to promote interest in the Marathon; like many organizations, they also used 
social media to connect directly to their base of runners and volunteers. These two traditional 
organizational purposes are also reflected in @BostonMarathon’s use of their eponymous 
hashtag, which until the tragic events at the 2013 Boston Marathon, was primarily used to 
promote the race and connect with interested parties. (An example of such a tweet can be found 
in Figure 5 below.) 
 
Figure 5: Sample @BostonMarathon tweet featuring #BostonMarathon hashtag 
The longstanding use of the tag to promote and connect suggests a fairly stable purpose. With the 
intervention of the bombing, however, the purpose of the tag fractures and shifts. Instead of 
exclusively marking conversations about running the marathon, the tag was enrolled into 
networks with a variety of rhetorical purposes, including sharing disbelief, grief, and blame in 
the aftermath of the blasts. This shift also calls attention to the ways that networked discursive 
groups trouble the efficacy of purpose and intention as measures of the relative success of 
particular agentive acts. This fracturing of purpose reveals an important feature of rhetorical 
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agency as deployed in this network: purpose, long an integral facet of rhetorical production, is 
complicated by the fact that the same rhetorical act (the inclusion of the #BostonMarathon 
hashtag) serves multiple, sometimes contradictory purposes.  
Theoretical Background 
 The viral spread of #BostonMarthon in the hours and days after the bombings raises any 
number of questions about agentive networks and highlights, as I discussed in Chapter Two, the 
networked and dispersed nature of agency. It also calls us to question a number of existing 
assumptions about how agency is produced and adjudicated. Most vitally for the current 
discussion, the growth of the network associated with #BostonMarathon challenges the long 
established relationship between intention and agency: to what extent does the intention of an 
actor or actors matter to the production of agency? The efficacy of particular material and 
rhetorical interventions has long been measured by how closely the results match the intentions 
or purpose of the rhetor/actor. In a distributed model of agency, in which no single participant 
can be considered the possessor or wielder of agency, what is the role of intention or purpose in 
producing agency? And how might we think about “efficacy” among this expanded field of 
participants? By and large, I will argue, unified purposes and/or intentions are not requisite for 
the production of networked agency. In fact, I will argue, intention and purpose cannot determine 
outcome if we – following Rickert, Cooper, and Latour – recognize agency as a product of a 
distributed, dependent rhetorical/material network that emerges from the fluctuating intersections 
of humans, nonhumans, time, and space.  As evidence, I will offer first a theoretical overview of 
Aristotelian and Burkean articulations of the relationship between purpose and rhetoric. In 
addition to this foundational work in rhetorical theory, I will also discuss Lloyd Bitzer’s 
articulation of the rhetorical situation, which similarly emphasizes the role of purpose in the 
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production of efficacious rhetorical acts. I will then offer a brief discussion of Hegel’s theories of 
action and agency, in which intention and agency are inextricably linked. As an alternative to 
these anthropocentric, intentional models of agency, I will discuss new materialist theories of 
cause and effect and Latour’s discussion of mediation, both of which better fit the networked 
model of agency discussed in Chapter Two.  
Following this theoretical discussion, I will map some parts of the #BostonMarathon 
network and suggest that the variety of purposes at work in the various networks bearing the tag 
demonstrate that though questions of purpose and intention might be valuable as forensic tools 
for understanding the growth of agentive networks, purpose and intention are in no way 
prescriptive, and they are of depreciating value as measures for rhetorical success. Instead, we 
might recognize that the success of the network, its reach and agentive power, are best measured 
by effects, whether or not those effects reflect the intended rhetorical or material purpose of any 
one of the members of the collective.  
I’d like to begin, then, by discussing the role of purpose in conceptions of rhetoric and 
rhetorical agency (Aristotle; Burke). I begin where much of rhetorical theory does: with 
Aristotle. For my purposes Aristotle’s codification of rhetoric is both deliberative (Lord; Hauser) 
and didactic (Poster; McAdon). As Poster and McAdon argue, Aristotle’s On Rhetoric is a 
textbook of sorts that codifies rhetorical practice in teachable segments and divides rhetorical 
practices by inventive strategy (topoi), by setting, and by purpose. It is the last of these that I 
wish to focus on for the moment. In Book 1 of On Rhetoric, speaking of the value of epideictic 
rhetoric, Aristotle asserts that “deliberate choice” marks all rhetorical action, whether that 
activity is personal, civic, or divine (99).  In the same section, Aristotle notes that the ends of 
rhetoric, the final outcomes and effects, are the predominant focus: “And if one thing is an ‘end’ 
 81	  
and another is not [the ‘end’ is a greater good]” (67). For Aristotle, the connection between 
purpose or intention and ends/effects is the focus of rhetorical education, and these ends reflect 
the nature of their creator and his/her purpose: “And where the vices and virtues are greater, the 
actions are greater too, since these [vices and virtues] are like causes and first principles, and the 
results [are greater]; and in proportion to the results so also the causes and the first 
principles” (68). The purpose or intention of the rhetor, then, matches or determines the nature of 
the effect s/he creates. In fact, Aristotle argues that deliberate intentions infuse all successful 
rhetorical action even when such in intention isn’t immediately apparent: “it is absurd to suppose 
that purpose is not present because we do not observe the agent deliberating” (104). 
This focus on final causation and purpose infuses Aristotle’s work and the work of those 
that follow. Most notably, Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic pentad reinforces the importance of 
purpose as it relates to rhetoric. In Grammar of Motives, for example, Burke treats each of the 
first three elements of the pentad separately, but when his discussion turns to agency and 
purpose, Burke discusses them only in relation to one another. For Burke the means, the ability 
to have an effect, is directly related to purpose (xv); it is "Agency and Purpose that draw together 
in the means-ends relationship" (Burke 274). Arabella Lyon argues in her discussion of purpose, 
intention, and agency in Burke’s work that Burkean purpose is fundamentally linked to outcome 
and effect: "Agency is then connected to planning and usefulness. Purpose, in contrast, is 
connected to desire and end outcome or action." (Lyon 99). For Burke, Lyon argues, purpose is 
both desire and outcome. Agency is the cause, the means by which some end is achieved, and 
purpose encompasses the desired effect and the actual result of rhetorical action.  Further, Daniel 
O’Keefe notes that Burke’s notions of agency and action assume that actions are only of 
rhetorical interest when they include/match particular intentions (11). For both Burke and 
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Aristotle before him, then, the purpose of an action is fulfilled in its outcome; put another way: 
for Aristotle and Burke (as for Hegel, as I will note later), when considering the success of a 
particular rhetorical action, the only appropriate measure is how well the intention of the act 
matches the ends/effect.  
The preoccupation with purpose as intrinsic to agentive rhetorical action is, of course, not 
isolated to Aristotle and Burke. Subsequent articulations of rhetorical scene and situation (Bitzer; 
Vatz) further reify the position of the human rhetor and the important place of purpose qua 
intention in the rhetorical situation. For Bitzer, rhetoric is situational and “comes into existence 
for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in the 
world” (3). It follows, then, that the success or failure of a rhetorical endeavor is judged by how 
closely the outcome matches the intended purpose, action, or change. Bitzer, like Burke, 
positions purpose as central to agentive action. A discursive intervention or creation can only be 
judged as rhetorical if it includes a particular purpose (7). Bitzer’s theory of rhetorical utterance 
relies on a discernable purpose and judges the success of a particular rhetorical instantiation by 
how closely the purpose of the rhetorical work matches its outcome.  
Rhetoric is, of course, not alone in its linking of agency and purpose/intention; 
philosophy, too, connects the concepts. In Philosophy, this connection is most clearly articulated 
by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel’s discussions of the connections between agency and 
intention fall into a philosophical subfield – action theory – which takes as its subject the 
connections between agent, action, and intention as foundational to human agency. Hegel’s 
articulation of the links between intention and agency further highlights the ways in which 
purpose/intention and outcome are conflated in relation to the production of agency. While there 
is much debate among Hegelians as to whether, for Hegel, intention is prospective or 
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retrospective (Deligiorgi, 2010; Speight, 2001), most critics agree that Hegelian agency and 
intention are inextricably linked to one another in an evaluative relationship (Deligiorgi, 2010). 
Hegel articulates, first in Phenomenology of Spirit, and later in Philosophy of Right, a 
causal connection between intention and agency. In Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel argues from 
a forensic perspective that action/effect is more indicative of inner nature that stated intentions. 
In fact, he says,  
when a human being’s performance and his inner possibility, capacity or intention are 
contrasted, it is the former alone which is to be regarded as his true actuality, even if he 
deceives himself on the point and, turning away from his action into himself, fancies that 
in his inner self he is something else than what he is in the deed. (322) 
Here, Hegel positions external action (“performance”) against internal attributes (including 
intention) and argues that is the former – the demonstrable, perceivable action – that defines the 
human. That is to say, a human being’s nature should be attributed to her action, the results of 
her agency. Furthermore, in Philosophy of Right, Hegel argues the actions are constitutive of the 
inner subject as well as the external environment:  
What the subject is, is the series of his actions. If these are a series of worthless 
productions, then the subjectivity of volition is likewise worthless; and conversely, if the 
series of the individual’s deeds are of a substantial nature, then so also is his inner will 
(124). 
For Hegel, then, the very subjectivity of a human being is based on the results achieved by her 
action. As we saw in Aristotle’s and Burke’s articulations of purpose, for Hegel, there is a causal 
connection between purpose/intention and results: the nature and intention of the actor are 
imprinted on the action. Furthermore, because intention is necessary for every act and intention 
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is an attribute of a rational subject, agency is only possible as a possession of a conscious, 
rational human. However, Hegel also argues that agency should be understood as the “right of 
the subjective will” to create actions “inwardly determined by me as my purpose and intention” 
(Philosophy of Right, 107, 110). Intentions, therefore, constitute the subject at the same time the 
subject asserts its intentions. In this way, intentions are not simply a forensic tool by which we 
judge the success of a particular agentive act; rather, intention also serves a productive function 
in that it helps form the act undertaken by the subject.  
Burke, Bitzer, and Hegel’s conceptions of agency share a number of traits that act as 
points of response for materialist rhetorics. First, Bitzer argues that some situations are not 
rhetorical. For Bitzer, exigence, a deterministic element of his rhetorical situation, is not always 
rhetorical: “an exigence which can be modified only by means other than discourse is not 
rhetorical; thus, an exigence is not rhetorical when its modification requires merely one's own 
action or the application of a tool, but neither requires nor invites the assistance of discourse” (7). 
New materialism in rhetoric follows theorists like Donna Haraway who posit that 
actors/networks/situations are material and semiotic pastiches; all situations, then, have material 
and rhetorical dimensions.   Secondly, all three of these theorists privilege the human actor as the 
central figure in the production of agency. Though Burke and Bitzer acknowledge the power of 
situational/nonhuman elements, they continue to privilege the human actor. As I noted in 
Chapter 1, Burke’s emphasis on ratios does not displace the human as the center of rhetorical 
action. However, the impact and value of nonhuman actors is a key point of departure for 
materialist and Latourian conceptions of agency.   
 85	  
New Materialism: Rewriting Cause and Effect 
Indeed, though Burke, Bitzer, and Hegel offer complex pictures of agentive production, 
all three position rational human actors as the possessors of agentive capacities and the ultimate 
causes of agentive interventions. As noted earlier, new materialists, especially Bennett, Coole, 
and Frost, question the efficacy of human causation16 and posit instead sprawling networks of 
humans and nonhumans in which “infinitesimally small causes…transform successive conditions 
for interaction among elements such that they end up having massive but unanticipated effects” 
(Coole & Frost 14).  As Coole and Frost suggest, new materialism does not erase or negate 
questions of cause and effect; rather, new materialists wish to complicate such questions by 
extending the list of causal participants and highlighting the strings of causes and effects 
necessary to produce agency. For Coole and Frost, nonhuman participants should be viewed as 
“something more than ‘mere’ matter: an excess, force, vitality, relationality, or difference that 
renders matter active, self-creative, productive, unpredictable” (9). The unpredictability inherent 
in these nonhumans contributes to the unpredictability of the network more generally and allows 
us to better understand why actual outcomes rarely match human intentions. For these writers, 
then, reliance on simple cause and effect and human intention should be supplanted by chains of 
cause and effect and an awareness of the role that nonhuman actants play in the production of 
agency.  
Among the new materialists, the work of Bruno Latour on cause and effect is particularly 
useful as an alternative to simple human causation. Latour, in his discussion of the sociology of 
science in Reassembling the Social, positions mediation as an appropriate successor to simple 
cause and effect. In traditional conceptions of causality, he suggests, “inputs predict outputs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For my purposes, intention, purpose, and cause/causation are equivalent terms as all three terms reference the 
practices through which action is undertaken.  
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fairly well: nothing will be present in the effect that has not been in the cause” (58). However, 
Latour argues that such a simplistic picture undercuts the importance of effects, for if outputs 
match inputs, we might as well focus simply on the inputs; there is no longer any reason to 
examine the effects or outcomes of an action or experiment. Realistically, however, experience 
tells us that outputs can surprise us: any number of valuable scientific discoveries (including 
penicillin and theories of gravity) happen serendipitously. In order to account for these 
sometimes unexpected outcomes, Latour offers his concept of mediation. In Pandora’s Hope, 
Latour defines mediation as “an occurrence that is neither altogether a cause nor altogether a 
consequence, neither completely a means nor completely an end” (153). This move from 
causation to mediation allows Latour to escape from theories of simple cause and effect and 
instead focus on events, moments, and trajectories that defy such oversimplification. Mediation 
reminds us that change is a complex process marked by events rather than “effects to be 
deduced”; instead, complex networks of humans and nonhumans “are simply offering occasions, 
circumstances, and precedents. As a result, lots of surprising aliens may pop up in between” (58). 
Latour’s theory of mediation seeks to account for those situations in which particular actions 
“make things do other things than what was expected” (59). Latour notes that this distinction 
“might look like hair-splitting,” but he notes that  
the differences in the type of cartography are immense. The first solution draws maps of 
the world which are composed of a few agencies, followed by trails of consequences 
which are never much more than effects, expressions, or reflections of something else. 
The second solution, the one preferred by ANT, pictures a world made of concatenations 
of mediators where each point can be said to fully act (RS 59).   
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Instead of delineating causes from effects, then, we might understand all participants as forces, 
and “when a force manipulates another, it does not mean that it is a cause generating effects; it 
can also be an occasion for other things to start acting” (RS 60). These forces bump up against 
other forces and in doing so eventually cause successive changes, some small and some large. 
What we call effects, then, are simply snapshots of these networks at particular moments.17  
Mapping #BostonMarathon  
New materialist conceptions of distributed agency and intricately related, infinitesimally 
small sets of causes and effects offer one way of reading the landscape created by tracing a 
snapshot of the network associated with #BostonMarathon. To understand the deployment of this 
network and how it was affected by the intervention of the bombing, I will use the remaining 
space to sketch a series of moments in the continuing life of the hashtag. In doing so, I hope to 
illustrate the sometimes conflicting intentions of the members of the network and suggest that no 
single set of intentions adequately explains the impact of #BostonMarathon. 
To begin, it might be useful to understand the size, scope, and purpose of the network in 
the days leading up to the marathon. During the weekend before (from Friday, April 12, 2013 at 
6 pm EST to Sunday, April 14, 2013 at 10 pm EST), 7,942 tweets bearing the tag 
#BostonMarathon were sent. The vast majority of these missives was sent by those with a first or 
secondhand connection to the race, and featured well wishes for racers and excitement about 
participation in the event.  That is to say, prior to the intervention of the bombing, the hashtag 
primarily represented those already tied to, or at the very least interested in, the marathon. As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 As I will note in Chapter 4, questions of responsibility and accountability become even more pressing if we 
distribute agency across multiple actors – both human and nonhuman. How might do we hold humans responsible 
for negative outcomes if we deny that humans are final causes for those outcomes? The answer, I will argue, is that 
blame and responsibility (like agency) are distributed throughout the network. Human actors may still be held 
accountable by moral, social, and legal institutions; nonhumans are held accountable by designers. This state of 
affairs, I will argue, is not new: we have always held nonhuman actors responsible for the bad outcomes in which 
they participate. Instead of calling it responsibility, however, we have instead called this process redesign. 
 
 88	  
with most events promoted via Twitter hashtags (like those for academic conferences, award 
shows, and other sporting events, including the Superbowl), the primary purpose of the tag 
appears to be to unite those already invested or looking to invest in the event. The space created 
by the tag, then, is one of shared affinity and fairly homogenous intentions to promote, critique, 
or otherwise comment upon the race. 
Though this understanding of the tag’s/tag creators’ intentions is fairly broad, the 
homogenous nature of the human participants results in a finite number of goals for 
communicators within the network and a few specific ways to enter and impact the discussion. 
This original set of purposes and intentions might be best exemplified by @BostonMarathon, the 
official Twitter handle for race organizers. @BostonMarathon sent thirteen tweets on race day; 
all these tweets were sent before the bombing for only two purposes: to share race trivia and 
runners’ names, progress, and official times, as seem in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: @BostonMarathon uses #BostonMarathon on Race Day 2013 
Once the bombs detonated, however, it was days before @BostonMarathon again used its 
eponymous hashtag. 
After the bombing, however, others repurposed the tag for their own ends, including 
major news organizations who used the tag to report breaking news, political officials who used 
the tag to offer condolences and denunciations of the attack, regular Twitter users who shared 
links to information, condolences for the victims, political jabs and conspiracy theories, and for 
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other sometimes difficult to discern purposes. In order to better understand the composition of 
the network in the immediate aftermath of the explosions, I have coded a sample18 (10% or 253 
tweets) of the 2,500+ “Top Tweets” in the four hours following the explosion. Table 2 offers an 
overview of the kinds of users who participated in the #BostonMarathon network in the 
immediate aftermath of the bombings.  
As we can see from Table 2, news organizations/journalists and public figures account 
for more than half (64%) of the participants examined in this random sampling of “Top Tweets” 
from the first four hours after the bombing. The prevalence of these kinds of actants might be 
explained in a number of ways: first, because the sample examines “Top Tweets,” it skews 
toward users with larger networks of followers. Second, news organizations and journalists, who 
account for over a third (38%) of the participants in this snapshot of the #BostonMarathon 
network, are considered more reliable sources of information and therefore are more likely to be 
retweeted/replied to, and these interactions factor into Twitter’s algorithm for identifying “Top 
Tweets.”  Most salient to the discussions of agency under consideration in this chapter, however, 
we might account for the prevalence of these public actors – as well as the use of the hashtag by 
politicians/leaders (2 % of coded actors) and organizations (12% of coded actors) – by 
considering that #BostonMarathon was initially inaugurated as a more official digital space 
through its association with Boston Athletic Association’s @BostonMarathon in the days and 
hours leading up the race. This original actor lends a sense of credibility to the tag, and though 
the tag’s original purpose is supplanted by a number of competing purposes after the intervention 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 My sample consists of a PDF screen capture of “Top Tweets” from the first four hours after the bombs detonated. 
The PDF of screen captures is 240 pages long, with a maximum of 11 tweets per page.  To create a random sample 
(approximately 10%), I used a random number generator; the generator first produced a page number (1-240) 
followed by a Tweet number (1-11). I focused on “Top Tweets” for 2 reasons: first, these tweets represent the most 
connected, enmeshed members of the network. Second, there were 113, 913 tweets sent on April 15, 2013. The 
sheer volume of data along with the lack of access to Twitter’s complete database made gathering all tweets from 
this 24 hour period prohibitively challenging.  
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of the bombing, all of the purposes and intentions that follow depend on the established 
credibility of the tag to build their own. 
Table 2: #BostonMarathon participants from the first four hours after the bombing coded by user type 
Participant Description Example Number of 
Tweets 
Percentage of 
Total 
News Newscaster, 
journalist, or 
official twitter 
profile for a 
news station, 
site, or 
organization 
@USAToday: USA 
Today’s official 
Twitter account  
95 38% 
Public Figure Individuals 
well-known 
outside of 
Twitter, 
including 
athletes, actors, 
musicians, 
business people, 
etc. 
@KingJames: Lebron 
James, star forward for 
the Miami Heat 
65 26% 
Corporate 
Entity 
Organizations 
and business not 
affiliated with 
news 
organizations 
@UNCWomensSoccer: 
official Twitter account 
for the UNC Division 1 
Women’s Soccer Team 
31 12% 
Official 
Account 
Accounts for 
government 
officials 
@UN_Spokesperson: 
the official Twitter 
account of the public 
relations arm of the 
United Nations 
6 2% 
Regular User Normal Twitter 
Users 
@Dan_Bubbles: a 
“Bahston” 
54 21% 
Other Trolls and 
parody accounts 
@CharlieACN: Parody 
account purporting to 
be the fictional 
character Charlie 
Skinner from Aaron 
Sorkin’s Newsroom 
2  <1% 
 
The continued efficacy of the original network surrounding #BostonHelp can be seen in 
the ways in which other credible sources of information – government entities, law enforcement 
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agencies, and new services in particular – utilize #BostonMarathon. Unlike other hashtag 
networks, most notably #BostonHelp, discussed in Chapter Two, #BostonMarathon hosts all 
sorts of official statements from celebrities, news networks, and law enforcement agencies, a 
point reinforced by aggregating the findings from Table 2 into a simple pie chart. How much of 
the network is inhabited by public figures, news organizations, and corporate entities? Nearly 
80%. In fact, as demonstrated in Figure 7 below, public users outnumber private users almost 
4:1. 
 
Figure 7: #BostonMarathon Participants in the first four hours after the bombing (by percentage) 
Why does this “publicness” matter? The large number of officially endorsed/Twitter “verified” 
users suggests that this network represents Twitter’s version of an official, public 
deliberation/conversation. The official nature of this conversation begins with early uses of the 
tag by @BostonMarathon and the longstanding connection between the tag and the race. The tag 
participated in the rhetorical acts of @BostonMarathon, whose purpose was to engage with 
members of the social media community about the race. The tag also participates in subsequent 
rhetorical acts by news organizations, celebrities, and government entities, each of whom had a 
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purpose different from @BostonMarathon but each of whom was well served by their use of the 
tag.  
This notion – that networks that repurpose the tag rely on the credibility built by the 
originators of the tag – has important implications for theories of networked agency. Namely, 
despite a fundamental shift in the purpose of the tag (from corporate promotion to public 
commentary, information sharing, and a number of other purposes identified in Table 2), the 
work of the original actors (@BostonMarathon and the users discussing the race in the lead up to 
race day) still figures into the networks that emerge after the bombing. However, though they 
participate – via the credibility built through the long-term use of the tag before the April 2013 
bombings – in these networks, their original intentions for the tag do not dictate the networks 
that emerge later.  Latour reminds us in Pandora’s Hope to “think of technology as congealed 
labor” (189; original emphasis). Intention, then, is one of a multitude of forces at work in the 
construction of the original network, but the original network eventually congeals (to use 
Latour’s verb) into a black box, a term that refers to the ways in which complex systems are 
eventually simplified to inputs and outputs rather than numerous actors characterized by 
“locality, particularity, multiplicity, and continuity” (PH 70). The resulting simple black box 
becomes a single actor among many in subsequent networks. Still, the sense of the 
#BostonMarathon as a sanctioned space of sorts remains, a trace left behind by the original 
#BostonMarathon network.  
 This sense of the network as Twitter’s version of an official channel is reinforced by an 
examination of the tweets according to their purposes. As I noted in my discussion of 
participants above, news organizations and journalists are the most commonly seen members of 
the network. An examination of the tweets according to their purpose reinforces this emphasis on 
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news: more than a third (37%) of tweets coded according to purpose provide news or 
information about the events of the day. This space also becomes a venue for support from 
regular and celebrity users of the network, as emotional responses to the bombings account for 
29% of the tweets coded. The sharing of resources (including links to Google’s “Person Finder”) 
occupies another sizable section of the map, with 13% of tweets coded as resources. The rest of 
the coded tweets (21% or 60 tweets) are fairly evenly divided between a number of other 
purposes: meta commentary, information about police activity in Boston and other metropolises, 
speculation about the suspects, links to or quotes from official responses, including President 
Obama’s press conference on the bombing, personal stories, and material support. (See Table 3 
below for more information.) 
Table 3: #BostonMarathon tweets from the first four hours after the bombing coded according to purpose 
Purpose Description Example Number 
of 
Tweets 
Percentage 
of Total19 
Emotional 
Support 
Offered 
emotional/spiritual 
support and/or 
cathartic displays 
@CherylDouglasNN: 
“My thoughts and prayers go out to 
everyone affected by the senseless 
tragedy at the #BostonMarathon 
today. So incredibly sad!” 
73 29% 
Resources Provided links to 
resources 
@ClaireRPorter: “Google Person 
Finder helps you tracked (sic) 
down loved ones in Boston:  
news.com.au/technology/goo… 
#BostonMarathon #Marathon 
@newscomauHQ” 
34 13% 
News Provided information 
or links to 
information about the 
ongoing investigation 
of the bombing 
@MandyWiener: 
“#CNN now reporting one of the 
dead in #BostonMarathon blasts is 
an eight-year-old child.” 
93 37% 
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 These percentages are based on the total number of tweets coded in this section (N=253); eight of the coded 
tweets clearly demonstrated multiple purposes, so the percentages in this column add up to more than 100%. 
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Table 3 Continued 
Information 
about Police 
Activity 
Provided information 
about police 
presence/activity in 
Boston and in other 
metropolitan areas in 
response to the bombing 
@SocialMediaMo: “Boston Police 
shutting down cell service & saying DO 
NOT USE your cell phones! May trigger 
other devices #BostonMarathon” 
13 5% 
Meta 
Commentary 
on Coverage of 
the Bombing 
Discussed appropriate 
and inappropriate 
coverage of the events 
@Yehudachababo: “NY Post false claim 
about Saudi suspect in custody is what's 
called a racial hoax, which has serious 
consequences. #bostonmarathon” 
17 7% 
Discussion/ 
Speculation 
about Suspects 
Discussed or speculated 
about potential suspects  
@Suntimes: “UPDATE: Boston police 
commissioner says no suspect is in 
custody in marathon explosions, despite 
reports #BostonMarathon” 
5 2% 
Links to 
Official 
Responses 
Repeated or linked to 
official governmental 
responses to the 
bombing 
@nicoleperlroth: “Obama's statement on 
#BostonMarathon coming shortly: 
whitehouse.gov/live/president…” 
10 4% 
Personal 
Stories 
Related personal or 
familial experiences 
with the bombing 
@14Ram: “Glad to hear my uncle and 
cousin were safe and sound following the 
#bostonmarathon Finished just half an 
hour prior to explosion.” 
3 1% 
Material 
Support 
Offered access to or 
requested lodging, food, 
transportation, etc. for 
displaced runners and 
other tourists 
@RWW: “MT @davidhoang: If you 
know a stranded #BostonMarathon runner 
who needs a place to stay, @AirBNB will 
waive the fee 
w.readwrite.com/10YtA7z” 
5 2% 
Other Did not fit into the other 
coded categories 
 7 3% 
 
As noted in Table 3, a plurality of tweets was aimed at sharing or linking to developing news 
about the bombings. The tweets from the hours immediately following the bombing also include 
a large number of missives aimed at offering or asking for prayers or comfort (coded as 
“emotional support”). These “Top Tweets” also include a small but notable percentage of meta-
commentary on the coverage (both on Twitter and via traditional publishing venues) of the 
bombing, most of which is critical of impolitic comments and those who might rush to judgment 
regarding the identity and ethnicity of any responsible parties.  
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Figure 8: #BostonMarathon tweets from the first four hours after the bombing coded according to purpose 
These results and the corresponding networks that they allow us to trace reveal a number 
of interesting developments: First, @BostonMarathon, the official Twitter account of Marathon 
organizers does not participate in the hashtag’s network in the immediate aftermath of the 
explosions. On race day, @BostonMarathon sent thirteen tweets bearing the tag. None of these 
occurred after 2:50 pm. Whatever their reason for not continuing to use the tag after the 
intervention of the bombing, the absence of this official voice from the evolving conversation 
occurring via #BostonMarathon marks the foreclosure of one set of intentions for the tag and the 
opening of another more dispersed and conflicted set of intentions and purposes.  
Second, by examining the “Top Tweets” in the four hours following the bombing, we 
discover two broad categories for the participants in this network: those participating in the 
conversation via Twitter and those implicated by that conversation. Unlike those users 
participating in the #BostonHelp conversations, the vast majority of users associated with 
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#BostonMarathon had no physical connection to the bombing or its aftermath. Rather, this 
diverse network of users acts as sort of digital punditry, commenting, speculating and offering 
emotional support, resources, and news to others following the developing story via Twitter. The 
content of these tweets, then, implicates a second set of participants. We might call these the 
objects of the conversation, and they include victims, political officials, and potential, as yet 
unnamed suspects.  
These subjects of conversation take on particular importance when we examine the 
continued use of the tag in the days, weeks, and months following the bombings. On April 19, 
2013, four days after the bombing, #BostonMarathon roared back to life: around 5 pm on April 
18, 2013, the FBI released the first officially confirmed video and photographic evidence of the 
suspects. The grainy video and photographs showed two men with dark hair and clothes in and 
around the area the bombs had been planted. Within a few hours, the FBI received thousands of 
tips, and as FBI agents began focusing their search on the area between Cambridge and 
Watertown, MA on Boston’s northwestern edge, the suspects allegedly mounted another series 
of attacks. In quick succession, they murdered an MIT campus police officer, carjacked a driver 
in the Allston-Brighton section of Boston, and finally exchanged gunfire with police officers in 
Watertown. The firefight and the suspects’ subsequent attempts to flee the scene resulted in the 
death of one of the suspects; the other suspect escaped in the stolen vehicle and was eventually 
captured just miles from the site of the first firefight with police.  Not surprisingly, given the 
events of the day, the overwhelming majority of tweets sent bearing the #BostonMarathon tag 
discussed the police pursuit of the suspects. In fact, of the top twenty five most retweeted 
messages from April 19, 2013, twenty four are explicitly related to the bombing suspects. The 
one tweet not explicitly related to the suspects commends law enforcement for their work in the 
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aftermath of the blasts, presumably including the capture of one the suspects just a few hours 
earlier. 20 
The tag experienced a similar resurgence on May 1, 2013, when 3 additional suspects 
were arrested on obstruction of justice charges. Once again, we find that, predictably, the 
hashtag’s predominant purpose reflects the events of the day: all but three of the top twenty-five 
tweets from May 1 focus on the arrest of additional suspects. Of these twenty-two suspect-
focused tweets, eighteen were sent from the twitter feeds of official news sources, including the 
BBC and MSNBC.   
We see another shift of the tag on November 2, 2013, when the Boston Red Sox, as part 
of their World Series victory parade, paused for a moment of silence at the marathon finish line. 
Once again the traffic on #BostonMarathon mirrors the events of the day, with all twenty-five of 
the “Top Tweets” focused on the Red Sox victory parade’s stop at the Boston Marathon finish 
line. Though the purpose for this particular day is fairly homogenous, the participants from 
November 2nd are not: unlike the participants on May 1st, the November 2nd tweets feature a 
number of “regular users” (seven of twenty-five) in addition to accounts local to Boston (sixteen 
of twenty-five) and few from the national sports media (two of twenty-five). 
The endurance of the tag, as demonstrated by the tweets from April 19, 2013 (the day the 
bombing suspects were killed/captured by police), May 1, 2013 (when three additional suspects 
were arrested on obstruction of justice charges), and November 2, 2013 (when the Boston Red 
Sox’s Word Series victory parade stopped for a moment of silence at the finish line), suggests an 
expanding pool of participants and competing and evolving agendas/intentions. The diversity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 It’s important to note that 3 of the top 25 tweets from April 19, 2013 also perpetuate misinformation about the 
supposed guilt of Sunil Tripathi. Tripathi, a missing Brown student, was repeatedly identified on Reddit and Twitter 
– and later by news organizations using those sites as sources – as a suspect in the bombings. Tripathi’s 
misidentification will be the main issue under consideration in chapter 4 as I examine the role of responsibility in 
distributed agentive networks.  
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purposes coded for the tweets under consideration here suggests a number of competing 
intentions represented by the same rhetorical marker. What, then, is the net result of these 
purposes? That depends on which section of the network we examine, which is precisely the 
point here: despite its inauguration for a very specific purpose (the promotion of the race and its 
runners – seen most strikingly in the tweets sent the weekend before the race and those sent by 
@BostonMarathon on race day), the intentions of race organizers mean little in the aftermath of 
the bombings. The intervention of an unforeseen actant (the bombing) supersedes the original 
purpose of the tag. This intervention, we might say, fractures the purpose of the tag and opens it, 
allowing it to service any number of agendas and intentions.  
And some of these agendas are well served by their use of the tag. Let us consider, for 
example, the top five most retweeted/replied to messages21 bearing the hashtag. Table 4 lists the 
top five messages in the #BostonHelp network. These “Top Tweets” reflect the findings from the 
larger sample: Lebron James, a public figure, offers emotional support; the official Twitter 
handle for an organization (in this case a drug company) provides news and information; a 
journalist provides up-to-date information about victims. There is, however, one notable 
deviation from this pattern in the form of the most retweeted missive bearing the hashtag: “For 
every retweet we receive we will donate $1 to the #BostonMarathon victims #PrayForBoston.” 
This message was sent by @_bostonmarathon, a fake account established less than 45 minutes 
after the explosion. 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The information regarding retweets and replies was gathered on May 27, 2014.  
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Table 4: Most retweeted/replied to messages in #BostonMarathon as of May 27, 2014 
Twitter User User’s Identity Message Number of 
Retweets and 
Replies 
@_bostonmarathon Fake twitter 
page meant to 
be confused 
with official 
Boston 
Marathon 
Twitter feed 
“For every retweet we 
receive we will donate $1 to 
the #BostonMarathon victims 
#PrayForBoston” 
68,694 
@kingjames Verified 
Twitter feed of 
Lebron James 
“Prayers goes out to those 
involved/hurt 
in #BostonMarathon. WTF is 
wrong with people man. Just 
sad” 
33,811 
@fenvirantiviral Official Twitter 
feed for the 
drug Fenvir, an 
antiviral 
treatment for 
herpes, cold 
sores and 
shingles 
“Doctors: bombs contained 
pellets, shrapnel and nails 
that hit victims 
#BostonMarathon @NBC6” 
23,628 
@redcross Official Twitter 
feed of the 
American Red 
Cross 
“Thanks to generosity of 
volunteer blood donors there 
is currently enough blood on 
the shelves to meet 
demand. #BostonMarathon” 
15,169 
@piersmorgan Verified 
Twitter feed of 
CNN host Piers 
Morgan 
“BREAKING: One of the 2 
confirmed dead is an 8yr old 
child. Just appalling. 
#BostonMarathon” 
9,337 
 
The account sent only a few tweets, all of which were aimed at engendering some sort of 
support, usually in the form of retweets.  
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Figure 9: Tweets sent by fake account prior to Twitter closing the account 
The purpose of the account – and its widely shared message – is unclear. What did the author(s) 
have to gain by asking for retweets? No money changed hands; no traffic was directed to a 
particular website. Despite this mystery, however, this tweet participates in rhetorical agency: the 
tweet circulated widely, particularly on Twitter and Facebook, and brought any number of actors 
(via responses to the message and retweets) into the #BostonMarathon network. In doing so, the 
tweet expanded the audience and the pool of potential participants in all the other purposes 
represented by the tag.  
Conclusion 
 In view of the expansive and complex material-semiotic linkages sketched above, simple 
notions of cause and effect seem insufficient to explain the growth and impact of the network. 
Even by Bitzer’s rather anthropocentric definition of rhetorical situation22, the explosions at the 
finish line of the Boston Marathon represent an opportunity for rhetorical action: linguistic 
interventions were necessary to provide information and emotional support to those affected by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 “A complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be 
completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action 
as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence” (Bitzer 3). 
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the events of the day. This group of participants, however, cannot be adequately understood if we 
use purpose or intention as a way of measuring rhetorical effects.  
 Latourian mediation and new materialism’s emphasis on chains of causes and effects 
provides a more useful alternative. The kind of mapping made possible by new materialist 
approaches allows us to consider a much wider variety of participants and purposes. Though this 
discussion has focused largely on the human participants in the network (users) and their 
purposes, the nonhuman members of the network (made visible by a materialist tracing of the 
ever-expanding latticework of contributors) play a vital part in the creation and continuation of 
the system. By recognizing the intervention of the bombing (and understanding that the event 
itself is not just an exigence but a hugely important participant in the #BostonMarathon 
network), we might be better able to understand the effects produced by the network. These 
effects (individual users’ catharsis, the spread of information – and misinformation – about 
suspects and motives, the connection between Twitter, its users, and other sites and resources – 
including Google’s Person Finder) are best understood not as simple results/outputs but as a set 
of messy forces that may act as both causes and effects depending on one’s position in the 
network.  
 The networks created on Twitter using #BostonMarathon reveal purpose as an unreliable 
measure of rhetorical success because (1) purpose is not always discernable (as evidenced by the 
tweets categorized in Table 3 as “other”) and (2) because in an ecological situation (like the one 
under examination here) all participants contribute to the work and reach of the network 
regardless of individual users’ intentions. Though a user might be drawn to the #BostonMarathon 
network because of a tweet sharing news or information about the bombing, s/he does not only 
encounter tweets with that purpose. Instead, once a user enters the network, s/he is exposed to all 
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tweets bearing the tag. S/he also becomes part of the network, another of the multitude of causes 
and effects, forces and participants that constitute a responsive, material-rhetorical network like 
#BostonMarathon.  
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Chapter Five: Networked Responsibility and Reddit’s Hunt for the Bombing Suspects 
On March 16, 2013, Brown University philosophy major Sunil Tripathi vanished. In the 
months leading up to his disappearance, Tripathi had taken a leave of absence from school citing 
depression, but he’d stayed in daily contact with family and his few close friends. Then, in the 
early morning hours, Tripathi simply vanished. Last seen on grainy video leaving a convenience 
store, Tripathi disappeared into the night, leaving his wallet, ID, cell phone and all his personal 
possessions in his off campus apartment. His family would never hear from him again. 
In the weeks that followed, Tripathi’s family used local news media and social media in a 
desperate attempt to find the missing student. In fact, as a way to crowdsource the search, the 
family created a Facebook page dedicated to their search. The page – still live under the name 
“Help Us Find Sunil Tripathi” – was a monument of sorts to the young man’s life, an outpouring 
of love in the form of pictures and notes of devotion and grief from his mother and sister and 
other loved ones and friends. There, among notes of support from friends and well-wishers, the 
family pleaded for information about the missing man. They received few promisingly leads, 
even as the FBI joined the search. 
Nearly a month later, a strange confluence of mistakes and malice would intertwine this 
desperate family and their unspeakable tragedy with a national one. Within hours of the Boston 
Marathon bombings, while some social media users offered help to displaced runners and 
tourists, other users began to sift through the scores of pictures, videos, and firsthand accounts of 
the bombings that appeared on Twitter, Facebook, 4Chan, Reddit, and other online meeting 
spaces; of particular interest to these digital communities was the finish line feed and the hours 
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upon hours of amateur video uploaded to social media sites including Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube, which provided real time footage of the lead up to and aftermath of the explosions. 
Amateur investigators also paid close attention to the police scanner, which provided insight into 
law enforcement responses to the tragedy. This amateur sleuthing wasn’t new, especially on 
Reddit. After the deadly Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting in 2012, Redditors began 
linking to the Facebook page of Ryan Lanza, who unfortunately shared a last name with shooter 
Adam Lanza. As they did in the case of Sunil Tripathi, Redditors eventually corrected their 
mistakes and deleted the erroneous information, but for Lanza – as for the Tripathi family – 
significant damage had already been done. 
In the Tripathi case, it was more than a month after Sunil vanished and three days after 
the tragic events at the Marathon finish line when his heartbreaking disappearance intersected 
with a digital hunt for clues about the identity of the bombers. On Wednesday, April 19, one 
forum dedicated to crowdsourcing the manhunt began to garner national attention. Alongside 
forums on 4Chan and numerous blogs, the subreddit /r/findbostonbombers fueled speculation 
about the identity and whereabouts of bombing suspects. From “blue robe guy,” a bearded man 
carrying a black backpack who appeared in numerous photographs snapped in the hours before 
the bombs detonated, to an unlucky eBay user who purchased two pressure cookers not long 
before the bombing, Reddit users speculated wildly about the identity of the bombers based on 
little actual evidence. Not long after Reddit user oops777 initiated the /r/findbostonbombers 
forum, speculation landed squarely on Tripathi. What happened to Tripathi (and to other 
innocent men, including Mike Mulugeta) is called, in internet parlance, “doxing,” posting 
personal information about someone in the news. The wild speculation about Tripathi and the 
release of his family’s address, telephone number, and other personal information led to hours of 
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harassment before the FBI publically released the names of the actual suspects. By then, though, 
the damage had been done. Erik Martin, Reddit’s General Manager, apologized to the family:  
When the stakes are high we must strive to show good judgment and solidarity…We 
have apologized privately to the family of missing college student Sunil Tripathi, as have 
various users and moderators. We want to take this opportunity to apologize publicly for 
the pain they have had to endure. We hope that this painful event will be channeled into 
something positive and the increased awareness will lead to Sunil’s quick and safe return 
home. 
Unfortunately, Tripathi would never return home. On April 23, 2013, Sunil’s body was found in 
the waters off India Point Park in Providence. He’d died of an apparent suicide, likely on the 
same night he disappeared.  
Though tragic, the outpouring of harassment, like the outpouring of support offered 
through #BostonHelp, offers important insight into the role that networks – not just individuals – 
play in the performance of agentive and meaningful acts. The harassment of the Tripathi family 
also illuminates a particularly vexing question about distributed agency: if no one human 
generates a particular agentive act, if, as I argued in Chapters Three and Four, agency is 
distributed across a network of humans and lively, vital nonhumans and if agency is the product 
not necessarily of human intention but of confluence and Kairos, then how do we hold actors 
accountable for the consequences of their agentive work? To answer that question – along with 
questions about the power of spaces like Reddit – this chapter will discuss the history of Reddit, 
the emergence of Tripathi as a suspect, his eventual exoneration, and the possibility that humans 
and nonhumans can all be held accountable for the consequences of the agency of the networks 
they inhabit. 
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A Brief Primer on Reddit 
Founded in 2005 by recent University of Virginia graduates Steve Huffman and Alexis 
Ohanian, for much of its history, Reddit billed itself as an aggregator – but not an arbiter – for 
user generated content. Instead, Reddit positioned itself (and still does to some extent) as 
“content agnostic.” Reddit’s corporate ethos is decidedly libertarian: users are expected to police 
themselves and each other; the role of the organization, then, is to enable participation and 
creation not to constrain it, except (perhaps) in the direst of circumstances.  
On Reddit, users, not paid writers, editors, or administrators, find/create and manage the 
site’s many subreddits – message boards organized around shared interests, questions, events, 
etc. Topics for subreddits (marked by “/r/”) range from horrifying (like /r/creepshots, where 
users posted sexualized – though not explicit – pictures of women taken without their 
knowledge) to humorous (like /r/adviceanimals, where members create and post “advice animal” 
memes, a particular strain of meme-making that features a picture of an animal or animals and 
three lines of text that represent a particular “stock character” and connects to some facet of the 
poster’s life) to informative (like /r/worldnews, which features links to the news stories from 
around the world). In order to manage such a variety – both in terms of topic and quality – of 
content, Reddit utilizes two main systems by which users reward “good” content and discourage 
the “bad.” First, Reddit operates on a scoring system for individual posts: any registered user 
who wishes to can “upvote” a post they like or find valuable and “downvote” a post they dislike, 
find objectionable, etc. The higher a post’s score (the upvotes minus the downvotes), the more 
likely a post is to show up on Reddit’s homepage, which can provide invaluable publicity for a 
post and its author. Reddit also operates on a “Karma” system based on “how much good the 
user has done for the reddit community” (“Frequently Asked Questions”). Most Karma is earned 
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from posting content that receives more upvotes than downvotes and by participating 
(moderating, volunteering, etc.) in the Reddit community.  
Reddit’s emphasis on participation and cooperation and their decision to position users as 
the ultimate authority regarding the site’s content makes Reddit more than simply a space for 
affinity groups to share funny pictures or discuss current events. Instead, Reddit’s community 
operates a bit like a liberal democracy with moderators and users voting on decisions about site 
policies and content. Alongside this civic governing model, Redditors have their own kind of 
ethos, and the community has official standards of behavior – some of which are articulated as 
subreddit specific rules but most of which are housed in the canonical “Reddiquette” document. 
Reddiquette begins with respect for other users: “Remember the human. When you communicate 
online, all you see is a computer screen. When talking to someone you might want to ask 
yourself ‘Would I say it to the person's face?’ or ‘Would I get jumped if I said this to a buddy?’” 
The document also reminds users to vote and comment, especially on the “New Submissions 
Page.” These community standards, then, are meant to encourage a kind of Reddit-centered civic 
participation.  As Farhad Manjoo of Slate notes, the rules – and the fervor with which Redditors 
enforce the rules – have created a “real, vibrant community, one of the few big websites where 
the users have constructed an unmistakable moral and political philosophy.” The Reddiquette 
rules reveal something else, too: the emphasis on being a good citizen is limited almost 
exclusively to being a good citizen on Reddit. All twenty-two “dos” pertain to respecting other 
Redditors and the content they create or curate. Though discussions of how to treat those offsite 
and those who may be the subject of a post show up on the document – Reddiquette directly 
addresses sharing personal information – these discussions are far outweighed by the document’s 
focus on being a good Reddit-zen.  
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This lack of concern for the subjects of posts/pictures on Reddit is reflected in the 
conduct of one of Reddit’s most notorious authors: Violentacrez. Violentacrez – whose real 
name we now know is Michael Brutsch –  was the progenitor of many of Reddit’s most offensive 
subreddits, including the aforementioned /r/creepshots as well as /r/beatingwomen – where users 
posted images of battered women – and /r/jailbait – which featured pictures sexualized though 
not explicit pictures of underage girls. Despite the horrifying content of the subreddits he 
managed, Brutsch was well-known and widely beloved on the site. His standing on Reddit had 
much to do with his reputation as a contributing member of the community; in fact, despite the 
horrifying nature of his contributions, site administrators believed he was doing as much good as 
bad for the site:  
Violentacrez’s privileged position came from the fact that for years he had helped 
administrators deal with the massive seedy side of Reddit, acting almost as an unpaid 
staff member. Reddit administrators essentially handed off the oversight of the site's 
NSFW [not safe for work] side to Violentacrez, according to former Reddit lead 
programmer Chris Slowe (a.k.a. Keysersosa)…For all his unpleasantness, they realized 
that Violentacrez was an excellent community moderator and could be counted on to 
keep the administrators abreast of any illegal content he came across. “Once we came to 
terms he was actually pretty helpful. He would come to us with things that we hadn't 
noticed,’ said Slowe. ‘At the time there was only four of us working so that was a great 
resource for us to have’” (Chen). 
Though somewhat startling for outsiders, the alliance between Brutsch and paid staffers fits the 
libertarian, laissez faire philosophy of the site: because Brutsch’s posts weren’t illegal and didn’t 
negatively affect the Reddit community directly, his work in weeding out illegal content made 
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him a valuable member of the community. The human subjects of his posts weren’t part of 
Reddit and therefore weren’t of concern to the site’s administrators, not because Reddit’s staff 
felt any sort of ill-will toward the subjects of the photos displayed in Brutsch’s forums nor 
because they necessarily agreed with his worldview or the content of his posts but because their 
fundamental concern centers on the community itself; the humans of concern in the 
admonishment to “remember the human” are the humans that participate in the Reddit 
community.  
Of course, Brutsch’s forums are far from the only problematic ones on Reddit. More 
recently, Reddit forums played host to photos from “The Fappening,” the moniker ascribed to the 
huge (and hugely illegal) hacking and posting of nude celebrity photographs from Apple iCloud 
accounts. Unlike Brutsch’s content, these photos represented illegal activity and were almost 
immediately deleted from the site. In responding to questions about the differences between 
Reddit’s response to the Tripathi debacle, /r/jailbait, and the forums that hosted these hacked 
photos, CEO Yishin Wong, offered valuable insight into what he sees as the primary purpose of 
the Reddit community: “We consider ourselves not just a company running a website where one 
can post links and discuss them, but the government of a new type of community. The role and 
responsibility of a government differs from that of a private corporation, in that it exercises 
restraint in the usage of its powers” (Jeong). Reddit, Wong claimed, is not simply a space; it’s a 
digital nation-state run by redditors, one governed by the philosophy and guidance of Reddit’s 
founders, moderators, and employees. Though seemingly grandiose, Wong’s claim resonates 
with how many users experience the web. Writing for Forbes, Sarah Jeong argues that “the web 
is increasingly experienced through a handful of centralized platforms, and the rules those 
centralized platforms impose are non-trivial to public life and community.” The rules established 
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by Reddit, the choices made about what to allow, what to delete, and whose voices to amplify 
and silence have real consequences for those users, for the web more generally, and for the ways 
that agency develops in these spaces.  
Tripathi’s Name Goes Viral 
Reddit’s tangible effect on those outside the space was, of course, obvious in the 
aftermath of the misidentification of Sunil Tripathi, when Reddit’s massive power combined 
with little to no editorial oversight led to a harrowing experience for an already grieving family. 
A few days into the massive manhunt for the Boston Bombing suspects, speculation began that 
one of the grainy photos of the suspects looked like the missing student. On Reddit, the 
speculation ran rampant: using the headshot profile picture from the Facebook page set up by his 
family to find him, Redditor AuDBallBag asserted, “I'm having a hard time unseeing [the 
resemblance] when I look at this profile pic on the facebook page and then the profile pics of the 
suspect. Also, in the face-on photo with the suspect on a phone, the features seem to fit.” 
Redditors’ speculation about Tripathi’s involvement was bolstered by tweets from a high school 
acquaintance, Kim Mattioli known on Twitter as @kmattio, who posted a side by side 
comparison photo of Tripathi and the first grainy photo of the “Suspect #2” and concluded that “I 
don’t think his disappearance and the FBI/his family’s inability to find him is a coincidence. 
Let’s say that.” Over the course of an hour, Mattioli exchanged more than three dozen tweets 
with a dozen other users defending her identification. Back on Reddit, those that cautioned that 
naming Tripathi and offering wild speculation without evidence might be ethically problematic 
were met with outrage: “Get off your high horses. His name and information is now being 
discussed on hundreds of websites. Your high and mighty, misguided moral fiber doesn't carry 
any weight. This is a news site (among other things) and this is FUCKING NEWS.” 
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The connection also seemed to be supported by tweeted transcripts of Boston Police 
scanner chatter. Around 2:40 am, a Redditor and Twitter user, Greg Hughes, claimed to hear 
Tripathi’s name – along with the name Mike Mulugeta – over the Boston Police scanner. When 
pressed for the source of his information, Hughes pointed to the police scanner frequency (which 
many were livestreaming through the site Broadcastify) and the Reddit transcript of the scanner. 
There was only one problem: though the name Mulugeta had indeed been mentioned by Boston 
Police, Tripathi’s name appears nowhere in the transcript nor in the recording from that night; 
Boston Police and FBI would later confirm that Tripathi had never been a suspect in the 
bombings. Despite the fact that law enforcement never mentioned Tripathi’s name, Hughes tweet 
(“BPD has identified the names: Suspect 1: Mike Mulugeta. Suspect 2: Sunil Tripathi.”) served 
as the basis for the nightmare the Tripathi family was about to endure. Writing for the Atlantic a 
few days after the manhunt ended, Alexis Madrigal described the aftermath of Hughes’ claim 
like this:  
There was a full-on frenzy as thousands upon thousands of tweets poured out, many 
celebrating new media’s victory in trouncing old media. It was all so shockingly new and 
the pitch was so high and it was so late at night on one of the craziest days in memory. 
That Redditors might have identified the bomber hours before anyone but law 
enforcement seemed like amazing redemption for people who’d supported Reddit’s 
crowdsourcing efforts.  
This congratulatory tone – combined with the smug certainty in the face of questions about the 
ethics of sharing unverified information about potential suspects and fueled by increasing 
speculation on Twitter and Reddit – produced an avalanche of nasty messages on the Facebook 
page the family set up as part of their search for Tripathi.  The misidentification of Tripathi in 
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these digital spaces also had real-life consequences for the family after someone posted personal 
contact information, including their addresses and private phone. Though the personal contact 
information was quickly deleted from Reddit – and in fact, Reddit denies that personal phone 
numbers were posted in the /r/findbostonbombers thread – links to the Tripathi’s Facebook page 
remained on Reddit even after the /r/findbostonbombers thread itself was removed from the site.  
In the wake of the devastating misinformation about Tripathi, Erik Martin defended the 
intentions of the /r/findbostonbombers group, but he acknowledged that things had somehow 
gone terribly wrong: “though started with noble intentions, some of the activity on Reddit fueled 
online witch hunts and dangerous speculation which spiraled into very negative consequences for 
innocent parties.” Though Twitter users – especially @kmattio and those that reported hearing 
Tripathi’s name on the police scanner – had a hand in this terrible case of mistaken identity, it 
was Reddit where the real damage was done. Unencumbered by the 140 character limit of 
Twitter and bolstered by a growing sense of righteous anger at the terrible events at the finish 
line of the Boston Marathon, Redditors unleashed a torrent of anger and vileness on Tripathi and 
his family. What is it about Reddit, though, that makes such practices possible and – up to this 
point – seemingly permissible? As Will Oremus, a senior technology writer at Slate, argues 
regarding the role of Reddit and Twitter in the misidentification of Sunil Tripathi as a suspect in 
the Boston Marathon bombings, “the truth is that the platform does matter. From Twitter’s 140 
characters to Reddit’s upvote system to cable news’ relentless pressure to fill airtime, the 
medium shapes the message.” The answer to the questions about the role and culpability of this 
nonhuman – the space itself – seemingly governed by human actors has ramifications for our 
assertions about responsibility.23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 As Marilyn Cooper noted in her discussion of Latour’s vision of an agency that includes a more robust role for 
nonhumans, the most pressing question facing those who would advocate a distributed sense of agency and cause 
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Reddit and the Tripathi Family 
The “witch hunt” to which Martin referred in his statement produced tangible 
consequences for Tripathi’s family: according to a spokesperson for the family, in early morning 
hours of April 19th, as speculation ran rampant of Facebook and Twitter that Sunil was one of 
those responsible for the horrific events at the Boston Marathon finish line a few days earlier, 
they received threatening emails via information shared (though quickly deleted) on Reddit and 
4Chan as well as hateful messages posted to family’s public Facebook page. The harassment 
reached such a point, in fact, that the family took the page down, a decision that seemed to 
increase speculation about Sunil’s guilt.24 Further, between 3 and 4:15 am, Sunil’s sister Sanjeeta 
received 58 voice messages, many from journalists asking for her reaction to her brother’s status 
as a suspect; the family also woke up to more than a dozen news vans parked on their street and 
in front of their house. When interviewed days after Sunil’s name was cleared by the FBI, 
Sanjeeta said that the family never believed Sunil played any role in the bombings but the 
onslaught of hateful missives was devastating. Though she appreciated Martin’s apology, she 
said, “The costs to somebody who is in a fragile state are immense and not undone by a casual 
apology” (Kang).   
Reddit, Electracy, and Distributed Agency 
I pause here, then, after articulating the tangible harm created by this strange confluence 
of events and users to call attention to the power of these digital spaces. This powerful network 
of humans and nonhumans represents a particularly potent example of the kind of agentive 
technological network discussed by Latour and others. For my purposes here, the work of 
Gregory Ulmer seems particularly prescient. Ulmer’s work on electracy – his term of the new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and effect is who and how to hold actors responsible when we can no longer claim one rhetor as the sole author of 
an agentive act. 
24 BuzzFeed’s Erik Malinowski tweeted about the “missing” Facebook page and speculated that the removal of the 
page indicated Tripathi must indeed be a suspect.  
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epoch typified by electronic communication and digital identity – identifies digital technologies 
and spaces as co-equal participants in the creation of our new digitally centered world. As Marc 
Santos, et al. argue in their article on Ulmer’s mystory genre, “For Ulmer, communicative 
technologies are not merely tools we use, but powerful ideological agents that influence (though 
not necessarily determine) who we are, shaping our identities, desires, and the horizons of what 
we consider possible.” Ulmer’s electracy encompasses not just a new way of gathering 
information, but a new way of thinking, one that supplements the logocentric focus of literacy to 
create a more robust decision-making apparatus: “Electronic thinking does not abandon, exclude, 
or replace analytic thinking; it puts it in its place in a larger system of reasoning” (Ulmer, 1989, 
66). This larger system, then, includes relationships with others – both humans and nonhumans – 
to the extent that “for Ulmer, there is no sense of a self apart from others. There is no self 
uninhibited from the influence of networks” (Santos, et al.). Networks then become the primary 
vehicle for agentive action because human and nonhuman alike are created in concert with the 
networks to which they belong. It is the process of making and unmaking networks – of, to use 
Latour’s vocabulary, enrolling and un-enrolling participants – that creates the conditions for 
agency.  
This emphasis on agency as an event closely mirrors Carolyn Miller’s argument in “What 
Can Automation Tell Us about Agency?” In that piece, as I noted in Chapter Two, Miller argues 
that agency is a product of an event as opposed to a possession of the rhetor or audience. 
Agency, Miller, notes is of particular importance to rhetoric because of its connection to political 
change. This insistence on personal agency to produce political change also creates a “metonymy 
between agent and agency” (144). However, the death of the Enlightenment subject and the rise 
of the fractured postmodern subject (Bizzell; Faigley) reveals the problematic nature of this 
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metonymic assumption. Instead of being a possession, then, Miller argues that agency is a 
product (though perhaps an illusory product) of interactions between rhetor and audience:  
Agency thus could not exist prior to or as a result of the evanescent act. Our talk about 
agency has tended to essentialize the temporal, condensing into a property or possession 
of the hypostatized agent what more productively should remain temporalized in the act 
or performance. As the kinetic energy of performance, agency resolves its doubleness, 
positioned exactly between the agent’s capacity and the effect on an audience (147). 
This insistence on rhetorical agency as performative emphasizes the relational nature of 
rhetorical agency. As Miller argues, “performance requires a relationship,” revealing that 
“interaction is necessary for agency” (149). Miller reminds us, however, that this argument is not 
a new one: Karlyn Kohrs Campbell locates a similar argument – that agency is “communal, 
social, cooperative, participatory” (5) – in ancient Greek rhetorical and civic practice. Miller also 
points to John Louis Lucaites and Celeste Michelle Condit’s 1999 textbook/reader on 
contemporary rhetorical theory, in which they remind the reader that rhetorical agency has 
always been “bound in relationship” between rhetor and audience (612). 
 This final argument – that agency requires relationships – lines up with Marilyn Cooper’s 
argument in “Rhetorical Agency as Emergent and Enacted,” which have previously examined in 
Chapters Two and Three. In Chapter Three in particular, I noted that Cooper argues for a kind of 
relational and distributed agency. More specifically, Cooper relies on the work of Bruno Latour 
to argue that  
neither conscious intention nor free will—at least as we commonly think of them—is 
involved in acting or bringing about change: though the world changes in response to 
individual action, agents are very often not aware of their intentions, they do not directly 
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cause changes, and the choices they make are not free from influence from their 
inheritance, past experiences, or their surround. (421) 
In Chapter Three, I focused largely on Cooper’s emphasis on embodiment and independence, 
which I argue are not part of Latour’s discussion of networked action and agency. Here, 
however, I’d like to emphasize Cooper’s discussion of process and reciprocity. Despite her 
insistence on independent agents, Cooper also argues that change is a result of interactions 
between rhetors and other human and nonhuman participants: “order (and change) results from 
an ongoing process in which a multitude of agents interact frequently and in which the results of 
interactions feed back into the process” (421). Furthermore, she notes that agency is always 
“responsive” (422) and that it “function[s] as part of the systems in which [it] originate[s]” (421). 
These systems – as well as the kind of circular causation that characterizes such complex 
systems – exist in a state of “ongoing perturbation and response” (437). 
Placing these two arguments side-by-side reveals significant overlap between Miller’s 
and Cooper’s arguments. However, Cooper notes one important distinction: while Miller 
recognizes agency as a disembodied property of the interaction between rhetor and audience, 
Cooper insists upon an independent, embodied  rhetor who can be held responsible for the 
consequences of his or her actions: “In contrast [to Miller’s argument that agency is analogous to 
kinetic energy], I argue that deeds are always done by someone, and replacing the doer of the 
action, the agent, with an amorphous force like kinetic energy leaves us with no basis for 
assigning responsibility for actions” (438). Cooper’s primary concern here, as it is throughout 
her essay, is ensuring that theories of rhetorical agency attend to the question of responsibility. 
Cooper’s Critique of Distributed Agency 
 In fact, Cooper’s preoccupation with responsibility is, I would argue, her primary point of 
departure from Latour’s more sweeping revision to agency: for Latour, all action occurs via 
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networks of humans and nonhumans. Latour doesn’t offer his readers a way to identify a singular 
responsible member of the network; instead, the network itself is the entity with the power to 
create change. Cooper, however, argues that it is not enough to hold a network accountable; we 
must be able to hold an individual human accountable. Cooper relies heavily on work by 
neuroscientist Walter Freeman to make this argument. Of particular importance, Cooper says, is 
crafting a theory of agency that recognizes that we “experience ourselves as causal agents.” 
Freemans work further emphasizes that “the attribution of causal agency by humans to other 
humans is essential for social organization and control, because it is the basis for assigning 
responsibility, with credit and reward or blame and punishment, individually and collectively” 
(430). Responsible agents, then, are those who are capable of recognizing the agentive potential 
in the others they encounter:  
Recognition of an other as someone capable of agency, someone capable of making a 
difference, is important in persuasion, but rather than creating agency, it is how a rhetor 
becomes responsible, how a rhetor enables real persuasion. Agency is inescapable: 
rhetors are agents by virtue of their addressing an audience. They become responsible 
rhetors by recognizing the audience not only as agents, but as concrete others who have 
opinions and beliefs grounded in the experiences and perceptions and meanings 
constructed in their brains (Cooper 442). 
This sense of responsibility and agency is undeniably human. Cooper urges us to recognize the 
potential for agency in other humans and, in doing so, become more responsible rhetors 
ourselves. I would agree with Cooper here: we must recognize the agentive potential of the other 
members of our networks. I would not, however, restrict this recognition to humans; instead, as I 
note in Chapter Two and as I will argue in the remaining pages of this chapter, I wish to use the 
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misidentification of Sunil Tripathi as a case study in how we might recognize the potential in 
both human and nonhuman participants and discuss how human and nonhuman members of this 
agentive network were held accountable.  
Holding Humans Accountable 
 Cooper’s argument about the need for human accountability is compelling, and in the 
case of the misidentification of Tripathi as one of the Boston Marathon bombing suspects, there 
are certainly humans who are culpable for the damage done to the Tripathi family. Among the 
most high profile of these might be Reddit General Manager Erik Martin. As the Verge noted 
after Martin’s departure in October 2014, Martin’s primary role was as spokesperson for the site, 
not just for “Reddit as a forum, but for Reddit as a freewheeling intentional community” 
(Robertson). Martin’s role as spokesperson placed him firmly in the crosshairs of criticism 
regarding Reddit’s role in the Tripathi family’s harassment, and in response to pressure from 
those in the national news media, Martin eventually apologized: “We want to take this 
opportunity to apologize publicly for the pain they have had to endure. We hope that this painful 
event will be channeled into something positive and the increased awareness will lead to Sunil's 
quick and safe return home.” As noted earlier, however, Sunil would never return home. 
Martin’s apology, though, follows the expected script for human accountability: as a participant 
in agentive action with negative consequences, other members of the wider community – in this 
case members of the national new media – pressured Martin to admit wrong doing and provide 
some sort of promised change in behavior.  
We see a similar pattern in the case of the oops777, the user who created 
/r/findbostonbomber. For oops777, it was the Reddit community itself to which he was forced to 
answer: on April 22, 2013, just days after the disastrous accusations against Tripathi appeared on 
Reddit, oops777 hosted an AMA – Ask Me Anything. On Reddit, the AMA is a particularly 
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important part of the site’s ethos and history. On forums like /r/AMA and /r/IAmA, regular users 
and celebrities alike create threads in which other users can – as the name implies – ask them 
anything. Notable AMAs include those from President Barack Obama, Bill Gates, and Louis 
C.K. While these AMAs usually focus on the notable accomplishments of the original poster 
(OP), oops777’s AMA experience was quite different: dozens of users took the opportunity to 
question oops777’s motives and decision making. Though some posters were obviously trolling 
oops777 (that is, using the forum to make deliberately offensive or provocative comments in 
order to provoke a reaction), others seemed genuinely dismayed: “Why, after it was proven time 
and again that /r/findbostonbombers was a magnet for false accusations and cyberstalking didn't 
you close the subreddit?” (thirtydegrees). Whatever their motives, however, the users who 
challenged oops777 in the AMA were using the tools of the Reddit community to hold a fellow 
Redditor accountable for his role in the harassment of the Tripathi family.  
Reddit users’ focus on Tripathi – amplified by users on oops777’s /r/findbostonbombers 
forum – found support for their claims from a user of a different social media site. Over on 
Twitter, among the most frequently cited sources of claims and confirmations about Tripathi’s 
involvement in the bombings was Kami Mattioli, a high school classmate of Sunil’s. Though she 
hadn’t seen Tripathi in at least three years, Mattioli openly speculated that he bore a striking 
resemblance to suspect #2; Mattioli went so far as to post a photo collage that included pictures 
from the family’s Facebook page on Sunil’s disappearance alongside pictures of the suspects 
released by the FBI. Mattioli’s speculation turned out to be misguided if not malevolent, and 
other users told her so: on each of her tweets regarding Sunil’s possible involvement in the 
bombings, other users (some of whom seemed to know Mattioli personally and some who 
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appeared to only know her via social media) cautioned restraint and encouraged her to contact 
the FBI directly if she believed she had pertinent information.  
Though this feedback didn’t necessarily alter Mattioli’s behavior – she continued to 
defend her assertions and let other users know she “hope[d]…to be wrong” about Sunil’s 
involvement – the feedback she received from other users makes clear that the Twitter 
community held her responsible for the information she was sharing. Eventually – about twelve 
hours after posting her belief that suspect #2 might be Tripathi and thirty minutes after the FBI 
confirmed that suspect #2 was, in fact, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev – Mattioli took to Twitter to 
apologize: “I want to issue a formal & public apology to the Tripathi family for any undue stress 
my Tweet about possible resemblance may have caused.” Still, the Twitter community was not 
so forgiving. Though some users replied with support and justifications for Mattioli’s tweets, 
others, especially Jodhbir Sachdeva, a management consultant with strong ties to the Indian 
community in the Northeast, pushed Mattioli and those who supported her to understand the 
damage she’d done: “Maligning someone on twitter as a terrorist instead of going to the police is 
pretty wrong... But you do realize such irresponsible behavior would have brought immense pain 
to an already suffering family?” This sort of feedback and conversation represents the primary 
way that responsibility and reflection happen: via users holding other users accountable for the 
consequences of their actions. 
Lessons from the Challenger Disaster: Nonhuman Responsibility 
Human accountability in case of Tripathi’s misidentification took expected forms: media 
and community pressure to apologize to those harmed. But how might the space itself be held 
accountable? After all, representatives of the site – General Manager Erik Martin and forum 
creator oops777 – were held accountable for their actions. Isn’t that enough? In what follows, I 
will argue that holding human participants is not enough. Instead, a more complete picture of 
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responsibility includes both the human and nonhuman – in this case Reddit itself. In the case of 
nonhuman spaces, technologies, etc., responsibility takes the form of redesign. 
Perhaps the easiest way to understand nonhuman accountability is to examine another 
disaster that involves humans and technology: the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger. 
Challenger has long served as one of primary cases supporting the need for technical 
communication and rhetoric of science research and practice (Dombrowski; Jabs; Christine 
Miller; Moore; Winsor). In “When Politeness is Fatal: Technical Communication and the 
Challenger Accident,” Patrick Moore reviews the numerous communication failures that led to 
the tragic decision to launch Challenger. Moore – like many in technical communication scholars 
who have written about the Challenger disaster – focuses specifically on the communication 
breakdowns that characterize the decision to launch despite the engineers’ warnings about 
potentially catastrophic equipment failure. Specifically, Moore argues that a misplaced sense of 
politeness resulted in miscommunication that was “blurred and muffled” by fear and outside 
political pressures. Like Moore, Dombrowski (1995) sees problematic – even unethical – 
communication practices at the center of the disaster and argues that neither additional data nor 
advances in technology could have prevented the disaster; rather, he says, that the failure to 
prevent the launch was ultimately an ethical one and that, in order to prevent future tragedies, 
ethical choices should be foregrounded and “deliberated among people in an interminate way” 
(146). 
 Despite this emphasis on the role of communication in the Challenger disaster, these 
authors also acknowledge that the human breakdown exacerbated a material one. As Moore 
notes, “O-rings, low temperatures, and managers who ignored the warnings of engineers were 
key contributors to the disaster” (Moore, 270). Similarly, Dorothy Winsor, in her argument that 
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questions about miscommunication between engineers and decision makers had been – to that 
point – insufficiently nuanced, suggests that the disaster can be attributed both to the “O-rings’ 
flaws…[and the] evidence which clearly demonstrated the flaws” as well as to communication 
about those flaws (8). 
Like these authors, the Rogers Commission Report, the product of months of 
Congressional inquiry, discusses both human and material causes for the disaster. In fact, the 
Commission recommended procedural, technical, and communicative changes to NASA’s 
launch procedures. Most recommendations, in fact, are a hybrid of at least two of these; that is to 
say, most of the committee’s recommendations have both a material and rhetorical component. 
Consider, for example, the recommendation that “NASA should consider reinstating full X-ray 
inspection of the propellant and insulation for all motors used on succeeding flights… [and] in 
conjunction with the appropriate contractors, should investigate the development of new, more 
accurate inspection techniques” (18). In order to address the potential for undetected leaks, the 
commission recommends a procedural fix (the reimplementation of x-ray inspections) with 
rhetorical and material dimensions and a technical/communicative one (consulting with 
contractors and developing a better way of inspecting the propellant and insulation). The 
Commission also suggests other hybrid – that is both material and rhetorically constructed – 
recommendations, including designating “the manufacture of critical items, such as the O-rings” 
as ‘critical’ processes,” a semantic shift that signifies a change to the material process by which 
those items are made (18). 
Reddit’s Rules Changes 
Like the Rogers Commission’s hybrid recommendations, Reddit’s revisions to their site 
policies and governing philosophy following the tragic misidentification of Tripathi involve 
changes both to human behavior and technological capacity. Despite pronouncements throughout 
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the scandal surrounding Violentacrez and his /r/creepshots and /r/jailbait forums that the site 
remained committed to their libertarian approach to content, in the weeks and months following 
the misidentification of Tripathi, Reddit signaled it was ready move beyond its content agnostic 
position to a more interventionist one. This new governing philosophy can be seen most easily in 
the site administrators’ responses to a subsequent tragedy: the nearly immediate deletion of 
/r/findnavyyardshooters, a crowdsourced search for the perpetrators of the September 2013 
shooting at the Naval Sea Systems command inside the Washington Naval Yard. About five 
hours after the deadly shooting that killed thirteen including the shooter and injured eight more, 
it looked like Reddit was about to wade back into the treacherous waters surrounding a 
crowdsourced manhunt: between 1:00 and 1:15 pm EST, Redditor uglyredditors created the 
/r/findnavyyardshooters and included just one subreddit specific rule: “no personal information 
about leads unless you are really sure.” By 3:15 EST, though, the subreddit had been deleted. 
According to Erik Martin, administrators deleted the forum because “it violated site rules by 
encouraging the posting of personal information. The quote from the side bar that subreddit that 
was banned said ‘no personal information about leads unless you are really sure.’ We do not 
allow the posting of personal information under any circumstances.” News outlet covering the 
deletion – including the Washington Post, Huffington Post, and technologically oriented 
Mashable – noted that the deletion seemed to be a direct implementation of Reddit’s promised 
reforms following the Tripathi ordeal.  
Conclusion: Networked Responsibility 
Despite the distribution of agency and responsibility across all members of the agentive 
network, human responsibility remains integral to human and nonhuman agency. The argument 
that redesign represents a way of holding nonhuman participants accountable for the part in these 
disasters (Challenger, the misidentification of Tripathi) actually strengthens human 
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responsibility: as I noted at the end of the last section, Reddit’s rules changes and redesigns are 
the result of human intervention. The nonhumans, in Reddit’s case at least, are held accountable 
by human designers and moderators who recognized the destructive power of the space and 
intervened. The redesign of the site, however, did not prevent human members of the agentive 
network from being held accountable by those inside and outside the Reddit community: General 
Manager Erik Martin, forum creator oops777, and Tripathi classmate Kami Mattioli are all held 
accountable by various communities to which they belong and/or must respond. In the case of 
Sunil Tripathi, then, all members of the network can be held accountable without diluting the 
responsibility of any of the actors. Humans and nonhumans alike changed their behavior as a 
way to take responsibility for the harm caused to the Tripathi family.  
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Afterword: Why New Materialism, Why Agency, Why Now 
 
“We tell the humanists that the more nonhumans share existence with humans, the more humane 
a collective is” – Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope25 
 
Jane Bennett argues that illusions of mastery lead to the casual destruction of the planet. 
Human mastery and notions of human exceptionalism and autonomous agency allow us to blame 
those who do not succeed for their lack. For too many advocates of this kind of independence 
and autonomy, it’s not that there are powerful, as yet unaccounted for networks of humans and 
nonhumans that reinforce and strengthen existing structures of power. It’s not that systems, laws, 
technologies, corporations, even educational institutions, are complex systems with histories and 
inheritances that influence – even determine – outcomes. It’s that a single individual must be 
responsible for her/his success or lack of success. Bootstraps and all that. What the new 
materialists offer us is something quite different. Instead of pinning success on a single human 
actor, new materialists sketch a world in which nonhumans and humans must works together, 
must recruit allies and persuade advocates in order to affect change.  
I don’t advocate a new materialist position in this project simply for theories’ sake. The 
theory itself is intricate and important, but it is not an end in and of itself. Rather, like Latour, 
like Bennett, I offer a new materialist reading of this complex situation precisely because such an 
approach makes my understanding of the aftermath all the more human.  And hopefully all the 
more humane. Such a reading of the social media aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombings 
multiples the bodies and hybrids that I must account for and answer to. There is no lone cause for 
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  Page	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the good – the material support, the shared resources, the care and comfort for victims and fellow 
citizens – or the bad – the irreparable, unimaginable pain caused to an already grieving family or 
the hate directed at those already judged for the color of their skin or religious affiliation. 
Instead, the good and the bad are products of overlapping networks of humans and nonhumans. 
The network must be held responsible for these outcomes, and in order to do that kind of work, 
we must slowly, carefully trace the connections.  
The forensic and political work required to shift our focus from single, human, actor-
heroes to complex systems is immense. It‘s messy. But it is also an advantageous shift, for if we 
are successful in more fully accounting for the networks that create change, we might, first, 
better understand the kinds of small and systematic changes that might actual matter to others 
lived experience. We might also begin to represent – rhetorically and politically – the causes of 
complex social problems. We might begin to talk about, finally, in concrete ways, the 
inequalities built into our systems. If we can – if only in momentary, provisional ways – escape 
the fiction of the independent, self-made citizen, if we can begin to multiply responsibilities so 
that poverty and disadvantage are no longer products of (a lack of) personal responsibility but are 
instead social products of shared responsibilities, perhaps we can also change the political 
conversations about who and how to help the poorest among us. 
Latour exhorts the staunch humanist to see that the addition of multitudes of lively 
nonhumans makes our collectives more human and more humane. Indeed, the addition of 
nonhumans forces us to recognize our weddedness to them and to each other. It forces us to 
acknowledge our dependence on one another. Only then, perhaps, might we treat those 
nonhumans – the animals, the technologies, the microbes, the ideas – with some care. Only then, 
perhaps, might we treat one another with more care. 
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